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Abstract 
In many respects, the mid-nineteenth century marks the beginning of China’s modern 
history: the Opium War (1839-42) and domestic turbulence compelled Chinese 
statesmen to realise that the old state apparatus was no longer able to cope with the 
changing world. However the pursuit of greater state capacity collided with a feeble 
ability to raise taxes and an ancient monetary system far from being unified. How did 
the government carry out even limited alterations to the monetary system in times of 
urgent fiscal need? And how did the monetary evolution proceed with these partial 
reforms? This thesis focuses on the movement of the Chinese monetary system from a 
traditional metallic system to a modern fiat money system, and discusses three issues 
during different phases of the transition.  
 
The first part re-examines the case of ‘Xianfeng inflation’ (1853-61) when the 
government attempted to issue new monies to resolve the crisis in public finances. It 
points out that under the traditional commodity money system the government had little 
impact on money supply, and that the so-called inflation was an outcome of coinage 
debasement combined with a banking crisis resulting from the debt default. The second 
part focuses on the introduction of modern coinage minted with steam power around the 
1900s, enabling the government to supply credible monies that no longer relied on their 
intrinsic metallic values. It argues that this technological innovation allowed the 
Chinese government for the first time to implement effective monetary manipulation 
and exert an impact on the rural economy. The third part investigates the behaviour of 
money holders during a war. It compares the velocities of paper notes issued in Free 
China and Occupied China during the Second World War (1937-45) and demonstrates 
that the credibility of the monies depends most on people’s expectations about the 
survival of the regime.  
 
The transition from a traditional to a modern currency system is a search for a new 
monetary credibility that had formerly lain within the value of the metal. The evolution 
of the Chinese monetary system illustrates vividly the constant state struggle between 
monetary credibility – via coercion, technology, or legitimacy – and its pocket gain, 
when the fiscal soundness is at stake.   
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Chinese weights 
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For copper cash: 
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1 metropolitan diao = 1,000 metropolitan cash 
 = 500 pieces of standard cash (before 1853) 
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 = $0.3 American dollars 
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Introduction 
 
The century following the First Opium War (1839-42) was perhaps one of the worst of 
times as well as the best of times in the Chinese history. It was a time when the Manchu 
regime suffered from great political turbulence both abroad and at home; it was also a 
time when China was, willingly or not, widely exposed to foreign trade, culture and 
technology at an accelerating speed.  
 
State reforms were needed in order to accommodate the changing environment and new 
challenges. It was in these circumstances that China’s monetary system transformed 
from the traditional metallic system to a modern fiat money system. The course of the 
evolution followed a zigzag pattern, because the reforms were often alterations to, or 
manipulations of, the existing system in order to meet the government’s urgent fiscal 
needs. How was the evolution of the monetary system shaped by the development of the 
state and how did the market react during the process? 
 
This thesis consists of three chapters that fall under the broad banner of early modern 
Chinese monetary history, with a particular focus on the evolution of the monetary 
system influenced by the collapse and formation of state capacity. Each of the chapters 
covers an independent research and together they are interrelated by the theme of the 
monetary evolution within a context of the state formation. The introduction will first 
lay out a succinct illustration of the historical context of the state formation and the 
traditional monetary system; brief sketches of the three main chapters will be provide, 
followed by an outline of the organisation of the thesis.  
 
State and money 
The state: crisis and reform in context  
The mid-19
th
 century undeniably marks the beginnings of modern China: it witnessed 
an ancient empire on the wane and a modern state in formation. From the 1840s and 
1850s the increasingly frequent and violent domestic rebellions tested the state’s fiscal 
and military capacity. With the opening of treaty ports following the ratification of the 
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Treaty of Nanjing, the traditional institutions encountered unprecedented challenges: 
not only were the Chinese authority and its legal institutions confronted within the 
jurisdiction of the treaty ports; the whole country gradually underwent fundamental 
economic changes following the opening of foreign trade and the integration with 
international markets. At the same time, new technologies, new business organisations 
and banking practices and new concepts of socio-political reform were introduced into 
the country.  
 
The conservative Qing government carried out limited reforms in order to cope with the 
changing socio-economic environment. However the reforms were only partial and 
were not carried out quickly enough. The central government remained to be 
undermined and the regional powers continued to strengthen. Decentralisation 
continued after the fall of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911): conflicts among regional 
warlords dominated the first two decades of Republican China (1912-49).
1
 The country 
was unified when the army of the Nationalist Party established the new capital in 
Nanjing, and defeated the Beiyang government in Beijing in 1928. The following 
decade saw a surge of economic and institutional development, and was remembered as 
the ‘Nanjing decade’. However, this period was short and sweet. With acts of Japanese 
military aggression since the early 1930s and the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese 
War, China again fell into segmentation.  
 
Monetary system: unity and diversity 
The history of the Chinese monetary system generally followed a cycle of unity and 
diversity. During the century from the 1850s to the 1940s, the Chinese monetary system 
was transformed from a traditional metallic system to a modern fiat money system. And 
the evolution of the Chinese monetary system after the 1850s mirrored the waves of 
dynastic collapse and modern state formation. 
 
                                                 
1
 The Republican era can be divided into three periods according to the change of legitimate governments: 
the warlord period or Beiyang government (1912-28) with the capital in Beijing; the Nanjing decade or 
Nationalist government (1928-37), the wartime period (the Second World War from 1937 to 1945 and the 
civil war from 1946 to 1949) during which the Nationalist government fled to Chungking in 1937 and 
returned to Nanjing in 1946.  
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Copper cash had been adopted as the common currency in China as early as the third 
century B.C.
2
 The bronze coin standard dominated China for almost ten centuries. With 
the country’s economic development, copper cash alone no longer met the market need 
(for both quantity and convenience as regards long-distance trade), and the currency 
composition diversified. A major change was the wide use of silver ingots. China was 
not a silver producing country but from the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, with the 
development of trade and the influx of foreign silver, the latter became an important 
part of the monetary system.
3
 By the time of the Qing Dynasty the currency system had 
consolidated into a system comprising copper cash and silver. The state monopolized 
the production and supply of copper cash, while silver circulated in bullion form.
4
 
There was no state coinage of silver and the supply of silver depended completely on 
markets and trade.
5
 Copper cash were used in daily exchanges, while silver ingots were 
more often used in long-distance trade or saved as a store of value.
6
 Silver bullion and 
copper cash were loosely linked by an exchange ratio, which was flexible but was 
always maintained at a certain level.
78
  
 
The commodity money system encountered two challenges after the 19
th
 century, one 
from within and one from the outside. First, the monetary system gradually 
decentralised. During the 19
th
 century the price of copper increased, and the minting of 
                                                 
2
 Copper cash (or cash, or standard cash) was a full-bodied bronze coin with a round shape and a square 
hole in the middle. Being full bodied means that copper cash basically circulated according to its intrinsic 
value, despite the fact that they circulated by tale (by counting). Since all copper cash were of only one 
denomination (1 wen), they all counted as units in a total; and the value of copper cash served as the unit 
of account. There was no face value on the bronze coin (since they all carried the same value). Instead, 
the words cast on the coin often indicate the time (name of the Emperor’s reign) and place (name of the 
mint) of issue. Dynasties changed and so did the words inscribed on the cash. However, the use of bronze 
coins lasted throughout (and even beyond) the imperial epoch. Frank H. H. King, Money and Monetary 
Policy in China, 1845-1895(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965), 52. 
3
 Richard Von Glahn, "Myth and Reality of China's Seventeenth-Century Monetary Crisis," The Journal 
of Economic History 56, no. 2 (1996a): 48-9, 113-4. 
4
 Official silver coinage started in 1890 (initiated from Guangdong Province), but silver ingots and 
foreign silver dollars continued to circulate. Throughout the Qing dynasty, silver did not have to be 
coined before it could circulate. Xinwei Peng, A Monetary History of China (Zhong-Guo Huo Bi Shi) 
(Shanghai: People's Press, 1958), 521-51.  
5
 Man-houng Lin, "Latin America Silver and China During the Daoguang Reign," in Asian Historical 
Economics Conference(Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan2012), 15-6. 
6
 Akinobu Kuroda, "Concurrent but Non-Integrable Currency Circuits: Complementary Relationships 
among Monies in Modern China and Other Regions " Financial History Review 15, no. 1 (2008): 19. 
7
 Peng, A Monetary History of China, 566-72. 
8
 Scholars such as Peng and King characterize this system as a ‘parallel bimetallic system’ of which the 
relative values of silver and copper cash ‘were determined by market forces’, ibid., 521. King, Money and 
Monetary Policy in China, 57. 
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full-bodied copper cash incurred a loss, instead of a profit, to the state vault.
9
 In the 
meantime, natural calamities intensified and domestic rebellion escalated, putting  the 
state in serious financial difficulty. Expenditure on the state mints, provincial mints in 
particular, was curtailed; the latter were entirely left to provincial governors’ own 
devices (the provinces funded their own mints, produced coarser coins, or encouraged 
the use of banknotes).
10
 Second, the bimetallic relationship of silver and copper cash 
was destabilized. Following the permanent drop in the price of silver in the international 
market (a result of the demonetization of silver after the 1870s and the discovery of new 
silver deposits in the Rocky Mountains), the exchange ratio between silver and copper 
cash not only permanently dropped, but also became increasingly volatile.
11
 The central 
government did not act, and the provincial governments tried to tackle the issue by 
introducing their own silver and copper coinage minted with steam power techniques. 
This was a fresh attempt to control the number and value of the coins in circulation. 
However, without central coordination and with a common drive for profit, silver dollar 
coinage turned into a game of competitive depreciation and copper coins became 
seriously over-issued.
12
 The regionalisation of the monetary system continued in early 
Republican China. The Beiyang government (1912-28) centralised silver dollar coinage 
and the silver dollar minted by state mints became popular.
13
 Banknotes (issued by 
private Chinese banks and foreign banks
14
) convertible to silver were also widely 
used.
15
 By 1927, however, the currency system was still ‘a complicated mixture of 
                                                 
9
 Hon-wai Ho, "From the Cheap Silver and Copper Famine to the Depreciation of the Copper Coinage - 
the New Currency Issue and Its Consequence in Late Qing (Cong Yin Jian Qian Huang Dao Tong Yuan 
Fan Lan - Qing Mo Xin Huo Bi De Fa Xin Ji Qi Ying Xiang)," Bulletin of the Institute of History and 
Philology Academia Sinica (Zhong Yang Yan Jiu Yuan Li Shi Yu Yan Yan Jiu Suo Ji Kan) 62, no. 3 
(1993): 395. 
10
 Ibid., 393-5. 
11
 The silver price in the London market dropped even more drastically after 1890: from 48.375 pence per 
ounce of silver in 1890 to 27.844 in 1904. "Global Financial Data," (Online historical database). 
12
 Qichao Liang, "Concise History of the Excessive Provincial Copper Coinage (Ge Sheng Lan Zhu Tong 
Yuan Xiao Shi)," in Collected Works of Yinbingshi, with Annotation (Yin Bing Shi Wen Ji: Dian Jiao), ed. 
Song Wu(Kunming: Yunnan Education Press, 2001). 
13
 The dollar minted by the state mint was called ‘Yuan Shikai dollar’, named after the President of the 
Beiyang Government. Akinobu Kuroda, "The Collapse of the Chinese Imperial Monetary System " in 
Japan, China, and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850-1949, ed. Kaoru 
Sugihara(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
14
 Half the banknotes were issued by foreign banks. Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth in Prewar 
China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 134-5.  
15
 Debin Ma, "Money and Monetary System in China in the 19th-20th Century: An Overview " Economic 
History Working Paper Series, London School of Economics 159/12(2012): 14. 
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silver coins and weights, fluctuating copper coins and paper money, all varying from 
place to place’.16  
 
In 1928, when the Nationalist Government in Nanjing became the legitimate central 
government in China, steps to reforming the monetary system were hastened. The 
Central Bank of China was established in Nanjing in 1928 and a supervision committee 
was set up to ensure that banks maintained adequate reserves behind their note issues. 
In 1933, the tael was abolished and the silver dollar became the exclusive unit of 
account. In 1935, China abandoned its traditional silver standard and adopted a 
managed currency system. The new Chinese dollar (CHD), also called the Nationalist 
Yuan or fabi,
17
 became the legal tender of the Republic of China. The new Chinese 
dollar was a managed currency, backed by foreign exchange: it had a fixed exchange 
rate with the British pound as well as the US dollar. The government banks were to 
keep the exchange value of the currency at this level and to this end they would buy and 
sell foreign exchange in unlimited quantities.
18
 Fabi were issued by government 
banks,
19
 and the banknotes issued by other banks were gradually retired. By 1936 the 
notes issued by foreign banks had shrunk to 8% of the total number of notes in 
circulation. 
2021
  
 
The currency reform proceeded successfully for the first twenty months until the 
outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. The Nationalist Government moved 
to the interior (Free China); and puppet regimes were set up in Japanese occupied areas. 
Although fabi was still used in the occupied area, puppet governments soon issued their 
own currencies to gradually replace the use of fabi. These currencies were inconvertible. 
The free exchange of fabi was also suspended during the war. During the wartime 
period, inflationary monetary policy became the most obvious way of raising funds and 
sustaining the war. These depreciated the fiat currencies competing in their area of 
                                                 
16
 Arthur N. Young, China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 1937-1945(Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1965), 3. 
17
 Fabi means legal tender in Chinese. Kia-ngau Chang, The Inflationary Spiral: The Experience in China, 
1939-1950 (Cambridge: Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1958), 3-4. 
18
 The exchange rate of fabi was anchored at 1 CHD = 0.3 USD = 14 ½ d. Frank H. H King, A Concise 
Economic History of Modern China (1840-1961)(Bombay: Vora, 1968), 138.  
19
 The four government banks were the Central Bank of China, Bank of China, Bank of Communications 
and the Farmers Bank of China.  
20
 Rawski, Economic Growth in Prewar China 135. 
21
 The provincial and local banks had some problems, too, the number being limited to a fifth of the total. 
Young, China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 135.  
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circulation, just as the regimes all competed to be the one legitimate government in 
China. After the Second World War and the retreat of Japanese troops in August 1945, 
the Nationalist Government was restored in Nanjing and fabi again became the sole 
legal tender of the country. However, the currency experienced hyperinflation during 
the subsequent civil war, and was replaced by a new currency in 1948. Still 
hyperinflation continued, even after the Nationalist Party and its troops fled to Taiwan 
just before the establishment of the Communist Regime.
22
  
 
Episodes under examination and outline of the chapters 
 
This thesis studies the period of monetary transition and analyses three of the critical 
episodes in the transitional period. The first chapter looks at the inflation puzzles of the 
1850s when China was still under a metallic monetary standard. The second chapter 
examines the problem of small coin shortage at the end of the nineteenth century, and 
shows how the new copper coinage minted under steam power solved the problem. The 
third chapter focuses on the behaviour of holders of different currencies during the 
wartime inflation period between 1937 and 1945. Various methods and kinds of 
evidence are used in the thesis. Below I provide more detailed summaries of the 
arguments and findings of each of the above chapters.   
 
Chapter 1 Reassessing the Xianfeng inflation (1853–1861): government 
finance and monetary instability in early modern China 
This chapter examines the new monetary policies introduced during the fiscal crisis of 
the 1850s and the subsequent inflation (the Xianfeng inflation). In the 1850s the Qing 
government encountered unprecedented fiscal stringency due to huge military outlays 
which it could not afford. Even the mint output of standard copper cash dropped and 
eventually stopped as the supply of copper ingots from Yunnan was cut off by the 
Taiping rebels.
23
 As a result the government resorted to different methods of money 
creation (debased coinage and government paper notes) in order to cover the deficit, 
leading to serious inflation in the metropolitan Beijing area.  
                                                 
22
 Shun-hsin Chou, The Chinese Inflation, 1937-1949 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 25-
8. 
23
 King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, 144-6. 
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The Xianfeng inflation is well known to historians because it was one of the highlighted 
outcomes of some important historical events (two Opium Wars, the Taiping Rebellion 
and the opening of the treaty ports) that marked the start of modern Chinese history. 
However, documents concerning this period have not been well preserved and have 
been even less well studied. This seemingly well-known event in fact contains a number 
of unresolved puzzles. One fundamental puzzle is how the government was able to 
manipulate money when China was under a bimetallic monetary standard in which only 
the supply of copper cash was under state control.  
 
The chapter examines archival materials including government memorials, treasury 
records and account books, and compiles new data series of the money creation and 
annual money stock in Beijing; it thereby re-investigates the nature of the new monetary 
policies and their market behaviour. It argues that the inflation resulting from coinage 
debasement combined with government debt default, rather than deriving directly from 
the increased quantity of money.  
 
Chapter 2 The Big Problem of Small Change in Late Imperial China (1890-
1910): Silver inflow, rural deflation, and how it was solved by steam power 
technology  
The second chapter examines the problem of shortage of small coin at the end of the 
nineteenth century. The drastic drop in the price of silver, together with China’s 
integration with the international market, permanently destabilized the traditional silver-
copper cash system. The Chinese economy suffered constantly from a shortage of 
‘small money’ (i.e., copper cash) because of the higher cost of minting them compared 
with that of minting coins with higher values. 
 
The chapter looks into the archives of the Imperial Customs Service and identifies a 
monetary shortage in rural areas in particular. It argues that the introduction of debased 
copper coinage manufactured by steam power successfully solved this monetary 
problem. Unlike the previous case of debased big cash (during the Xianfeng inflation), 
which immediately invited counterfeiting, the new technology allowed the state to mint 
sufficient copper coins at an affordable cost and without inviting forgery.  
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The chapter compiles a dataset of monthly grain prices at the prefectural level, and 
applies a differences-in-differences estimation to test the impact of the institutional 
shocks on the regional economy before and after the introduction of the new coinage, 
demonstrating that the introduction of new coinage helped to ease the monetary 
stringency in the countryside and acted as a positive shock to the economy. 
 
Chapter 3 The Second World War and Chinese Money Holders (1937-45): how 
did the wartime situation affect people’s money holding behaviour? 
This chapter identifies through the eyes of contemporary Chinese money holders the 
events that were considered important to the credibility of money during the war. It was 
a period when currency reform was successfully introduced and paper money became 
the only legal tender. During the war the country was split into competing political 
regimes, all issuing their own fiat currencies.  
 
The chapter applies structural break estimations on the series of real demand of money 
in Free China and in Japanese-occupied China (1937-45). It detects a problem during 
the war of asymmetric information across different monetary regimes, as the reaction in 
the Shanghai market to the same historical event usually preceded that in Chongqing. It 
also reveals that after the attack on Pearl Harbour, the divergence of interests between 
Free China and the Japanese-occupied parts of China increased. In addition, the people 
in Free China were more affected by domestic news (news that threatened the existence 
of the National Government); whilst in the occupied areas people’s expectations were 
closely tied to the Japanese military advance, above all in the Pacific theatre. 
 
Outline 
 
Chapter 1 deals with monetary policies during the Xianfeng period and the inflation 
mechanism. Chapter 2 discusses the small change problem at the end of the nineteenth 
century. Chapter 3 focuses on the behaviour of fiat money holders in wartime. In the 
conclusion, I examine again the relationship between state and money, with examples 
from the above three historical episodes.  
 
9 
 
Chapter 1 Reassessing the Xianfeng 
Inflation (1853-1861): 
 
Government finance and monetary instability in early 
modern China 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
When Xianfeng (r. 1851-61) succeeded his father Daoguang (r. 1821-50) as the seventh 
Emperor of the Qing Dynasty, he should have realised that the Celestial Empire was no 
longer the formidable kingdom it once was. The country had just been defeated in the 
First Opium War (1839-41) and had paid a massive indemnity.
24
 It was still facing a 
series of domestic insurgencies and declining tax revenues caused by bad harvests and 
the difficulty of collecting taxes in riot-torn areas. Military outlays and expenditure on 
disaster relief and the like greatly outpaced the fiscal capacity of the ancient state. In 
1853, the Taiping rebels occupied several southern provinces in the lower Yangtze 
Delta (the richest agricultural area) and established their capital in Nanjing,
25
 to bring 
the fiscal difficulties of the central government in Beijing to a climax: the stock of silver 
in the Treasury was depleted and the government was not able even to pay its troops 
and government officials.
26
 Other methods were not readily available, for the Chinese 
empire had no well-defined way of borrowing. Instead, drastic monetary policies, 
minting coins and the issuing of government notes, were used to quickly multiply the 
quantity of money. Facing serious fiscal stringency, the Qing government resorted to 
expansionary monetary policies, which led to inflation and market disorder that lasted 
for more than a decade.
27
 For a pre-modern society the inflation rate was high: from 
1854 to 1861 grain prices increased six to eight times over, and in 1862 the price level 
                                                 
24
 The total indemnity of the Opium War was 21 million silver pesos, which was approximately 14.7 
million silver taels, or 5,075,000 British Pounds (using the formula that 1 peso equals to 4 shillings 10 
pence). The average annual government income was around 45 million silver taels (including incomes for 
central and local government, as well as grain tributes which were paid in kind). Zeyi Peng, Public 
Finance and Economic Condition of Late 19th Century China (Shijiu Shiji Houbanqi De Zhongguo 
Caizheng Yu Jingji) (Beijing: People’s Press, 1983), 9. Zhihong Shi, Statistics on the Income, 
Expenditure and Stocks of the Treasury under Board of Revenue in Qing Dynasty (Qingdai Hubu Yinku 
Shouzhi He Kucun Tongji)(Fuzhou: Fujian People’s Press, 2009), 42-3. 
25
 King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, 144. 
26
 People’s Bank of China Financial Archive Division, ed. Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary 
History, Vol. I. Late Qing Period (1840-1911) (Zhong-Guo Jin Dai Huo Bi Shi Zi Liao 1840-1911) 
(Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1964), 341. 
27
 Opinions differ as to when the crisis ended. Although the crisis is commonly known as the ‘Xianfeng’ 
inflation, some scholars consider 1868 to mark the end of the crisis (Peng 1983) although the Emperor 
Xianfeng died in 1861. Others refer to 1861 as the end (King, 1965). The whole money-creation scheme 
was abandoned by the end of Xianfeng’s reign in 1861, although the repercussions of the crisis lasted 
much longer. Some of the new types of monies created were still in circulation after 1861 and the debased 
coinage continued until 1889. This paper considers 1853-61 to be the period of crisis, but the period after 
1861 will also be the subject of investigation since repercussions followed the crisis. Peng, Public 
Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 87. King, Money and Monetary Policy 
in China, 144-63. 
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stabilized at a level five times higher than the pre-crisis level.
28
 This event is 
remembered in history as the ‘Xianfeng Inflation’. 
 
In fact, the decade following the period of the First Opium War and the Taiping 
Rebellion marks the beginning of China’s modern history. The Qing government was 
forced to introduce a series of reforms to the traditional monetary and fiscal system. 
However, due to the lack of power and the limited knowledge of modern monetary and 
fiscal systems, the early measures of reform were far from well-designed, nor were they 
carefully executed over the whole country. Most of the measures hastily carried out by 
the central government during the 1850s and 1860s met with setbacks and brought 
about chaos. The monetary policies introduced during Xianfeng’s reign (1851-61) and 
the ensuing Xianfeng Inflation (1853-61) illustrates this. The Xianfeng Inflation is often 
cited by researchers studying the monetary history of early modern China. For monetary 
economists, it is an interesting period because the government was unprecedentedly 
active in the field of monetary policy. Zeyi Peng has accomplished remarkable work in 
three articles based on his careful study of the archives of the Qing Dynasty.
29
 Frank 
King’s book chapter on the Xianfeng period and Jerome Chen’s article are also 
exemplary.
30
 King’s chapter provides the most in-depth discussion of the post-inflation 
monetary system in Beijing. Most writers understand this event as the government’s 
using expansionary monetary policy to achieve its fiscal ends. Inflation followed, which 
also redistributed the nation’s wealth in the government’s favour and to the 
disadvantage of the common people. Peng argues that the fiscal need created by the 
military operations against the Taiping Rebellion was the main factor in the issue of 
notes and the minting of debased coins, and that these ‘exploitative’ methods caused 
inflation and damaged the common people’s standard of living. 31  Chen devotes a 
quarter of his article to describing the fiscal deficit problem and in his conclusion points 
out again that ‘the inflationary measures made it possible to carry on the military 
                                                 
28
 For grain price index, please see Figure 1-11, p.51.  
29
 The three articles deal with three issues: the central government’s treasury account, the Xianfeng 
inflation and the military expenditure. Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th 
Century China, 24-137. 
30
 King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, 144-63. Jerome Chen, "The Hsien-Feng Inflation," 
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 21(1958): 578-86. 
31
 Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 87. 
Chapter 1. Reassessing the Xianfeng Inflation                                                                                            12 
 
 
 
operations of the day, at the cost of disrupting the financial system of the country as a 
whole.’32 
 
However, previous studies have raised as many questions as they have answered. The 
monetary system in pre-modern China was a traditional commodity money system 
composed of silver and copper cash, and the government had very limited control over 
the money supply.
33
 The fiscal scheme of a monetary policy is normally of two kinds: 
financed by seigniorage revenue or by inflation (to reduce government debt). At first 
glance it appears that in the reign of Xianfeng the Qing government did both (big cash 
for seigniorage and paper notes to induce inflation). However, on second thoughts, we 
find that an increase in neither the seigniorage revenues nor inflationary finance could 
be easily achieved when the government had such limited control over the money 
supply. Moreover, under a commodity monetary system, how did the government 
persuade the market to accept depreciated or even worthless money, causing the serious 
inflation that it did? 
 
Historical documents concerning this period were not well preserved and have been 
studied even less well. The seemingly well-known events in fact contain many 
unresolved puzzles. Two puzzles should be addressed first to fully understand this area 
of history. First, did the Xianfeng monetary policy achieve its fiscal ends? How much 
revenue was generated by monetary expansion and was it enough to cover the military 
outlay? Second, given the monetary confusion, by what mechanism did the inflation 
develop? 
 
This paper re-examines the history of the Xianfeng Inflation with a statistical 
investigation of the Xianfeng monetary policies. It looks into various archival materials, 
analyses the structure of public finance, and compiles data tables showing both the 
amount of money issued and their market exchange prices. It then compares the growth 
trend of the money stock with the trend of retail price rises in Beijing, and finally 
proposes an alternative explanation of the inflation mechanism. The inflation resulted 
from two separate policy processes: coinage debasement and the issue of government 
                                                 
32
 Chen, "The Hsien-Feng Inflation," 586. 
33
 The government monopolized only the issue of copper cash which constituted less than 20% of the 
total money stock in terms of value. 
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paper (which led to a financial crisis). The paper notes issued by the government were 
really government debts that were made tradable on the market. The major inflation was 
generated by the market expectations of a government default rather than by the 
increased money stock per se.
34
 
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it investigates new 
archives and collects market information to form a more vivid picture of the events and 
to clear up the puzzling parts of the story. Second, by calculation and reasoning the 
paper disentangles the mechanism of the inflation, which is the essential part of the 
history and is often overlooked by previous writers. Third, the research helps to explain 
the government’s reserved attitude and the market’s sceptical reactions to the monetary 
innovations (for instance, the new copper coinage and the introduction of government 
fiduciary money) in subsequent years. 
 
The rest of the present paper is organised as follows: Section 1.2 sets out the historical 
and institutional background; Section 1.3 examines the Xianfeng monetary policy with 
the help of monetary and price data newly constructed from archival materials. It looks 
at the function of the newly created money in government finance, as well as the impact 
of the money in the market; using the data and calculations from Section 1.3, Section 
1.4 seeks to solve the above two puzzles: whether the monetary policy achieved its 
fiscal ends and by what mechanism did the inflation develop in Beijing. Section 1.5 
concludes. Detailed discussions on the available archival sources, data reconstruction 
and calculation are provided in Appendices A-D (Section 1.6).  
  
                                                 
34
 Dates using the Chinese traditional calendar differ from those of the modern calendar. In a Chinese 
calendar, a date is expressed by a combination of the number of days, the number of month and the 
number of regnal years. For example: the 27
th
 day of the 2
nd
 month of the third year of Xianfeng  is 5 
April 1853 in the Gregorian Calendar. Because most of the archival materials (account books in particular) 
were all recorded using the Chinese traditional calendar, this paper also follows the practice. In this paper, 
the same historical date will be expressed as: [Day27, Month2, XF3], or [Day27, Month2, 1853], both 
indicating a Chinese calendar year, unless stated otherwise. For more details please see Appendix A 
(explanations of archival and Chinese dates) and the table of Chinese regnal years (Appendix A 1-1). 
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1.2 Historical and institutional context 
In the nineteenth century, significant economic and political changes took place in 
China: the impact of foreign powers was clearly felt through trade and military conflict, 
notably during and after the Opium Wars (1839-42 and 1856-60). Internal conflicts 
grew increasingly frequent and intense. Both internal and external pressures called for a 
fiscally modernised state, which the Qing government was obviously failing to deliver. 
A crisis in public finance loomed at the beginning of the 1850s. 
 
Incapable of offering timely fiscal reform, the imperial government attempted to remedy 
the fiscal deficit with a series of new monetary policies. In 1853, the central government 
introduced several new types of monies into the market, including debased coins, 
government paper and the operation of official banks. The monies were not well 
received in the market and they allegedly led to serious inflation in the Beijing area. 
Having accelerated since 1858, inflation reached its highest level in the summer of 1861. 
After the crisis, banks folded and the market took a while to stabilize: the price level 
dropped in 1862, and stabilized at a level which was five times higher than the pre-crisis 
price level.
35
 
 
This section offers a brief account of the historical context and the fiscal and monetary 
systems in the late Qing period, and the mounting crisis faced by the ancient system 
from the 1850s. 
 
1.2.1 Socioeconomic challenges of the nineteenth century 
The crisis in public finance in the mid-nineteenth century is the major reason for the 
new monetary policies. While public expenditures escalated, the tax capacity of the state 
remained at its pre-modern level. Behind the increasing fiscal crisis, some deeply-rooted 
political and economic changes (economic depression and trade deficits) had been 
evident since the beginning of the century, undermining the fundamentals of the 
Chinese fiscal institutions. 
 
                                                 
35
 For price level indicators please refer to Figure 1-9 and Figure 1-10, p.49. For descriptions on market 
chaos please see: Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 101. 
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The country had been experiencing economic difficulties throughout Daoguang’s reign 
(1821-50). This period was marked by less agricultural activity, a drop in commodity 
prices, reduced demand for farm products, and the appearance of credit crises.
36
 Apart 
from the increased frequency of natural disasters, many studies attribute this depression 
to outflow of silver resulting from a long-term unfavourable balance of trade (mainly 
because of China’s import of opium). Whether or not opium was the culprit has often 
been contested,
37
 but it is true that, along with the increased foreign trade activity, China 
suffered from a trade deficit that resulted in silver outflows. It is estimated that during 
the period 1808-56 the net silver outflow had reached as much as 384 million silver 
dollars (approx. 276.48 million silver taels),
38
 and the market exchange ratio between 
silver and copper cash more than doubled: from 1040.7 cash per tael in 1801 to 2230.3 
in 1850.
39
 
 
The shortage of silver discouraged production and interregional trade. In addition, taxes 
were collected in silver, whereas the majority of taxpayers, the farmers, usually earned 
their income in the form of copper cash.
40
 The appreciation of silver against copper 
cash meant that farmers needed more copper cash to exchange for a tael of silver, 
increasing their real tax burden.
41
 Therefore during the first half of the nineteenth 
                                                 
36
 The notion of the ‘Daoguang Depression’ was coined by Chengming Wu in 1997, and examined by 
many scholars such as Mio Kishimoto and Man-houng Lin. There are debates on whether this should be 
called a ‘depression’ as well as about the causes of the phenomenon, but it is agreed that during 
Daoguang’s reign the whole country witnessed a continued fall in the money supply, agricultural output 
and commodity prices. Mio Kishimoto, "Foreign Silver and China's Domestic Economy During the First 
Half of the 19th Century," in Asian Historical Economics Conference(Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, 
Japan2012), 23-6. 
37
 Recent studies (by Lin Man-houng, Von Glahn and Irigoin) attribute the depression to the change in 
foreign silver supply, because of the Napoleonic Wars and the Latin-American independence movement. 
Ibid., 1-4. 
38
 This is Lin Man-houng’s estimate, although according to Von Glahn, the estimate is exaggerated. Von 
Glahn’s own estimation is a net outflow of only 22.608 million taels. Kishimoto reckons that the point of 
debate should not be the amount of net flow, but a change in the speed of the silver inflow. As in many 
ancient countries in the Middle and Far East, silver was used as a store of value as much as a means of 
payment. Silver therefore tended to flow from Europe to other countries and never flowed back. China’s 
economy relied on a constant inflow of silver. Thus a reduced speed for the silver inflow – which 
eventually turned negative – was detrimental to the Chinese economy. Richard Von Glahn, "Monetary 
Demand and Silver Supply in 19th Century China,"ibid., 95; Man-houng Lin, "China Upside Down: 
Currency, Society, and Ideologies, 1808-1856,"(2006). Kishimoto, "Foreign Silver and China's Domestic 
Economy During the First Half of the 19th Century," 27-9. 
39
 Exchange ratios varied in different places. This figure is taken from the account book of a grocery shop 
in Ningjin County of North China. Zhongping Yan, Selected Statistics in the Economic History of 
Modern China(Beijing: Science Press, 1955), 37. 
40
 Lin, "China Upside Down," 10-11. 
41
 During Daoguang’s reign, while the exchange rate between silver and copper cash almost doubled, the 
agricultural prices did not show obvious change. Kishimoto, "Foreign Silver and China's Domestic 
Economy During the First Half of the 19th Century," 30. 
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century, farmers’ lives became extremely difficult, first because of the reduced income 
from bad harvests and reduced market demand, and second because of their increased 
tax burden produced by the increase in the exchange ratio between silver and copper 
cash.
42
 Tensions arose between taxpayers and the state. The government had to face the 
dilemma of reduced tax revenue (by cancelling tax payments in difficult areas) and the 
possibility of a large-scale uprising. Eventually, government tax income was indeed 
curtailed. However internal conflicts, instead of being resolved, became increasingly 
severe and spread through the country. 
 
1.2.2 Public finance in crisis 
It is clear that in the nineteenth century the Qing government witnessed a structurally 
enlarged disparity between income and expenditure. However, in facing this changing 
world, the fiscal system was so rigidly designed that it was not able to cope with these 
economic changes and the subsequent deficit issue. 
Fiscal structure and its defects 
There are three main issues concerning the incompetency of the old fiscal regime: the 
rigidity of the sources of tax revenue, the relation between income and expenditure, and 
the power imbalance between central and local governments. 
 
The main sources of tax revenue included the land and pool taxes (tianfu or diding, land 
and population tax), the grain tributes (caoliang), the salt tax and the merchandise taxes 
(maritime and inland tariffs). Apart from grain tributes that were collected in kind, the 
                                                 
42
 During 1830s and 1840s, numerous memorials depicted tax payment difficulties following the silver 
shortage and the increasing exchange rate between silver and copper cash, and the majority of the 
memorials came from the provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang. For example, Mr. Sun’s memorial [Day11 
Month9 DG12] described the general difficulty for merchants and farmers to pay taxes due to ‘cheap cash 
and expensive silver’. Zexu Lin (the man who later became government special commissioner and burned 
opium in Guangdong Province, igniting the Opium War), the then viceroy of Jiangsu Province also 
submitted memorial [Day6 Month4 DG13] in demanding the government to mint its own silver coins, as 
well as to ban silver outflow, in order to suppress the escalating silver-copper exchange ratio. Financial 
Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 9-39. The southeast 
coastal provinces (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong) might be the area mostly affected by the 
change of exchange ratio because of their active engagement in trade. The market rate in these areas 
exceeded the official rate between silver and copper cash. However, merchants and farmers could rarely 
take advantage of the discrepancy between official and market rates, as calculating government officials 
would demand taxation payment in market rate instead. In fact as long as the market and official rate 
differed, government officials always demanded taxation being paid by the ‘undervalued’ money and 
profited personally. The actual amount of tax payment depended on the negotiation between government 
officials and tax payers and their relative bargaining power, which varied from place to place. 
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taxes were all collected in silver.
43
 The taxation system did not change much from the 
beginning of the Qing Dynasty until the 1850s. Land and poll taxes constituted almost 
80 per cent of the total tax revenue, and the amount of land and poll taxes levied each 
year had been fixed by law since 1712 and had never changed.
44
 In the early 1850s, the 
population more than doubled the number in the early eighteenth century,
45
 while the 
revenues from the land tax did not increase proportionately. In the nineteenth century 
this important source of government revenue even dropped: frequent crop failures 
meant that many provinces were not able to pay their land tax in time. Throughout the 
1840s, in particular, frequent bad harvests delayed the collection of land tax.
46
 
 
The collection of salt tax suffered from an increase in salt smuggling.
47
 With the growth 
in trade and business activities, merchandise tax should have been an important source 
of revenue. However, the inland tariff collection suffered from systemic corruption,
48
 
and an effective maritime customs service was only established in 1854.
49
 The 
inadequate taxation system made it certain that government revenue would not benefit 
from good years when it came to difficult times, such as a bad harvest or war.
50
 
                                                 
43
 Xianglong Tang, "The Fiscal System in Pre-Opium War China (Yapian Zhanzheng Qianxi Zhongguo 
De Caizheng Zhidu)," in Selected Thesis on Modern Chinese Fiscal and Economic History (Zhongguo 
Jindai Caizheng Jingjishi Lunwenxuan)(Chengdu: Southwest University of Finance and Economics Press, 
1987), 53-60. 
44
 Chen, "The Hsien-Feng Inflation," 578-9. In the original text the land and poll taxes was referred to as 
‘land and pool taxes’, which might be a typo.  
45
 The total population of China was 436.1 million in 1851. There is no census or population estimate for 
around the year 1712, but we do know that in 1679 it was 160 million, and that the figure rose to 331.5 
million in 1776. Shuji Cao, Population History of China: Qing Period (Zhongguo Renkoushi: Qing Shiqi) 
(Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2001), 832.  
46
 Lin, "China Upside Down," 133-4. King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, 144-5. 
47
 Chen, "The Hsien-Feng Inflation," 579. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 The Chinese customs offices included inland customs (Changguan, also called native customs) and 
maritime customs (Haiguan or Jianghaiguan). The inland customs was a long-established institution of 
the state. Before 1842, the government imposed a partial ban on maritime activities (haijin). The only 
maritime customs office was set in Guangzhou (‘Canton’ to the foreign merchants of the day) in the 
southeast of China, and the receipts formed part of the revenues of the Imperial Household (Nei wu fu), 
not the government revenue. After 1842, following the Treaty of Nanking, maritime customs were 
established in treaty ports. It was after 1854 that an effective Imperial Customs Service (the Inspector 
General system) was gradually established, by a British-dominated bureaucrat. Frederic   Wakeman Jr., 
"Chapter 4 - the Canton Trade and the Opium War," in The Cambridge History of China Volume 10: Late 
Ch'ing 1800-1911, Part 1, ed. John K. Fairbank(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1978), 163-4. 
Ruixue Jia, "The Legacies of Forced Freedom: China's Treaty Ports," IIES working paper, Stockholm 
University (2010): 16-7. R. A.  Brickers, "Purloined Letters: History and the Chinese Maritime Customs 
Service " Modern Asian Studies 40, no. 3 (2006): 691. 
50
 Precisely because the rate of official taxation was low, other means of ‘quasi-taxing’ such as land 
surtax and rent extraction were used to support administrative costs. However, instead of adequately 
increasing public income, these informal revenues were often tainted by personal corruption and gave rise 
to local resentment. Loren Brandt, Debin Ma, and Thomas G. Rawski, "From Divergence to Convergence: 
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Second, in terms of the relation between income and expenditure, budget and deficit had 
never been part of the traditional concept of Chinese fiscal policy. Instead, the Chinese 
fiscal concept is ‘to live within one’s means’ whereby the government tailored the 
amount of expenditure according to the estimate of its annual income.
 
Three-quarters of 
the estimated income would be divided under specific expenditure headings, leaving a 
quarter of the income for emergency use.
51
 This practice seemed a very conservative 
and stable policy in the good old days of peace, when bad harvest years were only 
occasional.
52
 However, this conservative fiscal concept, coupled with the rigid revenue 
structure, promoted a low fiscal surplus. During times of sudden increase in expenditure, 
such as the 1840s-1850s, the small surplus was soon depleted. 
 
But certain measures were available to temporarily increase fiscal income during 
abnormal years. The two biggest sources of occasional income were juanna and 
baoxiao. Juanna is the sale of government offices (or titles). Baoxiao, also called 
juanshu,
53
 is a type of contribution from wealthy merchants (more often than not a 
forced contribution from merchants in a monopoly business, such as salt sales) to the 
government to finance a particular project such as army munitions, disaster relief, or 
water conservation projects.
54
 It is estimated that, during the thirty years of Daoguang’s 
reign (1821-50), government income from juanna exceeded 33 million taels (more than 
one million per year), of which more than 18 million went into the Imperial Treasury as 
central government income.
55
 Records show that during the reign of Jiaqing (1795-1820) 
income from baoxiao was around 26 million taels (also more than one million per 
year).
56
 Still, these occasional incomes are quite different from methods of tax 
                                                                                                                                               
Re-Evaluating the History Behind China’s Economic Boom," Department of Economic History Working 
Paper Series, LSE 158, no. 12 (2012): 52. 
51
 Takeshi Hamashita, Studies on Economic History of Modern China: Public Finance of Late Qing 
Maritime Customs and Treaty Port Market Network (ChūGoku Kindai Keizaishi Kenkyū : Shinmatsu 
Kaikan Zaisei to KaikōJō ShijōKen, Chinese Edition) (Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Press, 2006), 47-8. 
52
 This seemingly virtuous fiscal regime resulted from centuries of peace and unity, and a small 
bureaucracy. The taxation structure was designed during the heyday of the empire (when Manchu rulers 
appeased aggressions from the north and never dreamed that stronger threats would come from the sea), 
and would soon be tested in the nineteenth century.  
53
 Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 148-9. 
54
 Madeleine Zelin, The Magistrate's Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth-Century Ch'ing 
China (London: University of California Press, 1984), 54.; Tang, "The Fiscal System in the Pre-Opium 
War China," 61. 
55
 Also called ‘juanshu’, "The Fiscal System in the Pre-Opium War China," 60.  
56
 Feng Chen, Papers on the History of Qing Public Finance (Qing Dai Cai Zheng Shi Lun Gao)(Beijing: 
The Commercial Press, 2010), 108-9. 
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smoothing. At the time, methods such as public borrowing were not yet developed to 
weather ‘fiscal storms’.57 
 
Third, in terms of the balance between central and local government, the fiscal power of 
central government was supreme in the administrative structure but rather limited in 
practice. Administratively, the fiscal system was highly centralised, more so before 
1840: the central government (Board of Revenue
58
) was in charge of setting the amount 
of income and expenditure for each year and the division between central and local 
administration. However, it was in practice rather a ‘bottom-up’ process. Local 
magistrates were responsible for tax collection. Provincial governments would keep part 
of the tax revenue for local use (the daily functioning of the local governments and the 
provision of public goods); and sent a certain amount as ‘fiscal assistance’ to other 
provinces, according to the central directions for its allocation;
59
 only the remaining part 
of the tax revenues (around 20-30 per cent of the total national revenue) would be sent 
to the Board of Revenue in the capital. This part of the revenue, known as the ‘capital 
revenue’ (jingxiang), was stored in the Imperial Treasury, and was mainly for the 
maintenance of the central government and for major military expenditure, as well as 
some immediate spending (for instance on disaster relief and war indemnities).
60
 The 
Board of Revenue allocated, rather than controlled, the tax revenues. Regional 
governments, however, had a firmer grip on the sources of revenue. Although local 
governments usually had to obey the central government, the provincial viceroys were 
not accountable to the director of the Board of Revenue, but on equal terms. A subtle 
antagonism between the two was perceptible. In times of domestic turbulence, tax 
revenues were quite often kept at the local level and never reached the capital. Various 
reasons or excuses were provided: the money might be used for local military purposes, 
or it might be claimed that rebels had intercepted the money en route. 
 
                                                 
57
 The traditional Chinese government did not borrow (explicitly). The first foreign debt dated back to 
1854 (negotiated between Chinese and foreign merchants on behalf of the local government in Jiangsu 
Province) and the first government debt was issued in the 1890s.  
58
 Board of Revenue, called hubu in Chinese pronunciation, can roughly be understood as the Treasury 
Department of the Chinese empire.  
59
 Known as ‘’xiexiang’ in Chinese.  
60
 The central government revenue is called ‘jingxiang’ (capital revenue) in the original government 
documents. Shi, Treasury Statitstics 25-33. Zhiyong Ren, "A Study of the Silver Vault of the Ministry of 
Revenue in the Late Qing and Its Reform after the Boxer Uprising (Lun Shu Wan Qing Hu Bu Yin Ku 
Zhi Du Yu Gen Zi Zhi Hou De Bian Ge)," Studies in Qing History (Qing shi yan jiu), no. 2 (2005): 47. 
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Growing deficit and crisis of 1853 
From the 1840s on, military conflict created a huge increase in expenditure. After the 
costly First Opium War (1839-42), the government had to pay a total indemnity of 
21,000,000 Spanish silver dollars,
61
 which was approximately 14,700,000 silver taels.
62
 
Domestic military expenses were even higher than that caused by foreign forces. 
Internal conflicts, increasingly frequent, and intense: regional uprisings mushroomed, 
amongst which the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64) caused the most damage to the 
economy. The Nian Rebellion (1851-68) in the north and the Mohammedan Rebellion 
(1853-74) in the southwest were also long-lasting and damaging.
63
 Take the Taiping 
Rebellion, for example: the military expenses to the central government for the first 
three years alone (from the end of 1850 to the summer of 1853) amounted to 29,630,000 
taels. A non-exhaustive study shows that the expenditure on the Taiping Rebellion from 
the central government’s vault alone was 170,604,104 taels at the very least, not to 
mention the much higher figure spent by local governments.
64
 Because of continued 
unexpected natural calamities, such as a sudden change in the course of the Yellow 
River in 1852, expenditures of government relief money also increased.
65
 
 
These expenses immensely exceeded the government’s fiscal capacity, which was 
already affected by a delay or cancellation of land tax payments because of crop failures 
in the 1840s.
66
 From 1820 to 1850, the average annual government revenue was around 
45,000,000 taels per year,
67
 of which the average amount of revenue that reached the 
central government in Beijing (measured by the income received in the Treasury) was 
only around 9,900,000 taels per year.
68
 As expenditures for unexpected events were the 
responsibility of the central government, and, at the same time, delays at the local level 
                                                 
61
 The exchange rate between a Spanish dollar (peso) and a tael is: 0.72:1.  
62
 Article VII, Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Commerce between Her Majesty the Queen of Great 
Britain and Ireland and the Emperor of China, (26 June 1843).  
63
 King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, 3 and 6. 
64
 These figures were extracted from central government reports and therefore do not include 
expenditures by the provincial government, which would have been much higher. After 1853, the military 
expenditures were mostly covered by regional governors and not central government. The real total 
military expenditure in fighting the Taiping Rebellion would have been much higher. The total central 
government expenditure may be underestimated because of missing documents in the government fiscal 
report. Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 127-30. 
65
 Ibid., 37-8. 
66
 Lin, "China Upside Down," 133-5. 
67
 Shi, Treasury Statitstics 42-3. 
68
 Compared to 50,000,000 taels and 12,420,000 taels as the total and central government revenue, 
respectively, during Qianlong’s reign (1735-96) in the High Qing period. The figures for central 
government revenue were collected by Shi from Imperial Treasury Records. Ibid., 43. 
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caused the capital revenue (revenues sent to the central government) to decrease, 
69
central government suffered more from the fiscal crisis than the provincial 
governments did. During the reign of Daoguang, the total expenditure already slightly 
exceeded the total income from tax revenues (Figure 1-1, p.21).
70
 The deficit increased 
from 1853 on: income was almost halved while expenditure expanded sharply. The 
Imperial Treasury was almost depleted. There had been a very large stock of silver in 
the Treasury from the fiscal surplus accumulated over the years. The average stock of 
silver during Qianlong’s reign was around 70 million taels, while during Xianfeng’s 
reign the figure fell to an average of no more than 3 million.
71
 
 
Figure 1-1 Annual tax revenue (in silver) and expenditure of central government, 
1821-70 (in millions of taels) 
 
Source: Shi (2009), pp. 198-242.  
                                                 
69
 Ibid., 45. 
70
 The revenue shown in Figure 1-1 are government revenues (from taxations, the sale of titles, and also 
contributions), received by the Treasury. The Treasury Records consist of two volumes: a book of 
incoming items (the Incoming category) and books of outgoing items (the Outgoing category). Before 
1853 (when the new monetary policies were introduced), the incoming category was composed of not 
only taxation revenues (in silver only), but also copper cash which were cast by the Imperial mints. The 
copper cash were deposited (therefore standing as an entry in the incoming category) in the Treasury 
vault, and would be used as part of the salary for bannermen and construction workers. Strictly speaking, 
the amount of copper cash registered each year was not government revenue. The revenues shown in 
Figure 1-1 are therefore figures extracted from the Incoming category of the Treasury book, and would all 
have been in silver. The expenditure, however, is a combination of silver, copper cash (and later other 
monies such as big cash and government paper notes). For a sample of the composition of the Incoming 
and Outgoing categories, please see Appendix B. 
71
 Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 84-5. 
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1.2.3 Monetary system and its changes in Xianfeng 
Traditional commodity money system 
The monetary system during the Qing Dynasty was a commodity money system 
consisting of copper cash and silver.
72
 Copper cash currency consists of copper coins 
bearing the face value of one wen;
73
 a string of copper cash consists of 1,000 copper 
cash and can be used for larger payments.
74
 As copper cash had a uniform shape and 
value, the face value is not cast on the coin, and during exchanges copper cash were 
paid by counting them. Silver circulated in the form of both silver ingots and silver 
dollars. Used more in large transactions and interregional trade, it was measured by 
weight in terms of tael.
75
 The government monopolized the supply of copper cash 
(which constituted less than 20 per cent of the total money in circulation
76
), while the 
supply of silver was determined by the market. 
 
The government monopolized copper mining and the minting of copper cash. The major 
copper provider for the imperial mints was in Yunnan province.
77
 There were two 
imperial mints in Beijing and many regional mints, and the coins cast in each mint were 
mainly for regional use (normally to pay bannermen’s salaries and the wages of workers 
on government construction projects). The imperial mints (Baoyuan and Baoquan Mints) 
situated in Beijing were the two most important ones: their output sustained the demand 
of the market not only in Beijing, but also in the part of northern China near the 
                                                 
72
 King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, 27. 
73
 A standard piece of copper cash in the 18
th
 century weighted 0.12 liang, containing 50%-70 % of pure 
copper, and other metals such as zinc and lead. Liang is a Chinese unit of weight, equivalent to 37.783 
grams using the standards of the Imperial Maritime Customs; the actual weight of liang varied in different 
locales. Peng, A Monetary History of China, 524-5. Hamashita, Public Finance of Late Qing Maritime 
Customs 2. 
74
 A string (or ‘chuan’ in Chinese) of copper cash consists of 1,000 copper cash bound on a strand, which 
can be used for larger payments. A string was valued at a premium. For example, a string of copper cash 
was worth 1,000 wen, but normally it contained only around 980 copper cash. Kuroda, "The Collapse of 
the Chinese Imperial Monetary System " 103. 
75
 Tael, or liang in Chinese, was used for both the unit of weight and the unit of account. The concept 
seems similar to that of a ‘pound’ and a ‘pound sterling’. There were various standards for defining one 
tael, because weighing scales varied between regions and government bodies. As a unit of weight, a liang 
varies from 33.99 to 37.50 grams. When ‘tael’ is used as a unit of account specifically for ‘silver tael’, 
various taels also had different definition in terms of purity and fineness of the silver. For example, the 
Treasury tael (kuping liang or kuping tael) is the standard for taxation, the customs tael (haiguan liang or 
haikwan tael) is the standard used in the Maritime Customs Service, the market tael (shiping liang) is the 
standard used in the market in Beijing. Lin, "China Upside Down," xxiii-xxiv.  
76
 Peng estimates that during the late Qing period, the total copper sector (copper coins including standard 
cash and the new type of copper coin minted after 1900) constituted 17% of the total money in circulation. 
Peng, A Monetary History of China, 595. 
77
 Ibid., 568. 
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capital.
78
 Since Qin Dynasty (221BC) every dynasty took it an imperial duty to provide 
good quality copper cash. The Qing Dynasty was no exception: the copper cash was 
minted as a full-bodied coin. It was written into the law that there must be at least one 
state mint in each province in order to ensure the sufficient provision of good money 
circulating in every region.
79
  
 
The supply and demand of silver, in contrast, was determined solely by the market. 
China’s domestic silver production was low and the silver in China came mostly from 
Japan and later from Latin America, mainly through international trade.
80
 This situation 
is similar to that of medieval England. England did not produce significant amounts of 
silver and therefore its coinage was closely associated with its overseas trade. The 
monarchs, in China and in England, did not own the silver supply.
81
 But unlike the 
English Crown, which set up royal mints to strike the bullion into coins with face value, 
the Chinese Emperor allowed only silver bullion to circulate in various forms. The Qing 
government provided only the standard unit (the kuping tael) that a silver ingot should 
be melted into, which evolved into one of the many ‘taels’ for silver bullion.82 
 
The purchasing powers of one piece of copper cash and a tael of silver are hugely 
different.
83
 They were used in different types of trade and therefore occupied different 
levels of markets. Copper cash was therefore not taken as subsidiary money: it was the 
currency for daily transactions and the only currency in rural area. Silver, on the other 
hand, was used in long distance exchange and foreign trade; it is also the major form of 
money used in tax payment and government expenditure. The government tried to fix 
exchange rate between silver and copper cash.
84
 However, this fixed official ratio was 
                                                 
78
 Baoyuan operated until 1905 and Baoquan until 1910.  
79
 Minting was decentralised due to the very high transaction cost of moving large amount of metallic 
coins (and especially heavy copper cash with small values). Sometimes production at provincial state 
mints was suspended but minting in the capital was always ensured. Peng, A Monetary History of China, 
524-27. Lin, "China Upside Down," 5.  
80
 "Latin America Silver and China During the Daoguang Reign," 15-6. 
81
 Nick J. Mayhew, "Coinage and Money in England, 1086-C.1500," in Medieval Money Matters, ed. 
Diana  Wood(Oxford: Oxbow, 2004), 72.  
82
 Lin, "Latin America Silver and China During the Daoguang Reign," 21. 
83
 Around 1840s, the price ratio between silver and copper bullion is around 1:100, Shichang Ye, Chinese 
Monetary Theories before and after the Opium War (Ya Pian Zhan Zheng Qian Hou Wo Guo Di Huo Bi 
Xue Shuo)(Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1963), 6.  
84
 During most of the time during Qing Dynasty, the official ratio was maintained at 1:1,000 (1 tael equals 
to 1,000 wen). The ratio was revised to 1:2,000 during the 1840s. Ibid., 3. 
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not enforced by any government institution,
85
 and the government did not control the 
supply or demand of silver (the state did not coin silver) which could flow in and out the 
country depending on foreign trade conditions. Therefore the market exchange ratio 
between copper cash and silver fluctuated, and varied from place to place.
86
 Services 
specialising in money exchanges developed in this currency system, and the exchange 
normally took place in commercial centres and trade ports where different trades were 
frequently carried out.
87
 The system in China is sometimes called a ‘parallel bimetallic 
system’, to distinguish it from the conventional model of a bimetallic system. The term 
‘parallel’ is given because the system functioned more like a coexistence of ‘two 
currency systems, each using a different metal’.88  Also unlike real bimetallism, the 
exchange ratio between the two currencies was not fixed; the ratio rather varied in time 
and in place.
89
 
90
   
 
Currency and units in Beijing 
Qing China’s monetary system was far from fully integrated. In terms of circulation, 
many of the monies had their own regional or local circuits. As in many traditional 
economies, in China’s the monetary unit and the unit of account were often separate. 
Various ‘ghost units’ were adopted in different places for accounting purposes only.  
 
In Beijing, the local unit for silver was the market tael (shiping), and the unit of account 
for copper cash was metropolitan cash (jingqian) instead of wen.
91
 Because of the 
                                                 
85
 China did not have the concept of central banking until 1902. Money exchange service was dominated 
by private banks, which profited from the volatile market exchange ratio. The semi-official banks 
(guanqianpu) that discussed later in this chapter were all modelled after the private banks, and were 
established for profit purpose instead of for market stabilisation purpose.  
86
 The market exchange rates between silver and copper cash fluctuated from 1:800 in early Qing period 
(1647-1764) to 1:2230 in 1855, Lin, "Latin America Silver and China During the Daoguang Reign," 29. 
87
 These native banks are normally called yinhao in the North and qianzhuang (ch’ien-chuang) in the 
South. King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, 41. Rawski, Rawski, Economic Growth in Prewar 
China 139-45. 
88
 ibid.  
89
 Peng and King both preferred the use of ‘parallel bimetallic system’. Peng, A Monetary History of 
China, 521. King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, 39-42. 
90
 Some scholars argue that the currency of modern China could not be called a system. It is rather 
composed of a number of systems. The systems only encountered each other (i.e. the silver and copper 
sectors were only loosely connected) in trade centres. Wen Pin Wei, The Currency Problem in 
China(New York: Columbia University, 1914), 30.    
91
 Unlike the market in Beijing, the central government treated kuping silver tael and strings of copper 
cash as its official units.  
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nature of small daily transactions, metropolitan cash currency was the universal unit in 
price quotations, denominations of paper notes and in account books. 
 
Besides silver and copper cash, there were the banknotes issued by private local banks 
in big cities. These were convertible notes linked to copper cash or silver. In Beijing, 
the notes convertible to silver were denominated in market tael and were usually issued 
for long-distance remittance. Most of the banknotes in market circulation were notes 
convertible to copper cash; these were denominated in the local unit ‘metropolitan cash’, 
or a diao of ‘metropolitan cash’.92  Because private banks did not form a national 
network, private banknotes, although convertible, normally had a very limited area of 
circulation (normally within a city).
93
 
 
1.2.4 The looming fiscal crisis and monetary policy debates 
To make things worse, the Taiping Rebellion swept through the Yangtze Valley in 1853 
and established its capital in Nanjing. The Taiping occupation of the south cut off the 
central government from several important sources of revenue: tax revenues and grain 
tributes from the southern provinces; the salt tax from the Huai area; and the copper 
from Yunnan (for the imperial mint).
94
 As a consequence, the central government was 
short of both silver (from taxation) and copper cash (from the imperial mint). During 
the summer of the same year, the central government realised that it could not even 
afford pay salaries: there were only 293,798 taels of silver stored in the Treasury vault, 
while the payroll for lower-ranking officials already required 300,000 taels,
95
 not to 
mention another 420,000 taels of silver as the salary for the bannermen.
96
 The 
government was in such urgent need of money that three giant gold bells from the 
imperial household, weighing more than a thousand kilogrammes, and later, some 
copper utensils from the imperial vault were melted down to cast copper cash.
97
 
                                                 
92
 One copper cash was worth 2 metropolitan cash. This ratio changed permanently after the Xianfeng 
Reign. A diao was 1,000 metropolitan cash. Kaixiang Peng, "Price and Wage Change in Contemporary 
Beijing: From the  Early 19th to Early 20th Centuries  (Jindai Beijing Jiage Yu Gongzi De Bianqian: 19 
Shiji Chu Zhi 20 Shiji Chu)," Seminar on Chinese Financial History Working Paper (2011): 3-4.  
93
 Rawski, Economic Growth in Prewar China 127.  
94
 Chen, "The Hsien-Feng Inflation," 580. King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, 144-5. 
95
 Salaries were paid twice per year, once in spring and once in autumn. The salaries for high ranking 
officials had already been suspended in the spring of 1853.  
96
 Board of Revenue memorial submitted by Junzao Qi (Day16 Month7 Xianfeng3), Financial Archive 
Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 177. 
97
 Ibid., 179-82. 
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The central government struggled to increase income and cut expenditure. However, 
occasional incomes such as juanna and baoxiao took time to collect, and this source of 
income was declining. Concerning juanna, there were only so many degrees and offices 
to sell to a limited number of purchasers each year.
98
 Baoxiao also declined as the 
economy did.
99
 Furthermore, military expenses as the major expenditure would be most 
unlikely to come to an end. The salaries of government officials and soldiers were not 
increased after1838 on, and in real terms even declined.
100
 
 
Various remedies were discussed among state officials to temporarily increase 
government income. Most of the proposals related to monetary policy. Given the silver 
shortage, some suggested that the state should manage its own silver mining so that the 
money circulation in China would depend less on the supply of silver dollars from 
abroad.
101
 Some disagreed, pointing to the practical difficulty of mining and minting 
silver, and suggested putting an end to the use of silver,
102
 increasing the copper cash 
coinage and also coining copper coins of higher denominations.
103
 This suggestion was 
in fact a coinage debasement, and it would also make the already high silver-copper 
cash exchange ratio rise further.
104
 Some suggested including other precious minerals 
(gold and even jade) as part of the currency system and banning the secular use of 
precious metals such as gold and silver.
105
 Others, recognising the difficulty of setting 
multiple exchange rates and the high transaction cost of low-value metal coins (such as 
copper cash), advocated the use of paper money, convertible or inconvertible.
106
 
                                                 
98
 The government encouraged juanna by giving discounts on the original price of each title. During 
1851-53, the total income from juanna amounted to around 3,670,000 taels, which made up almost 22% 
of the central government income. However, from 1854 onwards this income shrank sharply to a mere 
40,000 taels in a good year and 3,000 in a bad year. Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the 
Late 19th Century China, 146 and 67. 
99
 Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 175-6. 
Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 167-8. 
100
 Lin, "China Upside Down," 129-30. 
101
 Most notably by Yuan Wei, intellectual and social reformist of the early 19
th
 century. Shichang Ye, 
Baojin Li, and Xiangcai Zhong, History of Chinese Monetary Theory Vol. 2 (Zhongguo Huobi Lilun Shi: 
Xia Bian)(Beijing: China Finance Press, 1993), 7-11. 
102
 Ibid., 40-5. 
103
 Traditional copper cash did not have the value inscribed on the face. All cash carried the same face 
value, one wen.  
104
 Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 143-58. 
105
 Ibid., 182-4.  
106
 Whether or not the paper money should be convertible was a debate which had lasted for decades, 
before its materialization in 1853. For details please refer to: Ye, Li, and Zhong, History of Chinese 
Monetary Theory Vol. Ii, 11-40. Lin, "China Upside Down," 147-64. 
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Despite its initial hesitation, the central government was forced to introduce a series of 
new monetary policies. They included a debased coinage, the issue of inconvertible 
government paper notes, and the opening of official banks. Hastily introduced, these 
policies differed greatly from the ideas of the original court debates, and the policies 
lacked coherence. King comments that ‘the coherent monetary reform which had been 
planned […] by several of the Emperor’s advisers had degenerated into an attempt to 
force a depreciated currency on the people while placing obstacles in the way of its 
return to the government’.107  The following sections will explore the details of the 
monetary policy (by examining the new monies one by one), using information 
extracted from archival materials. 
  
                                                 
107
 King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, 156. 
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1.3 Analysis of the Xianfeng monetary policy: 
monies and their performance 
 
Monetary policies during Xianfeng’s reign were basically a series of forms of money 
creation (coinage debasement and the issue of paper notes) followed by the founding of 
institutions to facilitate their circulation. The debased coins and paper notes were 
distinct in nature and should be discussed separately.  
 
This section traces data about these new monies in archival materials (most of all in the 
Imperial Treasury Records and court memorials) and examines each of the new 
monies.
108
 The discussion includes the legal and institutional design of the money, the 
approximate quantities issued by the government, the channel through which the 
government introduced it into the market, and the market reaction. 
 
After the individual examinations, this section will assess the Xianfeng monetary policy 
as a whole. Data series of annual money creation and total money in circulation have 
been compiled. I first look at the function of the new monies in central government 
revenue and expenditure. I then calculate the approximate annual money stock by 
integrating the newly created money and compare the growth trend of this money with 
Beijing’s price index.  
  
Table 1-1 Timeline: introduction and suspension of new types of monies 
 
Unit Types Issue Suspension 
Big cash wen, string 
5, 10, 50, 100, 200, 
300, 400, 500, 1000  
1853 
1855 - casting of denominations 
other than 10-wen stopped; 
1890 - casting of 10-wen 
denomination stopped. 
Iron cash wen, string 1, 5, and 10 1854 1859 
Silver 
notes 
tael 1, 3, 5, 10, and 50 1853 
Printing stopped in 1856, use 
suspended in 1860. 
Copper 
notes 
wen, string 
500, 1000, 1500, 
2000, 5000, 10000, 
50000, 100000 
1853 1860 
Official 
banknotes 
Met.cash, 
diao 
Various 1853 1861 
Source: Peng (1983), p.88. 
                                                 
108
 For details of the archives consulted and the features of the treasury records, please see Appendices A 
and B.  
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1.3.1 Decomposition of the new monies 
Debased coins 
 
Big cash 
Big cash were different from the traditional copper cash (the standard cash) in shape, 
weight and face value. The standard copper cash had a uniform shape, purity and weight. 
They all bore the same value (1 wen) and therefore no face value was engraved on 
standard cash. Big cash were, as the name suggests, bigger and heavier than the 
traditional cash. Big cash also had different face values engraved on them. The 
denominations were 5, 10, 50, 100, 500 and 1,000 wen, although the weights did not 
increase proportionately to the increase in face value. (For an image of the big cash 
please see Appendix E 1-1; and for an image of the standard cash please see Appendix 
E 1-2) 
 
In the third month of 1853,
109
 after repeated campaigns by the group of metallists at 
court,
110
 the Emperor approved the issue of big cash in order to solve the copper cash 
shortage caused by the lack of copper ingots in the imperial mints.
111
 The first big cash 
were 10-wen big cash,
112
 with a weight of 0.6 liang and a fineness similar to that of a 
standard cash, indicating a depreciation of 50 per cent.
113
 In 1854, big cash with much 
higher denominations were also minted: 50-wen, 100-wen, 500-wen, and 1,000-wen, 
weighing 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, and 2 liang respectively.
114
 The higher the denomination, the 
more debased they were: the 1,000-wen big cash (of similar purity and 2 liang of weight) 
represented a debasement of 98.3 per cent. Big cash of very high denomination (such as 
500 or 1,000 wen) were so debased that people refused to use them. These big cash 
                                                 
109
 Day18, Month3, Xianfeng3 (24 April 1853), Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the 
Late 19th Century China, 88. 
110
 Notably Princes Gong and Hui, Shaoji He and Zaiquan. Chen, "The Hsien-Feng Inflation," 580-1. 
111
 Big cash is translated from the Chinese equivalent ‘da qian’, meaning copper coins bigger than copper 
cash.   
112
 10-wen big cash, called ‘dang shi da qian’ in Chinese, meaning ‘big cash equivalent to ten’. Because  
10-wen big cash were the only form of big cash accepted and widely circulated, the  ‘10-wen big cash’  is 
referred to hereafter  as ‘big cash’ unless stated otherwise.   
113
 A standard cash weighs 0.12 liang and is worth one wen. The official weight of the 10-wen big cash 
was later reduced to 0.44 liang. Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century 
China, 89. 
114
 Big cash with denominations of 200, 300 and 400 wen were also cast in Beijing, for a brief period in 
1854. However their exact mint output has never been found in any document and it is therefore 
suspected that the casting of those coins was only a trial and they never circulated. Selected archive in 
modern Chinese monetary history, op. cit., pp. 254-55, iibid. 
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were heavy to carry, and also difficult to distinguish: there was little difference of 
weight between a piece of 100-wen big cash and a 500-wen one. Although the face 
value was inscribed on the coins, most of their users were illiterate and therefore could 
not tell the difference.
115
 Lacking both real value and convenience, big cash 
denominations higher than 50 wen ceased to be minted within a year.
116
 The casting of 
10-wen big cash dominated the production of the imperial mints.
117
 The manufacture 
and use of 10-wen big cash in Beijing lasted until 1890.
118
 
 
 
Figure 1-2 Annual mint output (copper cash and big cash) from the Imperial mints 
in Beijing (total nominal values, in millions of strings), 1821–70 
 
N.B. figures are calculated from entries under ‘Department of Guangxi’, Incoming Category of Treasury 
Records of the reigns of Daoguang (1821-50), Xianfeng (1851-61) and Tongzhi (1862-74).  
Source: Imperial Treasury Records, copies from the Library of The Institute of Economics, CASS. 
 
Coins minted by the Imperial mints were deposited in the Treasury, and therefore the 
mint output (in nominal values) can be tracked through the Treasury Records. Figure 1-
2 shows the annual mint output (in nominal value) from the Imperial mints, taken from 
the Treasury Records. With part of the Treasury Records missing, we have only the 
                                                 
115
 Chen, "The Hsien-Feng Inflation," 584. 
116
 Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 103-4. Memorial of 
Junzao Qi of Board of Revenue (Day26 Month7 Xianfeng4), Financial Archive Division, Selected 
Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 265-6.  
117
 The production of 5-wen big cash was also suspended because of they cost more to produce than the 
10-wen big cash did.  
118
 Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 104-5. 
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mint output in 1851, 1852, 1853, 1855, 1856, 1859 and 1860. The total coinage from 
1851 to 1861 is reported as 11,090,500 strings.
119
 As the mints cast cash according to 
the quota set by the Board of Revenue and the quota was in turn set according to the 
quantity of cash needed in the budget, most of the cash stored in the Treasury would be 
spent by the end of the year. We can therefore take the amount of cash in expenditure as 
a proxy for the mint output for the years 1854, 1858 and 1861. The output for the year 
1858 is calculated by deducting the total of other years’ figures from the reported grand 
total (11,090,500 strings). Making a reasonable guess, we can form an estimate of 
minting conditions during Xianfeng’s reign (1851-61) shown in Table 1-2. Except for 
1854 and 1855, the average mint output during 1851-61 was actually lower than the 
average of the previous decades. Moreover, the relatively high output during 1854-55 
may be attributed to the casting of big cash with extremely high denominations (they 
became valueless immediately, and their coinage was suspended after 1855). Since all 
figures in the Treasury Records are total nominal values, we cannot know the exact 
numbers of the various cash minted; however it is certain that most of the coins were 
10-wen big cash.
120
  
 
How were big cash channelled into the market? The government did not own or operate 
any banks. Traditionally during the Qing Dynasty, copper cash cast in state mints were 
only used for paying bannermen
121
 and workers on government construction projects.
122
 
The big cash minted after 1853 served the same function. Standard and big cash were 
then brought into the market through the purchases of bannermen and workers. The 
                                                 
119
 Ibid., 88. 
120
 After the confusing period of 1854-55, the imperial mint coinage stabilized the combination of 
standard cash and big cash. The output of standard cash fell to around 20% of the total output, and after 
1857 to less than 7%. Ibid., 79-80, 88. 
121
 In fact all Manchu people (including the imperial house) were classified into one of the eight banners, 
which were both a social and military unit). Later some Han people (usually Manchu's family servants for 
generations) also became bannermen. After the conquering of China, bannermen served as guards in the 
capital and also several strategic posts around the country, and Manchus were forbidden to take any other 
type of job because they were not allowed to mix up with the Han people. Therefore beside from the 
actual standing army and some government officials with royal descent, the majority of ordinary 
bannermen in Beijing became jobless inhabitants living on a low but stable income paid by the Manchu 
government. This sort of government expenditure was named as ‘salaries for bannermen’ in the treasury 
account books, although they in fact resembled today’s social security assistance, but only for population 
within the eight banners. After centuries of living south of the Great Wall, the Standing Imperial Army 
composed of bannermen proved incapable of combat. Since 1850s, the real army fighting the rebels 
consisted entirely of local military troops recruited and financed by provincial officials (therefore rarely 
occurred in central government expenditure). 
122
 Before 1853, 20% of the salaries for bannermen and workers were paid in cash, with the other 80% 
paid in silver. All other central government expenditure (such as military expenditures or salaries for 
government officials) was paid purely in silver.  
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introduction of the 10-wen big cash met some reluctance in the market, and was soon 
followed by rampant counterfeiting. Big cash were, by government decree, intended to 
circulate according to their face value, side by side with the standard copper cash. The 
traditional standard cash were therefore not called in to be reminted. Predictably, the 
undervalued standard cash were melted down and forged into 10-wen big cash. (The 
forgeries weighed less than those minted by the state; eventually the weight of a big 
cash dropped to around 0.22 liang, and the intrinsic value of a 10-wen big cash was 
only 2 wen.)
123
 The market was finally dominated by 10-wen big cash
124
 and standard 
cash were rarely seen. Still, these coins could circulate only within the capital and at a 
discount.
125
 We see from that within two months of its introduction, a 10-wen big cash 
coin attracted a discount of more than 30 per cent. The exchange rate of big cash 
fluctuated with a clear downward trend, and stabilized at 20 per cent of its face value, 
being credited with a value of 2 wen instead of its face value of 10. 
 
 
Table 1-2 Annual money creation, amended by estimation (in strings) 
Regnal 
Year 
Year Copper cash Iron cash Silver notes Copper notes Banknotes 
XF1 1851 1245809 
    
XF2 1852 823833 
    
XF3 1853 1190287 
  
(1000000) 
 
XF4 1854 (3040551) (1808160) 
 
(6000000) (7846072) 
XF5 1855 1812804 (1808160) 
 
4063302 7613332 
XF6 1856 326546 (1360920) 
 
4405443 7448997 
XF7 1857 (606602) (1360920) 
 
(4150834) (7448997) 
XF8 1858 (629857) (1360920) 
 
(1510663) (11360116) 
XF9 1859 900000 
  
2120455 18337552 
XF10 1860 344671 
  
3706823 3442130 
XF11 1861 (169540) 
  
(155518) (408881) 
Total 11090500 (7699080) 9781200 27113038 (63906076) 
N.B. For detailed calculations please see Appendices A and B (Appendix B 1-4). Figures in brackets are 
estimations, of which: 1) for 1854, 58 and 61: the figures for expenditure are used as a proxy of money 
creation, and for 1857 the figures are calculated by deducting the total of other years from the grand total; 
2) annual output of iron cash as estimated by Peng (1983); 3) figures for the issue of copper notes (see 
page 28, below) in 1853 and 1854 are from the minimum estimation from archive documents, Huang 
                                                 
123
 Because copper cash had little value, they were less likely to be used as a store of value; nor were they 
likely to be exported elsewhere, since a large number of copper cash would be very heavy and the cost of 
moving them would be very high. Therefore when copper cash was undervalued, it was more likely to be 
melted down for counterfeiting than to be stored or exported. Moreover, it is likely that the copper cash of 
areas near Beijing might be shipped into the city to be reminted into big cash.  
124
 As 10-wen big cash was the only type of big cash really in use, the paper will use big cash to refer 
to ’10-wen big cash’ for purpose of simplicity, unless stated otherwise.   
125
 Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 277-8. 
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(2012); 4) the value of the banknotes deposited in the Treasury includes notes issued by official banks and 
by the Copper Donation Bureau. The estimation is therefore higher than Peng’s figure. 
Source: Imperial Treasury Records; Huang (2012), p. 137; Peng (1983), pp. 80 and 115.  
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Figure 1-3 Index of the value of the new debased coins and currency against silver.  
 
Sources: Secret memorials of the Qing Court (First Historical Archive); Expenditure reports of Imperial 
Household Department (First Historical Archive), Selected archive in modern Chinese monetary history, 
Vol. I. (1965); Zhang (1970). For details please see Appendix C.  
 
 
Figure 1-4 Index of the value of the new debased coins and currency against 
standard copper cash (i.e. the original full-bodied copper coin) 
 
Sources: Ibid. For details please see Appendix C. 
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Other debased coins 
From the second month of 1854, iron cash was minted to supplement the big cash.
126
 
Because it was made of a base metal, the intrinsic value of iron cash was much lower 
than that of the standard copper cash. The aim of casting iron cash was to meet the 
demand for small change, now that the market was flooded with cash of high 
denominations and standard cash (valued at 1 wen) were rare. Denominations included 
1, 5 and 10 wen. Compared to standard copper cash (1 wen), a 1-wen iron cash 
indicated a debasement of 70 per cent. Similar to big cash, iron cash with higher face 
value represented a greater debasement.
127
 It was also reported that lead cash was 
minted for a brief period in 1854, although it seems that lead coins were never actually 
introduced into the market.
128
  
 
Iron cash were first minted by the Imperial mints. Later an iron cash office was set up 
specifically for casting iron cash.
129
 Iron cash were stored at the iron cash office. The 
Treasury Records registered very few entries of iron cash
130
 and the actual annual 
output of iron cash is not clear. Peng provides an estimated annual figure based on 
information disclosed in government memorials: an average of 1,808,160 strings per 
year during 1854-55 and 1,360,920 strings per year during 1856-59. 
 
Similar to the function of big cash, iron cash was mainly used mainly to pay the salaries 
of bannermen and workers. Government memorials show that big quantities of iron 
cash were used for salary payments during 1856 and 1857, because ‘the public was 
craving small change’.131132 By the end of 1856, 10-wen iron cash had depreciated too 
much and dropped out of circulation. Only 1-wen iron cash still circulated, but shops 
often refused to take the coins. The counterfeiting of iron cash was also intensive, 
                                                 
126
 Day2 Month2 Xianfeng4 (28 February 1854), Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the 
Late 19th Century China, 88. 
127
 The market price of iron was 40 wen (standard cash) per jin (catty). A catty iron could be cast into 133 
1-wen iron cash, or 66 5-wen iron cash (a total face value of 330 wen), or 53 10-wen iron cash (a total 
nominal value of 530 wen). Disregarding the cost of minting, a 1-wen iron cash indicated a debasement of 
70%. Iron cash can easily be minted with iron scrap, which cost 15 wen per jin. Peng, A Monetary History 
of China, 89. 
128
 Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 223-4. 
129
 Ibid., 232-4. 
130
 Only one entry in the Incoming Category of 1856 shows that 431,515.849 strings of iron cash was 
deposited in the treasury vault. "Copy of the Imperial Treasury Records ", ed. CASS Social research 
division(Beijing1930). 
131
 Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 277-8. 
132
 This may be supplementary evidence to suggest that copper cash almost disappeared in or before 1856.  
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hastening the money’s depreciation.133 Iron cash soon became valueless and the coinage 
was suspended in 1859.
134
 
 
Impact of the policy of debased coinage: depreciation of the unit of account 
The coins during Xianfeng’s reign were limited in number and in use. The total output 
of copper cash, big cash and iron cash is estimated at 18,789,580 strings, equivalent to 
around 9.4 million silver taels for the entire eleven years.
135
 Given an average central 
government expenditure at around 11.8 million taels per year in normal years, the 
numbers created from debased coinage were unable to relieve the fiscal pressure to any 
significant extent.
136
 Moreover, debased coins could hardly be used for important 
expenditures. They were instead used to pay salaries, making sure that in nominal 
figures the payments seemed to be unaffected by any actual budget cut. 
 
Coinage debasement during this period was drastic (in terms of the high face value and 
the coarse metal used) and unprecedented in the Qing Dynasty, suggesting that the 
government was aiming for higher seigniorage. However, given the limited storage for 
copper ingots in Beijing, the big cash coinage seems more like an economical use of 
copper. Seigniorage revenue generated by debasement can be lucrative if the 
debasement compels the market to bring metal and old coins into the mint to have them 
reminted into new and lighter coins. However, in Xianfeng’s case, the mint did not 
remint old coins at all. Demonstrating Gresham’s Law, the reminting process 
nonetheless took place via large-scale counterfeiting which eventually eliminated 
standard cash from the Beijing market. In this sense, lucrative seigniorage revenues did 
occur during the debasement originally led by the government, but the profit went into 
private rather than public hands.  
 
The coinage debasement added to the chaotic monetary situation in Beijing. The 
overvalued big cash completely drove out the standard cash in 1857, and when iron 
cash were introduced to the market (with the aim of providing cash of small 
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 Elisabeth Kaske, "Silver, Copper, Rice and Debt: Monetary and Office Selling in China During the 
Taiping Rebellion " in Money in Asia (1200-1900): Small Currencies in Social and Political Contexts, ed. 
Jane Kate Leonard and Ulrich Theobald(Forthcoming), 361. 
134
 King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, 150. 
135
 The total was estimated as shown in Table 1-2 (p.31) Conversion into silver taels is carried out 
according to the official exchange ratio which was 1 tael of silver to 2 strings (of copper cash).  
136
 Average annual expenditure during 1821-50, calculated from Appendix B 1-1. 
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denominations), big cash became a relatively valuable currency, and its exchange rate in 
the market soared from the beginning of 1857 until mid-1858 (see Figure 1-3 and 
Figure 1-4). By 1859, only big cash remained in circulation. Within six years, the 
commonly used money in Beijing had changed from standard cash to big cash. 
 
This change of the money in common use permanently changed the unit of account, 
which depreciated to 20 per cent of its original value. In the Beijing market, prices were 
quoted either in metropolitan cash or a diao of metropolitan cash (which was 1,000 
metropolitan cash); but both were ghost units. Before 1853, a diao of metropolitan cash 
was satisfied by paying 500 standard cash (i.e. 500 wen). During the period of inflation, 
10-wen big cash gradually replaced standard cash, and a diao of metropolitan cash was 
nominally satisfied by 50 big cash (nominally also 500 wen), except that the purchasing 
power of a big cash continued to slide. After the crisis, standard cash totally 
disappeared, though the market use of big cash and the practice of counting 50 big cash 
as one diao remained.
137
 By then a coin of 10 wen big cash was worth only 2 standard 
cash. If we measure the value of the unit by a stable anchor currency – the standard cash, 
a diao of metropolitan cash was worth 500 wen before 1853; after 1861, however, a 
diao of metropolitan cash was worth 100 wen. The unit had depreciated by 80 per cent. 
It seems that during the interval of 1853-61 (when currency situation was chaotic and 
many coins had unstable metallic contents due to various reasons such as official 
debasement, implicit mint debasement as well as private counterfeiting), money’s 
purchasing power explains better the rate of inflation. After the currency stabilisation of 
1861, the quantity theory of money for explaining general price levels becomes credible. 
  
Government paper notes 
Two types of government note were introduced during Xianfeng’s reign: the silver note 
(yinpiao) and the copper cash notes (baochao). The Board of Revenue printed these two 
paper notes to fill the gap (at least in book value), as the supply of real silver and real 
copper cash was running low in its vault. The government decree stated that these paper 
notes should be taken and used as if they were real silver and copper cash, and should 
                                                 
137
 Kaixiang Peng, "Research on the Currency and Prices of Beijing, 1830s-1920s: Focusing on the 
Account Book of the Fire-God Society (1835-1926) (Jindai Beijing Huobi Xingyong Yu Jiage Bianhua 
Guankui: Jiandu Huoshenhui Zhangben 1835-1926)," Forum of Economic Development Working Papers 
Series No. FC20080161(2008): 3-5. King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, 158-63. 
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circulate side by side with silver ingot and copper cash at par. Although the names of 
these two notes seem to link them with metals, they were inconvertible from the 
outset.
138
 
 
Silver notes 
The full name of a silver note was ‘Official Paper Note of the Board of Revenue’ (hubu 
guanpiao); it was carefully printed in blue ink on a piece of fine paper. Below the title 
was stated the value of the note: the denominations were 1, 3, 5, 10 and 50 taels.
139
 (For 
an image of the silver note, please see Appendix E 1-3) 
 
Silver notes were introduced in the second month of 1853.
140
 They were first used to 
pay the salaries of government officials because the Board of Revenue reported that the 
real silver stock in the vault was too low even for immediate payments.
141
 In the 
summer of 1853, to partly replace real silver the use of notes was extended to all other 
kinds of expenditure. Silver notes issued in Beijing were also sent to other provinces 
mostly as central government expenditure on military or construction projects.
142
 The 
regulation stated that all government expenditures would be 80 per cent in real silver 
and 20 per cent in silver notes. Silver notes could be used for the payment of taxes and 
title sales (juanna and juanshu), and the composition of payments should also be 80 per 
cent real silver and 20 per cent silver notes.
143
 This ratio (in government expenditure 
and in people’s payments to the government) changed to half in silver and half in 
government notes (silver notes as well as copper notes up to a total of 50 per cent) in the 
later months of 1853.
144
 
                                                 
138
 Notable supporters for the use of paper notes included Maoyin Wang (Vice-President of the Board of 
Revenue), Yide Wang (Governor of Fujian Province) and Huashana (former vice-president of the Board 
of Revenue). While Maoyin Wang argued for the issue of convertible notes linked to banks, other 
officials were all inclined to issue unbacked paper notes. Chen, "The Hsien-Feng Inflation," 581. King, 
Money and Monetary Policy in China, 154. 
139
 It was often referred to as an ‘official paper note’ (guanpiao), or silver note (yinpiao) in government 
documents.  
140
 ‘Regulation on the issue of silver notes’, memorial submitted by Huashana (Day17, Month2, 
Xianfeng3), Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 
352. Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 88. 
141
 Financial Archive Division of the People’s Bank of China, Selected archive in modern Chinese 
monetary history, Vol. I. Late Qing Period (1840-1911), (Zhongguo jindai huobishi ziliao), Beijing: 
Zhonghua Book Company, 1964, p. 341. 
142
 Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 75-7. 
143
 ‘Regulation of silver notes’ memorial by Huashana (Day 17 Month2 Xianfeng3), Financial Archive 
Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 350-2, 410-6. 
144
 Ibid., 410-6. 
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The silver notes had limited use in the market. Because of their high face value, silver 
notes were not a convenient means of daily exchange. More importantly, silver notes 
were not convertible to monies with real value. When they were first used to pay official 
salaries in the second month of 1853, the government made a promise that, after six 
months, people could take the notes to the Treasury to have them redeemed.
145
 
Apparently by the eighth month of 1853 this promise had not been kept. During the 
ninth month of 1853, official banks were established to exchange silver notes.
146
 
However, these official banks refused to exchange silver notes for real silver. Instead, 
they exchanged silver notes, as well as copper notes, for big cash and their own 
banknotes.
147
 During the ninth month of 1853, a 1-tael silver note could be exchanged 
for 200 pieces of 10-wen big cash.
148
 
 
Although silver notes did not circulate well, they were sometimes traded through 
official banks. Some people were willing to purchase silver notes (at a discount), and 
use them as part of their payment of taxes or for title purchases. The regulation stated 
that people were not allowed to make more than half of the payment in paper notes, but 
in practice the proportion of paper notes that would be accepted was lower.
149
 The 
difficulty of paying tax with silver notes further undermined their credibility. Silver 
depreciated quickly in the exchange market: by the end of 1856 a ‘one-tael’ silver note 
could be exchanged only for 800 to 900 wen (standard cash), exhibiting a depreciation 
of more than 60 per cent. Furthermore, in 1859 silver notes depreciated to only 5 per 
cent of their face value.
150
 In 1856, the government stopped printing new silver notes 
                                                 
145
 ‘Memorial on issuing silver notes and other promissory notes’ submitted by Zaiquan, (Day26, 
Month12, Xianfeng2), ibid., 327-9 and 55-6. 
146
 Month4, Xianfeng3. Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 
93. 
147
 Memorial submitted by Ciheng Zhang on ‘Suggested modifications on government note regulation for 
the purpose of better circulation’ (Day22 Month8 Xianfeng3), Financial Archive Division, Selected 
Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 361-2. 
148
 On the same day, the market exchange rate for a real silver ingot against standard copper cash was 1 
tael = 2,500 wen. In addition, big cash had already depreciated by more than 40%. Currency exchange 
information is taken from Dechang Zhang, Life of a Qing Mandarin in Beijing(Hong Kong: Chinese 
University of Hong Kong Press, 1970), 233.   
149
 It was repeatedly mentioned in the memorials that local prefects and magistrates often insisted on all 
taxes being paid only in silver, and then used the silver to buy (often heavily discounted) paper notes and 
then paid the due total into the provincial treasury with a combination of silver and paper notes, earning 
themselves a profit and undermining the credibility of paper notes (Chen, "The Hsien-Feng Inflation," 
585. 
150
 The calculation is based on the exchange ratio (2,230 wen per tael) in North China in 1850 provided by 
Yan (1955). The exchange ratio in Beijing in 1856 may have been even higher with the scarcity of copper 
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(although the use of silver notes in expenditure continued until 1860) and concentrated 
on the manufacture and promotion of copper notes.
151
 
 
According to the Board of Revenue memorial, the total amount of silver notes issued 
during 1853-60 was 9,781,200 taels.
152
 This figure is not particularly high, and a large 
share of the silver notes was used outside Beijing. Unfortunately, the Treasury Records 
bookkeeping did not distinguish silver notes from real silver. In the Treasury Records 
all transactions with ‘taels’ as the unit of account were recorded as ‘silver taels’ without 
specifying whether they were real silver or silver notes,
153
 so the annual figure of silver 
notes pumped into the Beijing market through government expenditure is regrettably 
unknown. 
 
Copper notes 
Copper notes were introduced by the end of the year 1853 to replace that part of the 
expenditure which was formerly paid in copper cash.
154
 The official full name of copper 
notes was ‘Precious paper money of the Great Qing’.155 The copper notes had a design 
similar to that of silver notes, except that the unit of copper notes was wen. The 
denominations were: 500; 1,000; 1,500; and 2,000 wen.
156
 (For an image of the copper 
note, please see Appendix E 1-4) 
 
As with silver notes, the regulation stated that copper notes could be used for 
government payments, and would be accepted by the government in payment of taxes 
and for the purchase of degrees and titles (up to 50 per cent of the amount could be paid 
in silver notes and copper notes).
157
 Like silver notes, copper notes had limited 
convertibility, but they were better received by the market than silver notes were. 
                                                                                                                                               
cash being driven by big cash and iron cash. Yan, Selected Statistics in the Economic History of Modern 
China, 37.  
151
 Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 415-6. 
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 Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 115. 
153
 Occasionally beside an expenditure entry is a note that this was paid in ‘silver notes’, mostly in 
bannermen’s payrolls and in the payment of bank reserves.  
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 Day 24 Month11 Xianfeng 3 (24 December 1853), Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of 
the Late 19th Century China, 88. 
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 In Chinese this is called ‘daqing baochao’, often shortened to ‘baochao’.  
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 Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 88.  
157
 ‘Regulation on copper notes’, submitted by Junzao Qi, of the Board of Revenue (Day17, Month11, 
Xianfeng3), Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 
372-8. 
Chapter 1. Reassessing the Xianfeng Inflation                                                                                            41 
 
 
 
Government reports show that shops refused to accept copper notes
158
 but they could be 
fairly easily exchanged for official banknotes. Copper notes could also be purchased (at 
a discount) from the official banks to purchase titles and to pay taxes. The government 
soon recognized the greater popularity of copper notes than silver notes, and promoted 
the issue of copper notes instead. In 1855, many more copper notes were issued,
159
 and 
five more official banks (the Yu Group) were set up specifically for exchanging copper 
notes. Having insufficient reserves, the banks of the Yu Group could not exchange 
copper notes for big cash, but they exchanged copper notes mainly for their own 
banknotes. Because they seriously over-issued banknotes and had very limited reserves, 
the Yu Group banks folded in 1857.
160
 Although copper notes were still issued after 
1857 and could be exchanged in other official banks (Qian and Tian Groups), they were 
rarely seen in the market. In 1859, copper notes could no longer be used to pay taxes.
161
 
In 1860, the central government suspended the issue of copper notes (as well as the use 
of silver notes),
162
 and ordered the gradual withdrawal of the existing paper from the 
market.
163
 
 
We can reconstruct approximate annual note issues through the information in the 
treasury records. Because of their relatively small face value, the copper notes issued by 
the Board of Revenue were used mostly for salary payments and their circulation was 
restricted to Beijing.
164
 The treasury records are incomplete, however, and information 
about copper notes is missing for the years 1853, 1854, 1857, 1858, and 1861. For the 
years 1853 and 1854 we use the figures mentioned in memorial reports; for the years 
1858 and 1861, the figures of copper notes in expenditure are used as a proxy of copper 
note issue; the figure for 1857 is then calculated by deduction, since the total issue of 
copper notes is known to have been 27,113,038 strings. In the reconstructed data (Table 
                                                 
158
 One of the reasons was that copper notes were denominated in wen, instead of metropolitan cash, the 
unit commonly used on private banknotes in Beijing.  
159
 Copper notes with much higher denomination were issued in 1855, such as 50,000 wen or 100,000 
wen. Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 423-4. 
160
 Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 91-4. 
161
 Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 424-8. 
162
 Ibid., 415-6. 
163
 Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 96. 
164
 When central government allocated funds to the provinces, they were normally paid in silver and silver 
notes. In addition, copper notes were printed specifically for the provinces, and central government made 
sure that these provincial copper notes could not be used in the capital; they would not be accepted in 
banks or in the payment of taxes.  
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1-2, p.31), we also see that the note issue was maintained at a high level during 1854-57. 
The issue dropped after the bank run of 1857. 
 
The value of copper notes depreciated steadily from the date of issue: they depreciated 
to half their face value in 1854, and in 1857 they fell to around 20 per cent of the face 
value (see Figure 1-5 and Figure 1-6, p.48). After 1857, quotes for copper notes were 
rare. It is reported that copper notes dropped to 5 per cent of their face value during the 
eighth month of 1861.
165
 
 
Impact of the policy of government paper notes: a tradable forced debt 
Silver notes and copper notes were printed and issued under the name of the Board of 
Revenue, but from the very beginning they were mere printed paper without any 
reserves.
166
 Unlike big cash, which nevertheless contained some metallic value, paper 
notes were valueless without the institutions that insured convertibility. Commoners in 
Beijing were familiar with paper notes. With the development of private native banks 
during the Qing Dynasty (qianzhuang), banknotes became common in Chinese cities: 
they were promissory notes convertible to the amount of copper cash or silver specified 
on the paper.
167
 Besides the issue of convertibility, both silver notes and copper notes 
did not enjoy market preference because of their high face value: the smallest copper 
note had a face value of 500 wen, while the daily income in the period 1853-60 for an 
unskilled labourer was approximately 93-255 metropolitan cash.
168
 
 
The total issue of government notes amounted to 23,337,719 in terms of silver taels (of 
which a considerable amount in silver notes may not have circulated in Beijing at all).
169
 
This sum was not particularly high compared to the issue of official banknotes. Besides, 
government paper notes were primarily used in salary payment but the recipients of 
these paper notes could not use them to purchase goods in the market, unless they 
                                                 
165
 Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 102-3. 
166
 Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 350-2, 58-
9. Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 93. 
167
 Peng, A Monetary History of China, 557-8. 
168
 Sidney D. Gamble, "Daily Wages of Unskilled Chinese Laborers 1807-1902," The Far Eastern 
Quarterly 3, no. 1 (1943): 60-1. 
169
 The total amount of silver notes was 9,781,200 taels and of copper notes was 27,113,038 strings ( 
 
Table 1-2, p.31). The amount of copper cash in terms of silver taels is converted at the official exchange 
rate: 1 tael is equivalent to 2 strings. 
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exchanged the government paper notes at the official banks, which involved a huge 
discount. The government paper notes helped relieve the fiscal deficit by acting as a 
forced loan from government employees. Through the exchange service of official 
banks and the certainty that government notes could be used for tax payments, 
government debts became a tradable loan (at a discount). With their limited number and 
limited use in the market, the government paper notes are unlikely to have been a major 
cause of the inflation in the market. However, the default on these government papers, 
and the ensuing market panic may have been one cause. 
 
Official banks and official banknotes 
Strictly speaking, banknotes issued by official banks did not form part of the monies 
issued by the government. However, the issue of official banks needs to be addressed, 
since big cash and government paper notes were both intertwined with the function of 
official banks, and the over-issue of banknotes was probably the real reason for the 
inflation. Because official banks were not directly controlled or supervised by the Board 
of Revenue, and their operations were semi-commercial (operated by merchants), few 
records of official banknotes exist and their impact on the market has often been 
overlooked in previous research.
170
  
 
There were three official banking groups: the Tian, Qian and Yu Groups. The Qian 
Group was opened with four branches in 1853, operated directly by the Board of 
Revenue for the purpose of salary payment of the bannermen. The Tian Group was 
originally the royal pawnshop operated by the Imperial Household Department 
(Neiwufu) in 1841, in order to increase the private vault of the imperial household 
(which was separate from the government vault). The Tian Group was converted to 
official banks in 1854 in order to ‘facilitate’ Tian Group in the service of salary 
payment.
171
 The Yu Group was set up in 1855 and was semi-official: operated by 
                                                 
170
 King confuses copper notes with the banknotes issued by the official banks. He mentions that silver 
notes were the direct responsibility of the Board of Revenue while cash notes were issued through official 
banks which were the fiscal agents of the Board of Revenue. But, in fact, silver notes and copper notes 
were both issued by the Board of Revenue, and the official banks were responsible for accepting the notes 
(mostly copper notes) in exchange for big cash or their own banknotes. It seems that King has mixed up 
copper notes with the banknotes issued by official banks, because of their close relationship ( King, 
Money and Monetary Policy in China, 150. 
171
 Memorial of Sushun, Director of the Board of Revenue [Day 3 Month10 XF10], Financial Archive 
Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 474-75. 
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merchants with imperial charter and received (very infrequent) deposits from the Board 
of Revenue. All these banks were modelled on the private native banks of Beijing, and 
they offered money exchange services, accepted deposits and issued their own 
banknotes denominated in ‘metropolitan cash’.172 Different groups delivered slightly 
different services; their funding situation also differed.  
 
The official banknotes were fully convertible notes similar to the banknotes issued by 
private banks (to begin with, at least). Therefore official banknotes were recognised and 
widely used in the market, together with private banknotes. The difference of these 
official banks was that they were responsible for changing government paper notes 
(mostly copper notes) into real money (a combination of big cash, iron cash and official 
banknotes).
173
 With official banks as intermediaries, government paper notes became 
convertible: they were linked to big cash and a larger amount in unbacked official 
banknotes. (For images of the official banknotes please see Appendix E 1-5 and 
Appendix E 1-6; an image of a private banknote is also provided in Appendix E 1-7) 
 
Seeing that banknotes denominated in metropolitan cash could circulate well in the 
market, the government, besides promoting government copper notes, focused on the 
promotion of official banknotes with three major measures. First the government put 
money into the Qian and Tian Groups and encouraged them to issue more banknotes. 
The newly printed banknotes were directly transferred to the Treasury vault and used in 
government expenditure. Second, the government also deposited money with the Yu 
Group, whose banks concentrated on exchanging government copper notes into official 
banknotes.
174
 Moreover, the government established another institution called the 
Copper Donation Bureau (juantongju). Originally set up to encourage people to donate 
copper (in exchange for titles and or degrees), the Bureau became solely responsible for 
receiving all kinds of donations (juanna and juanshu). With these donations in hand, the 
Bureau issued its own banknotes (similar to the official banknotes) that were also put 
                                                 
172
 Banknotes denominated in metropolitan cash were called ‘jingqianpiao’ or ‘jingpiao’ in Chinese. 
173
 Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 470. 
174
 Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 93. 
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directly into the Treasury to be used in government expenditure (mostly bannermen’s 
salaries).
175
 
 
The total number of official banknotes issued is difficult to track down, in that none of 
the bank account books exists today. The number of banknotes printed specifically for 
use in government expenditure can be found in the treasury records. By supplying the 
missing years, we can get a rough idea of the size of the banks’ annual note issue. The 
figures in Table 1-2 (p.31) show that note issues increased significantly during 1858-
59.
176
 The total number of notes issued through government expenditure (from Qian and 
Tian Groups, and the Copper Donation Bureau) was equivalent to 31,953,038 taels.
177
 
As this estimate does not include banknotes circulated in the market through money 
exchange services (in particular the amount issued by the Yu Group), the total quantity 
of banknotes in the market was probably much higher. 
 
The reserves deposited by the government seemed obviously far from enough. From 
government documents we could only learn that each Qian Branch was endowed with a 
government deposit of 20,000 diao of metropolitan cash (directly from the treasury 
under the Board of Revenue) as initial capital. The documents do not specify how often 
the government pumped money into those banks, nor do they specify in which form of 
money the payment was realised.
178
  The treasury records show that in 1853 a total of 
13,784 taels of silver was transferred to the Qian and Tian Groups ‘as their 20 percent 
reserve money’.179 This kind of information never appears in the records of subsequent 
years. From their salary payment service, we could guess that the bank reserve of Qian 
and Tian Group should include big cash and copper cash, as most of the salary 
payments were made in a combination of big cash, standard copper cash and 
                                                 
175
 Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 219-21. 
Kaske, "Silver, Copper, Rice and Debt: Monetary and Office Selling in China During the Taiping 
Rebellion " 363-8. 
176
 Banknotes were denominated in metropolitan cash or diao. In the treasury accounts all figures for 
banknotes were kept with strings as the unit; the figures were converted by the official ratio between 
metropolitan cash and strings, which was 2,000:1 (the official ratio between a diao and a string is 
therefore 2:1).  
177
 The total was 63,906,076 strings, and was equivalent to 31,953,038 silver taels at the official exchange 
rate. Peng’s estimate of the total banknote issue is equivalent to 24,723,955 taels, because he does not 
include the number issued from Copper Donation Bureau. Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition 
of the Late 19th Century China, 115. 
178
 From the knowledge learnt from various government documents, the contents were normally kept 
vague on purpose in order to cover an obvious fact of capital shortage.   
179
 Outgoing Category of 1853, "Treasury Records." The accounting details of these banks no longer exist 
and the treasury records hold incomplete and disorganised information about the official banks. 
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banknotes.
180
 The reserve of the semi-private Yu Group seemed to be the weakest: it 
had an initial capital reserve of around 10,000 string, the group later received 
government deposit composed mainly of iron and lead cash.
181
 Without any surprise Yu 
Group experienced the worst case of the over-issuing which caused the great demand to 
exchange copper notes against a limited reserve of mainly big cash and copper cash. 
After several bank runs, the Yu Group folded in 1857 and the Qian and Tian Groups 
followed suit in June 1861.
182
 
 
  
                                                 
180
 Memorial submitted by Sushun, director of Board of Revenue (Day3 Month10 Xianfeng10), Financial 
Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 474-76. 
181
 Memorial of Mr. Fuxiang Wu [Day27 Month12 XF4], ibid., 494-95. Peng, Public Finance and 
Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 93. 
182
 Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 91-94. 
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1.3.2 New monies in public finance: the currency composition of 
government income and expenditure 
 
Through the above discussion, it is quite clear that a great deal of worthless currency 
was thrown into the market but not much of it flowed back into the treasury vault. This 
section confirms this suggestion by a more thorough examination of the currency 
composition of government income and expenditure at the time.
183
  
 
Structure of government income and expenditure 
The central government revenue and expenditure are reconstructed with information 
extracted from the treasury records (Appendix B 1-1and Appendix B 1-4). From the 
figures (Figure 1-5 and Figure 1-6, p.48), we see that throughout the Qing Dynasty until 
the third year of Xianfeng (1853), revenue consisted of silver only.
184
 After 1854, 
although the specie of expenditure changed (from mainly silver, to a greater part in the 
form of paper notes), the main composition of government income did not vary much: 
revenues were still mainly collected in silver and, at a later stage, in the form of 
numerous official banknotes.
185
 
 
Further investigation on the specific entries of the expenditure shows that payment for 
military purposes was almost always made in silver; other expenditures were paid partly 
in silver and partly in copper notes, with salaries for bannermen being almost always 
paid in banknotes. 
 
This examination shows that although large quantities of government notes were 
pumped into the market, most of the monies did not flow back to the government’s 
vault (except for some official banknotes).  
  
                                                 
183
 For details of the composition of the treasury record, please see Appendix B.  
184
 There were occasional appearances of very small amounts of copper cash, and they were originally 
payment by legal offenders to the Board of Punishment as compensation for their wrongdoing.  
185
 Copper cash (mostly big cash) and copper notes formed only a very small proportion of the revenue. 
They entered the vault as a source of income mainly through the Board of Punishment and the Office of 
Title Selling. Payments for titles were usually made half in silver and half in copper cash or copper notes.  
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Figure 1-5 Currency composition of central government fiscal revenue (in millions 
of taels) 
 
N.B. In the original treasury records, the unit of silver is the tael; the unit for all other forms of money is 
the string. In the above chart, all monies denominated in strings are converted into tael at the official ratio 
of 2:1 (1 tael equals to 2 strings). Source: Incoming Categories (Regnal Years XF 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, and 10), 
Imperial Treasury Records. For details please see Appendix B 1-3. Bigger charts of Figures 1-5 and 1-6 
with patterns provided in following pages) 
 
Figure 1-6 Currency composition of central government expenditure (in millions of 
taels) 
 
Source: Outgoing Categories (XF 2, 3, 8, and 9), summary tables of annual income and expenditure (XF 4, 
6, 9, 11), Imperial Treasury Records. For details please see Appendix B 1-1.  
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Figure 1-5 (Bigger chart with patterns) Currency composition of central 
government fiscal revenue (in millions of taels) 
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Figure 1-6 (Bigger chart with patterns) Currency composition of central 
government fiscal revenue (in millions of taels) 
 
 
 
 
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861
official banknotes Copper notes
(Copper, big, iron) cash Silver
Currency composition of central government  expenditure, 
1851-61 
(in millions of taels) 
 
Chapter 1. Reassessing the Xianfeng Inflation                                                                                            51 
 
 
 
Improved fiscal situation after 1859 
After 1859, the government’s fiscal situation was ameliorated: the amount of tax 
collected in pure silver increased to the pre-crisis level. The evidence of the treasury 
records is supported by government reports. Take salary payments to bannermen, for 
example. Throughout the Qing Dynasty, 20 per cent of the salaries for bannermen were 
paid in copper cash and 80 per cent in silver. From the start of the crisis in 1853, the 
composition of the bannermen’s salary was revised to: 20 per cent in (big or iron) cash, 
40 per cent in silver and 40 per cent in paper notes (a combination of government notes 
and official banknotes). By the end of 1853, all the silver payment was made in a 
combination of cash and banknotes. The year 1857 was probably the direst for the 
bannermen, since the composition of their salary was again revised, to 30 per cent 
copper notes and 70 per cent banknotes. The situation improved after 1859 when the 
composition was changed to 20 per cent in (big or iron) cash, 70 per cent in silver and 
10 per cent in banknotes.
186
 
 
Figure 1-7 The silver component of the central government’s annual revenue (in 
millions of taels), 1821–70 
 
Source: Shi (2009), pp. 198-242. 
  
                                                 
186
 Memorial submitted by Sushun, director of Board of Revenue (Day3 Month10 Xianfeng10), Financial 
Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 474-5. 
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1.3.3 New monies in the market: Money stock and the price level in 
Beijing, 1851-61 
 
How much currency was then circulating in the market and how did it impact on market 
prices?  
 
The previous literature focuses without exception on estimating the ‘increased’ part of 
the money supply and emphasizing how the additional supply of money disturbed the 
market. Admittedly the nominal value of annual money creation was extremely high 
during the period 1853 to 61: it increased almost nine-fold, from 1.14 million (strings of 
copper cash) to 9.5 million (strings of a mixture of monies). However, if the original 
total of money in circulation (the total money supply before 1853) was large, then even 
a relatively high increase in the money supply would not significantly disturb the money 
market. If, however, the original total amount of money in circulation was already small, 
then even a slight increase of money supply would be serious enough to be detected in 
the market.  
 
Trend of money growth in Beijing (1821-70) 
This paper provides an approximate series of the annual money stock: it estimates the 
money stock in Beijing in 1821 as a benchmark year, and adds to this basis the annual 
mint output and note issues in subsequent years.
187
 Figure 1-8 (p.54) shows that the 
money supply continued to increasing slowly throughout 1821-50, and dropped 
suddenly in 1851 and 1852, then surging upwards until 1861. After 1861, there was a 
mild monetary contraction and then the money supply remained stable. Figure 1-8 (p.54) 
is only a very conservative estimate. Still, the growth of money is very high: by the end 
of the inflation period, the money supply had risen to four to five times its original size 
in 1850. 
 
  
                                                 
187
 For details of the data and method used, please refer to Appendix D.  
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Figure 1-8 Money stock in Beijing, 1821-70.  
 
Source: Appendix D. 
 
Trend of price rises in Beijing 
The paper also collects market price information. It is impossible to construct a price 
index with a basket of weighted goods and services for a certain time period. But it is 
possible to obtain a series of certain important goods (for example, grain prices or 
exchange rates).
188
 Two figures (Figure 1-9 and Figure 1-10) show that both wages and 
prices experienced inflation to different degrees. The daily wage of unskilled workers 
increased from less than 100 metropolitan cash in 1854 to over 250 in 1861. Retail 
prices experienced much higher inflation: the indexed figures for the prices of selected 
goods (picked up from account books) show a price rise of five to nine times from 1854 
to 1861.  
 
  
                                                 
188
 For a further explanation of the archival materials concerning price series, please refer to Appendices 
A and C.  
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Figure 1-9 Wages of unskilled workers in a suburb of Beijing, 1807-1870 
  
Source: Gamble (1943), pp. 60-1.  
 
Figure 1-10 Selected price series, 1840-70 (Indexed 1840=100, original unit: 
metropolitan cash) 
 
Source: Peng (2008; 2011). For more details, please see Appendix C. 
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Comparison of money the stock and price level 
Grain prices (Figure 1-11) are the most consistent and reliable series, and because wheat 
(rather than rice) was the major grain consumed in North China, we take the wheat price 
series to compare with the trend in money growth (Figure 1-12). Because the data are 
limited, the figures provide only a rough picture, which is nonetheless very interesting. 
Although the price level kept pace with the increase in money supply during the first 
half of the century, it lagged behind the increase of money stock from the beginning of 
the Xianfeng inflation. A great amount of money (and in the table the amount of money 
increase is only a lower-range estimate) was pumped into the market, whereas the price 
adjustment seemed slow. It was only in 1861 that prices rose sharply and almost 
exceeded the level of money stock. 
 
Oddly enough, the inflation gathered pace from 1858 on, while the growth of note 
issues greatly slowed down in 1859 and 1860, and virtually halted in 1861. As 
discussed above, official banknotes were the major currency that the government 
successfully channelled into the market, and in 1860 the number of banknotes printed 
dropped to 3.4 million strings, less than 20 per cent of the amount in the previous year 
(Table 1-2, p.31). In 1861, only 0.17 million strings in banknotes were used in 
government spending (see Appendix B 1-1). At the same time real government revenues 
(by taxation and in real silver) increased from 1859, and in the years 1860 and 1861, the 
revenue in real silver was already restored to the pre-Taiping Rebellion level of 1852 
(Figure 1-7, p.51). It seems that the worst inflation occurred after the injection of money, 
with a lag of one or two years. The original purpose of the monetary policy from 1853 
was to tackle the fiscal crisis of the central government. From 1860 on, the government 
started to bring the rebellion under its control, and the fiscal situation ameliorated at the 
same time. The inflation did become more serious, but only when the fiscal crisis was 
almost over.
189
 
 
  
                                                 
189
 With the stabilization of the war situation during 1859-60, the provinces were able to transfer to the 
central government the tax revenues which had been kept for local military use, or had been unable to 
reach Beijing because of interception en route). Not only this, but they could also transfer more: the 
ability to tax at the local level was greatly enhanced by the introduction of likin as a new source of 
revenue. In addition, the Inspector-General of Imperial Maritime Customs Service was installed in 
Beijing in 1859, and the customs revenue became a source of income for the Qing government from 1860. 
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Figure 1-11 Grain price indices, 1807-1911 (original unit: metropolitan cash) 
  
Source: Peng (2008; 2011). For more details please see Appendix C. 
 
Figure 1-12 Index of money stock and price in Beijing, 1821-1870 (1821=100) 
 
Source: Appendix D 1-3 
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1.4 The Xianfeng Inflation: a Reassessment 
 
Examination of the treasury records into the number of money issues allows us to 
answer the fiscal puzzles identified at the beginning of the paper: first, did the Xianfeng 
monetary policy achieve its fiscal ends (how much revenue was generated by monetary 
expansion and was it enough to cover the military outlay?); second, by what mechanism 
did the inflation develop? 
1.4.1 Tackling puzzle I: did the monetary policy achieve its fiscal ends? 
Did monetary expansion cover military outlays? 
The problem of an inadequate fiscal system prompted by the expanding military outlay 
was undoubtedly a motive for proposing monetary reform. However, the Xianfeng 
monetary policies carried out were a series of hasty measures that helped only to finance 
the survival of the central government, rather than sustain a series of military operations. 
The monetary policies were first of all temporary and regional. Moreover, the size of the 
fiscal revenue generated by money creation was trivial compared to the actual military 
expenditure. In fact, the military expenditure was covered by the provincial 
governments through their own fiscal reforms. 
 
The monetary policies originated from the central government’s desperate need to fund 
its fiscal deficit, and they were meant to be temporary and regional. Although the 
central government ordered provinces to follow the example set, few provinces 
genuinely implemented those policies. In the 1850s, domestic warfare had rendered the 
country less integrated and the power of the central government over other regions was 
greatly undermined. The Emperor had limited access to fiscal resources, and obedience 
to his commands was equally limited. After its introduction of big cash in 1853, the 
central government ordered provincial mints to follow this precedent in the following 
year. However, the Board of Revenue reported one year later that only three provinces 
had observed the edict.
190
 Most provinces followed by casting big cash a year or two 
                                                 
190
 Memorial by Junzao Qi of Board of Revenue (Day18 Month5 Xianfeng4): only the Provinces of 
Shanxi, Shaanxi and Fujian observed the new measures. Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in 
Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 234-5. 
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later, and the output was never significant.
191,192
 The printing and issue of silver notes 
was controlled and supervised by the Board of Revenue, which would send part of the 
notes (mostly in silver notes) to other provinces. The central government did encourage 
provincial governments to issue their own copper notes and to establish their own 
official banks.
193
 However, with the immediate example of monetary chaos in Beijing, 
even some central government officials objected to a nationwide implementation, 
stating that the situation would simply be more chaotic in places further away from the 
capital. Therefore, provinces were reluctant to implement the policy, despite the 
repeated commands of central government over three years.
194
 
 
Besides the limited area of implementation, the fiscal revenue raised by the monetary 
policies was too small to cover the huge military expenditure. Putting aside the puzzle 
of how valueless papers could be used to buy munitions and feed the army, the nominal 
value of the total issue during 1853-61 was 63,650,726 taels.
195
 Statistics for the 
military expenditure during 1853-61 (which would include operations in several 
domestic rebellions, such as the Taiping Rebellion and the Second Opium War) are 
incomplete. However, central government records show that during 1851-53, the central 
government expenditure on the Taiping Rebellion alone exceeded 170,604,104 taels.
196
 
The total military expenditure during 1853–61 could only be far higher. The huge 
military expenditures over nine years could never be covered by an amount less than 64 
million taels. 
 
                                                 
191
 King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, 149. 
192
 The exact output of the provincial mints is unknown. However, if the debased coinage was of 
considerable size, the big cash would in the end drive standard cash (the good money) out of the market. 
After the chaos, big cash were the only coins circulating in Beijing; and only standard cash circulated in 
the rest of the country. This would suggest that the policy of coinage debasement was vigorously 
implemented only in Beijing.  
193
 Copper notes issued at the provincial level were called ‘shengchao’ (provincial notes), Peng, Public 
Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 114-5. 
194
 Imperial edict on the use of government notes and the establishment of official banks in each province 
(Day13 Month10 Xianfeng5), Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary 
History, Vol. I., 450. 
195
 Calculated from  
 
Table 1-2 (p.31). The figure was even smaller according to Peng, who estimates it to be 60,249,000 taels. 
Peng does not provide details of his calculation. Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the 
Late 19th Century China, 114-5. 
196
 The military expenditure during 1851-53 may be higher; this figure was calculated only from existing 
trackable records of the central government. Neither does the figure include expenditures by the 
provincial government. After 1853, the military expenditures were mostly raised by regional governors 
instead of coming from central government. Ibid., 127-30.  
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After 1853, the relevant provinces were left to their own devices to cover most of the 
cost incurred by the war. Facing a sudden rise of military expenditure, any province 
would have had the same fiscal difficulties as the central government, but their problem 
was far less acute than Beijing’s because they enjoyed local tax revenues and had also 
devised better means of resolving fiscal difficulty. As well as local tax revenues, two 
methods of raising funds – a transit tax (likin) and foreign loans – were introduced by 
provincial governments. Likin was a transit tax collected from inland merchandise and 
was first introduced in Jiangsu province (the location of the camps of the Qing army 
against the Taiping rebels) to finance the army in suppressing the Taiping Rebellion.
197
 
During this period also the first foreign loan between local officials and foreign 
merchants in Shanghai was negotiated in order to hire mercenaries for the defence of the 
city. The loan was later paid off by the tax revenue from the customs house in 
Shanghai.
198
 These two province-initiated fundraising methods proved to be extremely 
important sources of income, and they changed the entire fiscal structure of the Qing 
Dynasty in the post-Taiping period.
199
 
 
The Xianfeng monetary policies therefore did not help to cover actual military outlay 
because they were limited in their place of implementation and also limited in terms of 
the amount of revenue they could raise. They were first and foremost methods to 
resolve the public finance crisis in the capital caused by the sudden contraction of 
capital revenue (jingxiang) when the provinces could not (or would not) send the tax 
revenues to the capital but instead kept them for local military use. Treasury records 
show that money creation had a considerable role in meeting the needs caused by 
increased expenditure. Acting more like a government debt, these temporary measures 
                                                 
197
 Likin is called ‘lijin’ in Chinese, meaning ‘one per cent of money’, because likin was normally levied 
at one per cent of the value of the goods involved.  
198
 Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 150-6. 
199
 The appearance of likin replaced the malfunctioning inland customs houses (changguan), and levied 
taxes on trade and business – a growing substantial sector of the economy. Foreign loans backed by 
maritime customs revenues also became a common way of issuing domestic and foreign loans in later 
times. Revenues from customs tariffs often proved to be reliable collateral when otherwise the regime 
itself lacked credibility. It is also worth mentioning that, during the siege by the Taiping rebels, the actual 
control of the customs house in Shanghai was handed to foreign counsellors (mainly British), who 
eventually helped to found the Imperial Maritime Customs Service. Later the Customs Services also 
collected salt tax and likin on behalf of the Chinese government. From late Qing until Republican China 
before the Second World War, likin, a salt gabelle and customs revenues, together with land tax, formed 
the three pillars of tax revenue. Chen, Papers on the History of Qing Public Finance, 109-31. Yinpu Yang, 
A History of Public Finance in Republican China (Min Guo Cai Zheng Shi)(Beijing: Finance and 
Economics Press of China (Zhong guo cai zheng jing ji chu ban she), 1985), 46-50. 
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did help to solve the urgent problem of central government financing and therefore 
sustained its functioning, although at the cost of monetary instability and inflation. 
 
Did the money expansion generate revenue for central government finance? 
The answer is complicated. Monetary policy can generate revenue via seigniorage 
revenue or by inflation (to reallocate wealth and to reduce government debt). However, 
when the government has very limited control over money supply, neither seigniorage 
revenue nor inflationary finance is easy to gain. 
 
The coinage of big cash is an effective debasement – the most common monetary policy 
in early history; it earns the ruler seigniorage revenue but induces inflation.
200
 In a 
typical government-led debasement, the mint would raise the mint equivalent by 
reducing the commodity content of a coin or raising its face value  (thereby reducing the 
commodity content of the corresponding unit of account). Therefore the new coins 
minted were overvalued in relation to the old ones, attracting people to take their metal 
(or old coins) to the mint to have it cast into (more) new coins.
201
 Hence debasement 
often had two fiscal functions for the state: first, it would induce a wave of increased 
coinage (or re-coinage), increase the mint output and as a result increase the seigniorage 
revenue. Second, with the gradual price adjustment inflation would occur soon 
afterwards, transferring wealth from nominal creditors to nominal debtors.
202
 
Debasements were common in early modern Europe partly because kings tended to be 
big debtors themselves. 
 
                                                 
200
 Although some would argue that it is more a fiscal policy than a monetary one. Michael D. Bordo, 
"History of Monetary Policy," ed. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, Second ed., The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008),  
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_H000180. 
201
 The mint equivalent is the total face value of the number of coins that can be struck from a certain 
quantity of metal. The mint price is the market value of the raw metal (the price at which the mint 
purchased the metal). The difference between mint equivalent and mint price is the gross seigniorage. For 
example in early 16
th
 century France, the legal tender value of one gold écu was 2 livres tournois (l.t.). 
From a marc of gold (4,608 grains) 74.26 écus d’or could be made, with a total face value of 148.52 l.t., 
and therefore the mint equivalent of gold is 148.52 l.t. The mint price was 147 l.t. per marc, leaving 1.52 
l.t. as the gross seigniorage for the mint. Debra Glassman and Angela Redish, "Currency Depreciation in 
Early Modern England and France," Explorations in Economic History 25, no. 1 (1988): 77.   
202
 François R. Velde and Warren E. Weber, "Commodity Money ", ed. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence 
E. Blume, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008),  
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_C000235. 
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Chinese monetary history is also full of repeated debasement and reinforcement.
203
 
During the Qing Dynasty, however, copper cash constituted only a small part of the 
total money stock, and debasement of copper coinage was not an effective way of 
raising funds.
204
 During the Qing Dynasty the authorities gradually realised that by 
minting full-bodied cash the mint lost money.
205
 Therefore there were sometimes 
copper cash debasements before 1850, but they were very mild to conceal the 
government’s wish to make ends meet. 206207 
 
The debasement during Xianfeng’s reign was drastic in terms of depreciation,208 but 
very limited in terms of scale.
209
 Moreover, old ‘undervalued’ coins were not reminted 
by the mints. Instead, the state explicitly ordered that the big cash should circulate 
together with standard cash. Although the imperial mints did not remint standard cash 
into big cash, the market did. With waves of counterfeiting, the Beijing market was left 
with nothing but big cash, and inflation followed. Seigniorage income did occur with 
waves of debasement, but a large share of the profit was enjoyed by counterfeiters 
instead of the state. 
 
The government paper notes – silver notes and copper notes – were not full legal tender 
in the eyes of the common people. They could be used to pay part of the taxes, or to 
purchase titles and degrees, but they barely qualified as monies. Although they were 
called ‘silver’ or ‘copper’ notes, they were in no way convertible to real metal. They 
                                                 
203
 Reinforcement is a restoration of coinage to its original fineness and weight.  
204
 Less than 20% of the total money stock in terms of value. Peng estimated that during the late Qing 
period, the total copper sector (copper coins including standard cash and the new type of copper coin 
minted after 1900) constituted 17% of the total money in circulation. Peng, A Monetary History of China, 
595. 
205
 The government intended to fix the exchange rate between silver and copper cash at 1 (tael) : 1,000 
(wen). However with the increasing inflow of silver, the coinage of full-bodied copper cash became 
increasingly costly.  
206
 In 1660 (the early Qing period), a copper cash weighed 0.14 liang and contained 70% copper. The 
weight of the copper cash was reduced to 0.1 liang in 1684 and in 1702 it was further reduced to 0.07 
liang. The weight was stabilized at 0.12 liang in the mid-18
th
 century. Since the 19
th
 century, the regime 
had undergone a slow and discreet debasement by secretly reducing the copper content from 60% to 
around 50% (i.e. a debasement of around 17%). Peng, A Monetary History of China, 522-26, 66-68. 
207
 The debasement in 1702 led to a permanent devaluation of the unit of account in Beijing. This unit of 
account, called the ‘metropolitan cash’, used to be at par with 1 wen of copper cash. It depreciated when 
the weight of one cash was reduced to half: from 0.14 to 0.07 liang. Later the weight of copper cash was 
restored to 0.14 liang, and the debased ‘small coins’ were called back from the market. The ‘metropolitan 
cash’ remained as a ghost unit in Beijing (and certain northern areas) even though the ‘small coins’ no 
longer existed, and one copper cash (one wen) was worth 2 metropolitan cash thereafter. King, Money 
and Monetary Policy in China, 58-65.   
208
 Minting a piece of 1,000-wen big cash means a debasement of 98.3%. 
209
 The production of big cash was prompted by the lack of copper ingot stock. 
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were finely printed IOU papers forced into the hands of the government employees 
(who happened to be the last group wishing to protest against the Emperor), but they 
could hardly be pressed into market circulation. In order to ease the lives of the IOU 
holders, official banks were set up to exchange these government paper notes for other, 
usable, money (big cash and banknotes) at a discount. The official banks also sold the 
government paper notes at a discount to people who wanted to pay tax or buy titles, 
thereby establishing a secondary market for trading in  debt. As the government 
progressively reduced the proportion of tax payment that could be paid in government 
paper notes, silver notes and copper notes depreciated quickly in the currency market. 
The market would not be fooled into accepting the face value written on a valueless 
piece of paper. From 1857, government notes were rarely seen in the market. From 
1859 on, only big cash and official banknotes circulated in the market. In 1860 and 
1861, serious inflation occurred in Beijing.
210
 If government notes were almost extinct 
as early as 1857, what then was responsible for the inflation of 1861? 
 
 
  
                                                 
210
 Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 99.  
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1.4.2 Tackling puzzle II: a new explanation of the inflation mechanism 
How to explain the much higher money increase and relatively low inflation? And why 
did inflation gather momentum only when the increase in money supply slackened? 
 
The larger increase of money compared to the slower momentum of this inflation may 
have been a result of genuine economic growth, or a slowed velocity in money 
transactions. Beijing was a consumer city (similar to Madrid in the twentieth century
211
) 
without any substantial economic production. The city relied on supplies from other 
parts of the country and consumption was sustained by a large number of salary 
receivers (the royal household, the bureaucrats, and the personnel of the eight banners). 
The disturbance of the trade route during the Taiping Rebellion would only cut the 
supply of goods and money.
212
 A low velocity of money would be a more reasonable 
explanation: in this case monies would not have been treated as money (but stored 
instead of circulating in the market) until 1861. The part of the money which was more 
likely to have been stored was silver notes and copper notes: they were less suitable for 
daily exchange, but they could be taken to the official banks and exchanged for 
banknotes when necessary. Since the exchange rates between these government notes 
and the banknotes were low, people might have preferred to keep the government notes 
until the exchange rates had risen (for instance, when the government’s fiscal situation 
was better). Or they might have tried to get rid of the paper quickly if they expected the 
exchange rate to deteriorate. 
 
Withdrawal of emergency policies 
From 1859, the government finances improved, which can be seen from the 
improvement in the bannermen’s salary. Bannermen received salaries according to their 
social status, not from their seniority in service. Their salaries were a heavy burden on 
central government expenditure: they were the first victims when a budget cut was 
required, and usually the last to have their salary raised. During the crisis beginning 
1853, bannermen’s salaries were paid with a small amount of cash (mostly big cash and 
                                                 
211
 David R. Ringrose, "Towns, Transport and Crown: Geography and the Decline of Spain," in 
Geographic Perspectives in History: Essays in Honor of Edward Whiting Fox, ed. E. D. Genovese and L. 
Hochberg(Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). 
212
 Some reports show that there was a shortage of everyday necessities because of the war, and also 
because of the monetary confusion in the city, which made merchants reluctant to bring in goods and 
trade. Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 108-9. 
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iron cash) and a combination of different paper notes (including copper notes and 
banknotes). From 1859, in contrast, silver made up 70 per cent of their salary.
213
 
 
However, in addition to the restoration of the old payment rules, the government wanted 
to restore the old taxation and monetary system. In early 1859, Xianfeng’s most trusted 
official, Sushun,
214
 known for his heavy-handed approach, was appointed the president 
of the Board of Revenue. Sushun first suspended the casting of iron cash, signalling the 
government’s rejection of the value and use of iron cash.215 The market responded 
quickly by exchanging iron cash for other forms of money: big cash and, more often, 
banknotes. By the fourth month of 1859, the exchange rate of iron cash had plummeted, 
and during the seventh month, iron cash was hardly accepted by shops any longer and 
rarely seen in the market (except for one or two occasions when it was reported that iron 
cash were thrown into Sushun’s face by passers-by on the street).216 
 
This uncompromising politician then turned his attention to limiting the issue and use of 
copper notes: from 1859 on, copper notes could no longer be used for tax payment.
217
 
Copper notes could still be used to purchase titles, but only at the Copper Donation 
Office. However, in 1860, the use of copper notes for the purchase of titles was also 
ordered to end.
218
 Later the Court also discussed the possibility of a total abolition of 
copper notes, causing people to rush to exchange their copper notes for banknotes.
219
 
 
Sushun’s way of regulating the monetary situation is more like ‘cleansing’ than 
‘dredging’ the channels of circulation. Measures such as limiting the use of copper 
notes and iron cash could be taken as the government’s admitting the failure of its 
temporary monetary policies. This open acknowledgement of failure undermined the 
credibility of an already frail government,  compelling the market to exchange the 
government-issued money for banknotes, thereby further adding to the already high 
                                                 
213
 Memorial submitted by Sushun, director of the Board of Revenue (Day 3 Month10 Xianfeng10), 
Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 474-5. 
214
 Sushun was a Manchu noble and an influential statesman. He was named a regent after the death of 
Xianfeng, but was executed in the coup d’état of 1861 plotted by the Empress Dowager Cixi.  
215
 King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, 157-8   
216
 Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 100, 470-1. King, 
Money and Monetary Policy in China, 158.  
217
 Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 424. 
218
 Ibid., 426-7. 
219
 Ibid., 488-9.  
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liquidity of banknotes in the market. The city’s monetary stability could easily be 
challenged by any untoward event. 
 
Market panics of 1860-61 and stabilization of 1862 
In the summer of 1860, Tianjin, the last point of defence between the sea and Beijing, 
was taken by the joint Franco-British force. Fleeing from the endangered capital, people 
rushed to the banks to exchange their banknotes for real metal coins (since the 
banknotes of Beijing would be worthless elsewhere). Banknote depreciation was 
rampant: they fell to 10-28 percent of their face value, while in 1858 banknotes had 
depreciated only to 50 per cent of their face value (see Figure 1-3 and Figure 1-4, 
p.34).
220
 Since banknotes could be exchanged for 10-wen big cash, banknotes already 
depreciated in step with the depreciation of big cash. After 1860, banknotes depreciated 
further, and even their link with big cash could no longer be sustained: a banknote of 
1,000 metropolitan cash could be exchanged for big cash of only 700 metropolitan cash 
(i.e. 35 10-wen big cash coins).
221
 
 
The crisis of 1860 exposed the serious over-issue of official banknotes in the city. 
Because banknotes had been over-issued for years, unbacked by proper reserves and 
official banks were unable to exchange as many banknotes as people demanded. 
(Private banks fared much better because they had not received a government order to 
issue so many banknotes.) Although, with hindsight, one should understand this as a 
systemic corruption, a forced negligence caused by a deliberately ill-designed institution, 
Sushun understood the over-issue of banknotes as the product of the negligent officials 
and corrupt merchants who had been in charge of the official banks. He undertook a 
thorough investigation of the accounts of the official banks and even the treasury, and 
arrested over a hundred notables and merchants for being  involved in corruption.
222
 He 
also suggested that the official banks should be allowed to exchange the banknotes at a 
discount.
223
 Instead of reassuring the market, Sushun’s actions made people suspect that 
                                                 
220
 Government reports show that banknotes fell to 28% of their face value. This may only have been the 
official exchange rate, for the official banks were ordered to exchange banknotes of 1,000 metropolitan 
cash for 35 big cash (i.e. a nominal value of 700 metropolitan cash, equivalent to 70 wen standard cash 
only). Records kept by contemporaries show that the banknotes fell to around 10% of their face value. 
Ibid., 473. Zhang, Life of a Qing Mandarin in Beijing, 234. 
221
 Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 473.  
222
 King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, 158. 
223
 Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 473. 
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the government would soon repudiate official banknotes, following the example of 
copper notes and iron cash.
224
 
 
In the following summer (the sixth month of 1861), rumours spread again that official 
banks would soon be dissolved because of Sushun’s investigation.225 Moreover, a secret 
memorial from the Board of Revenue somehow leaked out; it informed the Emperor 
that the government would never have enough silver to exchange for all the official 
banknotes.
226
 A renewed wave of bank runs occurred in the summer of 1861 (in the 
sixth month). People lined up outside the banks day and night to exchange their 
banknotes. Official banks had to close early in order to avoid the overwhelming demand 
for money exchange, and they folded within a month.
227
 This was a virtual suspension 
of the convertibility of the official banknotes. They were no longer accepted in shops 
and private banknotes were once again in favour.
228
 Two months after the banking crisis 
(i.e. the ninth month of 1861), the official banks were officially dissolved. Instead of 
setting up an institution specifically to recall the official notes that were in the market, 
the government declared that banknotes would be used for purchasing titles through the 
Copper Donation Bureau.
229
 
 
The over-issue of official banknotes led to a depreciation of the unit itself. However, 
private banknotes fared better during the inflation, although they too depreciated.
230
 
After the crisis when official banknotes were no longer recognised, the market was 
under some monetary stringency. The stringency was relieved partly by big cash and 
partly by the issue of private banknotes. Price stability was restored in 1862. The level 
did drop, but stabilized at five times the pre-crisis level (see Figure 1-12, p.56). It could 
do because the private banknotes after the crisis were linked to big cash instead of the 
traditional standard cash. Since big cash represented a depreciation of 80 per cent 
                                                 
224
 Some officials sensed that this would send negative signals to the market, and suggested timidly that 
‘before we arrest the merchants, we need also to pay attention to the overall situation that might be 
brought up by those arrests’. Ibid., 477. 
225
 Ibid., 477, 88. 
226
 Ibid., 488. 
227
 Ibid., 489. Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 101. 
228
 Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 489. 
Zhang, Life of a Qing Mandarin in Beijing, 235. 
229
 Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 484. 
230
 In the summer of 1861, official banknotes of 1,000 metropolitan cash accounted for only 10-30 pieces 
of standard cash (i.e. 5-15 pieces of big cash, equivalent to 20-60 metropolitan cash); while private 
banknotes of the same face value could be used as 100 pieces of standard cash (i.e. 50 pieces of big cash, 
equivalent to 200 metropolitan cash). Zhang, Life of a Qing Mandarin in Beijing, 235. 
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compared to the standard cash, the unit of account – metropolitan cash – also 
depreciated by 80 per cent. 
 
The government’s original monetary policy was debased coinage and government paper 
notes. These new monies did not work well in the market and therefore the policies 
could hardly achieve the government’s fiscal goal. However these monetary policies 
produced unexpected consequences. First, big cash replaced standard cash as small 
change in Beijing, and a permanent depreciation of the unit followed. Second, although 
government notes never quite circulated as money, they functioned as a tradable debt 
through the exchange service of official banks.
231
 In this regard, the official banks, and 
to some extent the whole banking sector in Beijing, were hijacked by the government 
and compelled to amortise its debts. It was the ensuing banking crisis, rather than the 
new monies created under the government plan, that had triggered the inflation. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
231
 There was a (small) market for the government notes, since purchasers of degrees and titles would buy 
these government notes through official banks (at a discount). 
Chapter 1. Reassessing the Xianfeng Inflation                                                                                            68 
 
 
 
1.5 Concluding remarks 
 
In pre-modern China, under a commodity money system in which the government 
exerted very limited control, nothing could sound more far-fetched than exercising a 
successful monetary policy by means of limited debasement and the introduction of 
inconvertible paper monies. 
 
This paper investigates the Xianfeng monetary policy by consulting historical archives 
and proposes an alternative explanation for the mechanism of the Xianfeng Inflation. 
The paper compiles monetary and price datasets from archival materials. It calculates 
the nominal value of the total money created and also traces their major functions in 
government expenditure, demonstrating that the monetary policy during Xianfeng 
hardly achieved the fiscal need of covering the government’s military expenses. It then 
constructs a rough picture of the annual money stock in Beijing and compares the 
money growth with the price index, showing that the increase in the amount of money 
alone cannot explain the development of inflation. 
 
In terms of monetary policy, both policies – big cash coinage and the issue of 
government notes – were of limited size and fiscal impact. However, the appearance of 
big cash drove out the standard cash, changed the money and daily exchange, and 
induced the depreciation of the unit of account. The inconvertible government paper 
notes (silver notes and copper notes) acted rather like a forced loan to government 
employees and government banks. Official banks issued official banknotes in order to 
exchange government paper notes. Because the official banks had insufficient reserves 
(mostly big cash and even iron cash), official banknotes were clearly over-issued. At 
first, official banknotes, similar to private banknotes, were convertible to copper cash 
upon demand. This linkage was soon broken and banknotes were redeemed with big 
cash instead of copper cash. In 1861, the government finally defaulted on its debts 
(government paper notes), leading to bank runs and the inflation of banknotes. In 1862, 
this financial crisis was consolidated when the remaining banknotes (issued by private 
banks) resumed their convertibility with real money. Because all banknotes after the 
crisis were linked to big cash instead of copper cash, the market price stabilized, though 
a level at which they did so was five times higher than the pre-1853 price level. 
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Through a mechanism of debasement and default, the monetary measures caused 
inflation in the capital. The monetary policies during Xianfeng’s reign were in fact a 
series of incoherent monetary measures intended to temporarily ease the fiscal 
stringency of the central government. With the restoration of the central government’s 
income and subsequent fiscal reform, those monetary policies were soon abolished 
(except the coinage of big cash). 
 
Earlier parallels existed in European monetary history: John Law’s experiment (1716-
20) in France is an example. Law's system was a more sophisticated mechanism 
involving both public finance and fiat money creation. The system converted existing 
French public debts into (public company) equity. At the same time, the system 
replaced existing commodity money with fiat money. As the company took over 
government's role of tax collection and also monopolized overseas trade, the fiat money 
can be understood as backed by state revenue.
232
 If Xianfeng's currency change was led 
and managed by a business genius (for instance, by Maoyin Wang who insisted on the 
importance of establishing banks in facilitating money exchange and circulation) instead 
of government officials with closed minds, or if the issue of government debts (and later 
legal tender) was issued by a more credible entity (for instance, the de facto independent 
Imperial Maritime Customs Service founded in 1858) with tax collection as a backing, 
the result of Xianfeng's monetary policy might be different: it might well be a chance 
for successful monetary and financial innovation.  
 
The monetary measures during Xianfeng crisis were incoherent, unsuccessful and short-
lived: it was implemented only very limited area and old practices were restored quickly 
after the end of the crisis. In retrospect, however, the crisis and the temporary monetary 
measures left a long term legacy with unexpected consequence on the course of 
monetary evolution: the central government became extremely conservative in terms of 
monetary reform; and both monetary reform and monetary innovation became 
regionalised. The monetary measures during crisis therefore precipitated the collapse of 
the once unified traditional monetary system during a time when regional power grew 
                                                 
232
 François R. Velde, "Government Equity and Money: John Law’s System in 1720 France," Federal 
Rserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper Series, no. 2003-31 (2003). Larry Neal, The Rise of Financial 
Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 62-88. 
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much stronger (regional fiscal capacity as well as military power grew much stronger 
after the Taiping Rebellion). Regional initiated monetary reforms became extremely 
active in subsequent decades, and pushed forward the modernisation of the monetary 
system.  
 
With the lesson of the Xianfeng inflation, the central government was not eager to try 
any new monetary reform too soon. The Xianfeng inflation deprived the central 
government of its last remaining bit of capability or willingness to innovate. With the 
failure of official banks and inflation caused by the over-issue of unbacked banknotes, 
the government had squandered the last morsel of its credibility. The government 
reaffirmed the dynastic fear of the issue of paper notes, and tried its best never to issue 
paper notes any more. Similar to the case of France, after the bust of Mississippi bubble 
there was hesitation even in pronouncing the word ‘bank’ for 150 years thereafter,233 the 
notion of paper money became the ‘you-know-what’ taboo for the Manchu rulers till the 
end of dynasty.
234
  
 
The depreciation of the market price of big cash also convinced the government that the 
market would accept only a coin with a face value matching its intrinsic value as a piece 
of metal and not only by the face value stamped on the coin. The government 
recognized a dilemma: although the minting of full-bodied small coins cost the 
government a disproportionate amount, the minting of debased coins would invite 
counterfeiting which would soon wipe out any seigniorage profit. Therefore, several 
decades later, when Li Hongzhang (Viceroy of Guangdong and Guangxi) sent a 
memorial to Beijing suggesting the minting of a new type of copper coin with steam-
powered machines, the proposal was immediately and furiously rejected. 
 
In addition, because the monetary measures were most vigorously carried out in Beijing 
and only partially put into force in some of the other provinces, the uneven 
implementation accidentally accelerated the nation’s monetary disintegration. At the 
same time, provinces unwilling to carry out the monetary policies found better ways to 
raise funds – by restructuring their fiscal system. In the end, after the political 
                                                 
233
 Charles Poor Kindleberger, A Financial History of Western Europe(London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1984), 98.  Cited from Neal, The Rise of Financial Capitalism, 62. 
234
 The next successful introduction of a national paper currency was in 1935.  
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turbulence and monetary chaos, fiscal power was also regionalised. Provincial leaders 
had more say and more resources to carry out their own initiatives, including regional 
reforms in the monetary sector. It turned out that the regionalisation of the currency 
system could be a blessing in the Chinese context (when Beijing remained conservative 
or even counteractive). The next chapter (Chapter Two) describes how ten years after 
Li’s initial proposal, copper coinage produced by steam-powered machines was 
implemented in Canton against the wish of the central government (which itself was too 
busy with the Boxer Rebellion and a foreign siege), and this coinage proved to be an 
economic and fiscal success. 
 
If things had to get worse before they could get better, the impact of Xianfeng inflation 
was not entirely negative: it kick-started the whole monetary modernisation process.  
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1.6 Appendices 
Appendix A: Archival materials concerning Xianfeng’s Reign 
 
Government publications 
Archive materials directly related to the monetary policy are scarce, and material on 
mint output or the amount of paper notes printed do not exist. Nor could we find many 
systematic records of market information, such as price series or exchange rates 
between different currencies. Scholars therefore need to research government 
publications to piece the picture together. Government compilations that were 
frequently consulted by previous writers include: Veritable Records of the Qing (Qing 
Shi Lu), The Collected Statutes of the Qing Dynasty (Da Qing Hui Dian), and A 
Classified Compendium of the Administrative Statutes of the Imperial Dynasty (Huang 
Chao Zheng Dian Lei Zuan). These works were compiled by court scholars and provide 
an important and relatively reliable source of information. However, as official 
publications, they were usually a biased description favouring the government’s 
standpoint.  In addition, these works emphasize big events, regulations and government 
statutes; the details of a particular policy (for instance, the date of the issue of big cash, 
or the exact number of the cash minted) were of the least concern to government 
officials. This paper relies on previous studies of the above government compilations.  
 
Government internal documents  
Compared to government publications, government internal documents are of greater 
value because they are more direct and contain more detailed information. Materials 
consulted by this paper include: Memorials, Secret memorials, and annual ministry 
reports including treasury records. 
 
Memorials and secret memorials were records of communication from officials to the 
Emperor encompassing all aspects of public affairs. Memorials (tiben) were reports 
submitted by Board officials to the Emperor for discussion. They are a more routine 
form of communication, and needed to pass through many levels of bureaucracy before 
they could reach the Emperor. Secret Memorials (zouzhe) were more important 
communication documents from top officials, which for security reasons were 
submitted directly to the Emperor without being handled by any other bureaucrat. Secret 
memorials are also called ‘Palace memorials’ (gong zhong zhe) or ‘Folded memorials’ 
(zouzhe), because these memorials were folded and could be opened only by the 
Emperor himself. Memorials contain details of government decision making and also 
reveal rich information on socio-economic conditions. Secret memorials often disclose 
important statistics, such as military expenditures, government fiscal actions, actual tax 
income and real stock in the vaults instead of those stated in the regulations.  
 
Besides memorials, the six ministries (Six Boards) submitted each year a statistical 
report to the Emperor, stating the Board’s activities (fiscally-related activities in 
particular). The reports were submitted each year directly to the Emperor. The reports 
were bound in bright yellow covers (the royal colour) and are therefore known in 
Chinese as ‘huangce’ (Royal Yellow Copies). One of the most important reports was 
the treasury records compiled by  Board of Revenue listing all the monetary 
transactions in the Imperial Treasury vault. All central government tax incomes, all 
copper cash minted by the Imperial mints (and later big cash as well as government 
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paper notes) were deposited in the Treasury vault before being used. The treasury 
records document every single item that came into or went out of the vault. These 
records therefore give us the most direct information on the income and expenditure of 
central government.  
 
Private account books 
The best archival materials containing market information (for retail prices, currency 
exchange rates, etc.) would have to be account books for shop keeping or personal use. 
As commercial records in everyday use, they are not as well preserved as government 
documents. Today, account books which are kept in archives are difficult to use: most 
of them are not digitalised; the originals are too delicate to touch; all the figures in the 
account books were kept in Suzhou code instead of normal written Chinese. Moreover, 
most account books are seriously damaged: some of the years are missing and the rest in 
a state which makes it difficult to discern what is written. It is therefore impossible to 
construct a price index with a basket of weighted goods and services for a certain period 
of time. But constructing a series of the cost of certain important goods (for example, 
grain prices or exchange rates) is possible.  
 
Access to archives 
These government documents were first made public in the 1920s when the Forbidden 
City became the state property of the new Chinese Republic. The Palace Museum was 
established on the site of the original imperial residence and those documents were sent 
to the Library of the Palace Museum. Because of earlier riots in Beijing and fire 
accidents, some of the documents had been destroyed during the Qing Dynasty. More 
were lost in the chaos in the Forbidden City following the fall of the Qing Dynasty and 
the warfare of subsequent decades. The remaining original documents are now kept 
partly in the First Historical Archive in Beijing and partly in the National Palace 
Museum in Taipei.  
 
Parts of the collections in both archives underwent a separate digitalisation process. In 
the First Historical Archive, scanned copies of the memorials and secret memorials can 
be consulted by using the computers in the research room of FHA. The National Palace 
Museum has made its scanned copies available online, requiring a license to access 
them. Parts of the memorials relating to currency issues have been published in the 
Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History (1964). 
 
In the 1930s, Academia Sinica undertook a project to make handwritten copies of the 
Qing government documents, including the Memorials and the Ministry Reports from 
the Palace Museum. These huge collections are now kept in the Library of the Institute 
of Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) in Beijing. This 
library is not strictly speaking open to the public. Only scholars related to CASS can 
have access to the whole collection.   
 
The Antiquity Branch of the National Library of China has the most important 
collection of private account books, which are readily available for public consultation 
(although reading through the original copies is a challenging and daunting task). The 
Beijing Municipal Archive also has a considerable collection which is digitized and 
therefore more user-friendly.   
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Dates and years in Chinese calendar 
Dates using the Chinese traditional calendar differ from those of the modern calendar. 
In a Chinese calendar, a date is expressed by a combination of the number of the day, 
number of the month and number of the regnal year. Appendix A 1-1 lists out all the 
regnal years that may have appeared in the text and their corresponding year in the 
Gregorian Calendar. Please note that a year in Chinese calendar and a year in the 
Gregorian calendar are not exactly the same. For example the First Year of Xianfeng 
(XF1) started in February 1851 and ended in January 1852.  
 
Appendix A 1-1 Chinese era name and approximate year  
Chinese era name Regnal Year(s) 
Corresponding year in 
Gregorian Calendar 
Daoguang DG1 1821 
| DG2 1822 
| DG3 1823 
| DG4 1824 
| DG5 1825 
| DG6 1826 
|  DG7 1827 
|  DG8 1828 
|  DG9 1829 
|  DG10 1830 
|  DG11 1831 
|  DG12 1832 
| DG13 1833 
| DG14 1834 
|  DG15 1835 
| DG16 1836 
| DG17 1837 
| DG18 1838 
| DG19 1839 
| DG20 1840 
| DG21 1841 
| DG22 1842 
| DG23 1843 
| DG24 1844 
| DG25 1845 
| DG26 1846 
| DG27 1847 
| DG28 1848 
| DG29 1849 
| DG30 1850 
Xianfeng XF1 1851 
| XF2 1852 
| XF3 1853 
| XF4 1854 
| XF5 1855 
| XF6 1856 
| XF7 1857 
| XF8 1858 
| XF9 1859 
| XF10 1860 
| XF11 1861 
Tongzhi TZ1 1862 
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Appendix B: Statistics from treasury records 
 
Original statistics 
The Imperial Treasury (yinku) was a department under the Board of Revenue. The 
collection and management of the tax revenues were the responsibilities of the Board of 
Revenue, which regulated all the central government revenues (in monetary form) that 
were deposited in the Imperial Treasury. Every year, the Treasury compiled a book (the 
Imperial Treasury Records, or hubu yinku huangce) to submit to the Emperor 
containing detailed information about the monetary transactions and the-end-of-year 
money stock. The book consists of two volumes: the ‘Incoming category’ (dajin) and 
the ‘Outgoing category’ (dachu). The former kept details on every monetary entry for 
deposits in the Treasury, and the latter details on every item that was withdrawn from 
the Treasury. The Library of the Institute of Economics of CASS has the best-preserved 
copy of treasury records, but it is still far from complete. For the eleven years of 
Xianfeng’s reign, for example, the collection contains only seven years of the ‘Incoming 
category’ (Xianfeng 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, and 10; roughly speaking, 1851, 1852, 1853, 1855, 
1856, 1859 and 1860) and four years of the ‘Outgoing category’ (Xianfeng 2, 3, 8, and 
9,  roughly speaking, 1852, 1853, 1858 and 1859).  
 
The annual reports were supplemented by a separate table summarizing the total figures 
of both categories. Copies of the summary tables of Xianfeng 4, 6, 9, and 11 were kept 
in the archive. Sometimes even when the original volumes of the incoming and 
outgoing categories were lost, the table was kept in the collection, which could help us 
work out the overall (though not detailed) monetary transactions of the year. They could 
be used to make up a relatively complete picture. 
 
The treasury records simply registered everything that entered or left the vault. The 
‘Outgoing’ category was indeed a record of the expenditures of central government, but 
the ‘Incoming’ category should not be taken for granted as revenue. Besides revenues 
from various sources (such as taxation monies sent by the provinces, income from royal 
lands, and income from the sale of degrees and titles), copper cash minted by the 
imperial mints were also kept in the Treasury and therefore their figures also appear in 
the ‘Incoming’ category. After 1854, other monies such as copper notes, official 
banknotes and iron cash were also deposited in the vault immediately after manufacture, 
and therefore also appeared in the ‘Incoming category’ of the treasury records 
(Appendix B 1-1). 
 
There are some problems with the original figures. First, some monies were not 
consistently deposited in the Treasury vault, and their totals would be underestimated 
(for example: only part of the amount of iron cash and the official banknotes were 
deposited in the vault). Second, the style of bookkeeping of the records has erased some 
important information: all the entries were all recorded in nominal values (for example, 
there are various big cash with different face values. We cannot track further details of 
the numbers of different big cash.) Moreover, the treasury records did not distinguish 
silver ingots from silver notes: all entries paid with real silver or silver notes were kept 
under the ‘silver sector’ category, making it difficult to work out the proportion of silver 
notes to real silver. Third, the records are incomplete (years 1854, 1857, 1858 and 1861 
are missing).  
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Appendix B 1-1 Original statistics: Incoming and outgoing categories, The Imperial Treasury Records (1841-61) 
Regnal 
year 
Year 
Incoming Category Outgoing Category 
Silver 
(taels) 
Cash coins: 
copper cash 
and iron cash 
(strings) 
Copper notes 
(strings) 
Official 
banknotes 
(strings) 
Silver 
(taels) 
Cash coins: 
copper cash 
and iron cash 
(strings) 
Copper notes 
(strings) 
Official 
banknotes 
(strings) 
DG21 1841 6796038 1233614 
  
15733178 1233598 
  
DG22 1842 10914111 1144433 
  
13519847 1140848 
  
DG23 1843 7919693 1222831 
  
10989389 1270073 
  
DG24 1844   
  
9018625 1266883 
  
DG25 1845 9069654 1160832 
  
8737519 1014232 
  
DG26 1846 9044024 1209094 
  
  
  
DG27 1847   
  
8479905 1158391 
  
DG28 1848 8872940 1165946 
  
  
  
DG29 1849 8507408 1238528 
  
9340395 1219044 
  
DG30 1850 7748585 1076127 
  
9531910 1177265 
  
XF1 1851 7635529 1247809 
  
  
  
XF2 1852 8361837 834109 
  
10268561 835110 
  
XF3 1853 4443174 1198580 
  
7471746 1368406 
  
XF4 1854 4996127 3045824 -- 7846072 5031019 3040550 -- 7834543 
XF5 1855 3067774 1898807 4088318 7791060 
 
   
XF6 1856 2669663 811063 4405082 7884489 2704989 517736 4405082 7950869 
XF7 1857         
XF8 1858     3061904 629857 1510663 11360116 
XF9 1859 4463478 968530 2133825 19131590 3808417 903324 2124455 13976064 
XF10 1860 5429091 366762 3725297 4315242     
XF11 1861 6678614 295355 155518 408881 6331926 169540 155431 174287 
Source: Shi (2009), pp. 198-237, 264-5; Imperial Treasury Records, CASS. 
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Splitting the Incoming Category: money creation and government income 
 
By reading the detailed entries of the treasury records, we can find details about the 
amounts of newly created monies. Appendix B 1-2 is a summary of figures for money 
creation extracted from the Incoming records in the treasury.  
 
By deducing the money created (Appendix B 1-2) from the Incoming category, we can 
also calculate the real government revenue. Appendix B 1-3 shows the real central 
government revenue, apart from the coinage and paper note printing.  
 
Reconstruction: annual issue of money (government money creation) 
As most of the monies (except real silver) deposited in the vault were meant to be used 
in government expenditures for the year, the amount of different monies in expenditure 
can be used as a proxy for the figures of money creation. We thereby can supply the 
numbers for the years 1854, 1858 and 1861. Because we know from government reports 
the total amount of each kind of money created, the figures for money creation in 1857 
can be obtained by deduction. We can therefore draw a very approximate picture of the 
annual money creation during 1851-61 (Appendix B 1-4). 
 
 
Appendix B 1-2 Number of monies created, according to treasury records 
Regnal 
year 
Year 
Copper 
cash 
(strings) 
Iron cash 
(strings) 
Silver 
notes 
(taels) 
Copper notes 
(strings) 
Banknotes 
(strings) 
XF1 1851 1245809 
    
XF2 1852 823833 
    
XF3 1853 1190287 
    
XF4 1854 
     
XF5 1855 1812804 
  
4088318 7613332 
XF6 1856 326546 431515 
 
4405082 7448997 
XF7 1857 
     
XF8 1858 
     
XF9 1859 900000 
  
2120455 18337551 
XF10 1860 344671 
  
3706823 3442130 
XF11 1861 
     
Total 11090500 15026000 9781200 27113038 49447910* 
N.B.* The totals of banknotes provided here are only the total number of banknotes issued from official 
banks to the Treasury; they do not include banknotes issued by the Copper Donation Bureau. The figure 
of 49447910 strings therefore underestimates the number of banknotes generated in government finance. 
Source: annual figures come from the treasury records, Incoming Categories, Regnal Year: XF 1, 2, 3, 5, 
6, 9, and 10, Imperial Treasury Records, CASS; total figures are originally from government reports, 
Peng (1983), p. 115. 
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Appendix B 1-3 Total revenues of central government (excluding money creation) 
Regnal 
Year 
Year 
Silver 
(taels) 
Copper cash 
(strings) 
Copper notes 
(strings) 
Banknotes 
(strings) 
XF1 1851 7635529 2000 
  
XF2 1852 8361837 10276 
  
XF3 1853 4443174 8294 
  
XF4 1854     
XF5 1855 3067774 86002 (3510)* 0 177728 
XF6 1856 2669663 53001 (479)* 0 667805 
XF7 1857     
XF8 1858     
XF9 1859 4463478 68530 13370 13256794 
XF10 1860 5429091 22091 18474 3192501 
XF11 1861     
N.B. * In 1855 and 1856 with the ‘salary saving’ scheme, some undistributed salaries for bannermen 
(mostly in the form of copper cash) in previous years were returned to the Treasury vault. If these 
deductions are not taken as income, the copper cash revenue in 1855 and 1856 becomes 3510 and 478 
respectively. 
Source: annual figures come from the treasury records, Incoming Categories, (Regnal Years: XF 1, 2, 3, 5, 
6, 9, and 10), Imperial Treasury Records. 
 
 
Appendix B 1-4 Annual money creation, amended by estimation (in strings) 
Regnal 
Year 
Year Copper cash Iron cash Silver notes Copper notes Banknotes 
XF1 1851 1245809 
    
XF2 1852 823833 
    
XF3 1853 1190287 
  
(1000000) 
 
XF4 1854 (3040551) (1808160) 
 
(6000000) (7846072) 
XF5 1855 1812804 (1808160) 
 
4063302 7613332 
XF6 1856 326546 (1360920) 
 
4405443 7448997 
XF7 1857 (606602) (1360920) 
 
(4150834) (7448997) 
XF8 1858 (629857) (1360920) 
 
(1510663) (11360116) 
XF9 1859 900000 
  
2120455 18337552 
XF10 1860 344671 
  
3706823 3442130 
XF11 1861 (169540) 
  
(155518) (408881) 
Total 11090500 (7699080) 9781200 27113038 (63906076) 
N.B. Figures in brackets are estimations, of which: 1) for 1854, 1858 and 1861, the figures in expenditure 
are used as a proxy of money creation, and for 1857 the figures are calculated by deducting the total of 
other years from the grand total; 2) annual output of iron cash as estimated by Peng (1983); 3) figures for 
the copper notes issued in 1853 and 1854 are from the minimum estimation from an archive document, 
Huang (2012); 4) the amount of banknotes deposited in the Treasury includes notes issued by official 
banks and by the Copper Donation Bureau. The estimation is therefore higher than Peng’s figure. 
Source: Imperial Treasury Records; Huang (2012), p. 137; Peng (1983), pp. 80 and 115. 
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Appendix C: Market price information   
 
Market information is also collected from secondary sources, including the exchange 
rate of the new monies, retail prices and wages.  
 
Previous studies consulted 
The paper relies on the work of previous studies. The series are amended by information 
extracted from memorials and secret memorials. Extensively consulted works include: 
Peng (2008, 2011), Zhang (1970) and Gamble (1943).  
 
Peng (2008, 2011) studies a wide range of account books in Beijing’s archives and 
provides an important collection of price series, including a long-term sequence of grain 
prices; prices of common consumables, such as cooked rice (served in restaurants), 
festive banquets (price per table), and liquor. Zhang (1970) studies the lifetime personal 
accounts of a government official in Beijing, and compiles different series from 1840s 
to 1870s, including: retail prices, official wages and currency exchange information. 
Gamble compiles a wage list for unskilled labour from the account books of a fuel store 
near Beijing.  
 
Explanation of currency exchange rate series 
 
Because the currency exchange information comes from various non-statistical sources 
and there were so many different currencies, the figures are not readily comparable. 
Typical descriptions of the exchange rates are as follows: ‘1 tael is equivalent to 2,000 
(no unit given)’; ‘1 tael is equivalent to 30,000 paper money (no unit given)’; ‘1 tael is 
equivalent to 12,000 metropolitan cash (no type of money given)’; ‘1,000 paper money 
is equivalent to 500-600 standard cash, or 1,100-1,200 big cash, or 1,500 iron cash’, etc.   
 
This paper therefore converts all the observations into exchange rates against silver 
(taels) and standard cash (wen). This conversion is feasible because most of the actual 
exchange rates were either related to silver or to standard cash; and information on the 
annual exchange ratio between silver and standard cash is also available. 
 
Figure 1-3 shows the exchange rate of each new currency against silver and Figure 1-4 
shows their exchange rates against copper cash (p.34). the exchange rates of silver notes 
and copper notes are not included in the figures, because there are not enough 
observations of them (there were occasional mentions of copper notes; but almost no 
mention of silver notes) – evidence that government notes were not frequently used in 
the market. 
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Appendix D: Estimates of Beijing’s money stock  
 
Information of the total money stock in Beijing on an annual basis during the nineteenth 
century is not readily available. In order to facilitate the discussion in this chapter, I 
estimated the annual total money stock in Beijing from 1821 to 1870. The estimation is 
carried out with the following steps: first, I estimated the total amount of money in 
circulation in Beijing in a benchmark year (1821); second I estimated the annual 
increase in the money supply (annual money issues deducted by net outflow and 
depreciation) during the period under investigation; third, the annual money stock can 
be calculated by adding annual money increase onto the base year total money stock. 
The estimates are crude due to data limitation, but the results define the upper and lower 
bounds, and thus give us a straightforward idea of the money growth trend.  
 
Money stock of Beijing in 1821 
Previous studies provide estimated series of the total money stock in China from 1660 
to 1860 (an estimation of the total silver and copper cash in circulation at intervals of 
ten years, Appendix D 1-1).
235
 Estimates on regional money stock changes are not 
available. I take the year 1821 as the base year. And I calculate the approximate money 
stock in Beijing by taking its percentage GDP as an indicator of the percentage of 
money circulating in Beijing.  
 
Appendix D 1-1 Total money in circulation in China, 1644-1860 (in millions of 
silver taels and millions of copper cash strings) 
 
Source: Yan (2008), p. 33. 
 
                                                 
235
Hongzhong Yan, "Economic Growth and Fluctuation in the Early Qing from the Perspective of 
Monetary Circulation (Cong Huobi Liutongliang Kan Qingdai Qianqi De Jingji Zengzhang Yu Bodong)," 
Studies in Qing History (Qing Shi Yan Jiu) 24, no. 3 (2008): 33. 
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The year of 1821 is selected as the benchmark year for several reasons: first, 1821 is a 
normal year during a peaceful time period before the major socio-economic storm of the 
1840s. Second, data information relatively good: a nationwide population census was 
conducted in 1820, GDP estimates (national level and in Jiangnan region as well) are 
also available during the 1820s.  
 
This paper then uses Beijing’s GDP percentage in national GDP - instead of its 
population percentage - as a proxy of the percentage of money stock, because the per 
capita GDP in capital (and therefore the concentration of money and wealth) was 
obviously much higher than the national average. Estimate of the GDP of Beijing as a 
city is again not available. But we have the per capita GDP estimate (23.2 taels per 
capita in 1821) in Jiangnan, an area considered as wealthy as the capital.
236
 In 1820, the 
population in metropolitan Beijing (shuntianfu) was 2,934,449 (0.83% of total 
population in China). If we assume that the GDP per capita in Beijing was similar to 
that in Jiangnan, the regional GDP in Beijing during the 1820s was around 68 million 
taels.  
 
In terms of national GDP, there are different estimates available for this period ranging 
from 3,818 million (Liu 2009) to 5,337 million taels (Broadberry et al, 2013).
 237
 
238
 The 
relative size of the capital economy to total Chinese economy therefore ranged from 
1.28 (Broadberry et al estimate) to 1.78 per cent (Liu estimate). 
 
We take both percentages (1.28 and 1.78) to calculate the lower and upper bound 
estimates of the money stock in Beijing. The lower bound estimate suggests that the 
money stock in Beijing of 1821 was around 5,451,630 million taels of silver, plus 
2,959,448 strings of standard copper cash. The upper bound estimate indicates 
7,618,289 million taels of silver, and 3,899,056 strings of standard cash.  
 
Annual increase of money supply in Beijing since 1821 
With total money stock in Beijing in the benchmark year of 1821, we can estimate the 
annual money stock by adding annual changes of money supply onto the base year. The 
annual change of the money supply depends on the money issue (copper coinage and 
later issues of government paper notes), net outflow (or inflow) of the money, as well as 
depreciation.  
 
Different types of money enjoyed circulation areas of different widths. As silver were 
more used for regional trades, silver (and silver notes) were more likely to be flowing in 
and out of the city. Monies of smaller denomination had relatively more restricted area 
of circulation.
239
 As two most important Imperial mints (Baoquan and Baoyuan) were 
                                                 
236
 Bozhong Li, "Investigation of the Early Modern Chinese Economy: From the Gdp Estimation of 
Huating-Louxian Area in the 1820s," Journal of Tsinghua University (Philosophy and Social Sciences) 14, 
no. 3 (2009): 14-6.  
237
 Ti Liu, "An Estimation of China’s Gdp from 1600 to 1840 (1600-1840 Nian Zhongguo Guonei 
Shengchan Zongzhi De Gusuan)," Economic Research Journal (Jingji Yanjiu) 55, no. 10 (2009): 153. 
238
 Broadberry et al. (2013) estimate that in 1800 the Chinese GDP was 5364 million taels; the figure 
dropped slightly to 5,337 million taels in 1840, suggesting a GDP of at least 5,337 million in 1820. Steve 
Broadberry, Guan Hanhui, and Li Daokui, "China, Europe and the Great Divergence: A Study in 
Historical National Accounting," Working paper series for the Project 'Reconstructing the National 
Income of Britain and Holland, c.1270/1500 to 1850', no. F/00215AR (2013): 33-4. 
239
 The transaction cost of carrying small money for long-distance trade is very high. For example, to 
transfer the same value of money, carrying copper cash was 100 times heavier than carrying silver.  
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located in Beijing meeting the demand of copper cash of capital and adjacent areas, 
there should be a net outflow of copper cash in normal years (from 1820s till early 
1850s).  
 
After 1853, the Xianfeng crisis changed the types of monies in circulation as well as 
their circulation patterns: silver tended to travel less frequent due to military 
disturbances and the cut off of normal trade routes. Apart from silver and silver notes, 
all other types of money seemed to be able to circulate only within the capital area, 
because the metropolitan Beijing area adopted the use of brand new monies while other 
areas did not, making these monies hardly acceptable anywhere outside the capital. 
Plenty of reports show that big cash could not be used at all outside this city or within a 
few kilometers, as the contemporary writings record.
240
 Copper notes could be 
exchanged only through certain designated banks. The circulation of banknotes was also 
restricted to local areas: the national banking networks were not well developed and 
banknotes for small amounts could circulate only within a city or even within a block. 
Besides, banknotes in Beijing were denominated in metropolitan cash (jingqian, the unit 
of account in the Beijing area), making them less likely to be recognised or used in 
other places. 
 
Therefore the basic assumption of the annual monetary flow is: before 1853, the 
increase in money supply therefore came basically from the copper cash produced by 
the Imperial mints (banknotes issued by private banks were unknown). With the two 
Imperial mints being the most important providers of copper cash in north China, I 
assume that half of the newly minted copper cash would have circulated outside Beijing. 
Figures for copper coinage are available from the treasury records. From 1853 onwards, 
the increase in the money supply included a mixture of cash coins (copper cash, big 
cash, and iron cash), government paper notes (silver notes and copper notes), and 
official banknotes. And most of the new monies circulated only within the city of 
Beijing. A depreciation of 10% per decade (suggested by Yan, 2008) is used for cash 
coins.
241
 
 
Figures of the mint’s production and note issues are available from the table in 
Appendix B 1-4, which is a reconstruction of the original data from the treasury records.  
 
Estimate of money stock in Beijing (1821-70) 
The paper estimates the stock of silver and copper cash separately: the trend of silver 
stock is deduced from the number for the decennial total silver stock in China 
(assuming the percentage GDP of Beijing as the percentage of copper cash stock in 
Beijing over the whole country).  
 
For the stock of copper cash, I estimated the stock of copper cash in Beijing 1821 
(assuming the percentage GDP of Beijing as the percentage of copper cash stock in 
Beijing over the whole country). The figures for the copper cash in circulation in the 
following years are calculated by adding the annual mint output figures. I assumed that 
during 1821-53, half of the copper cash minted would flow outside Beijing, and that 
                                                 
240
 Peng, Public Finance and Economic Condition of the Late 19th Century China, 108.  
241
 Yan, "Economic Growth and Fluctuation in the Early Qing from the Perspective of Monetary 
Circulation," 31. 
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after 1853, the big cash circulation would be restricted to the city. A depreciation of 10% 
per decade is used for cash coins.
242
  
 
In order to reach a total sum of silver and copper cash, all monies were converted into 
strings. Silver was converted at the silver-copper cash exchange rate of the same year. 
Two GDP percentage estimates (1.28 per cent and 1.78 per cent) are both used to 
produce two different series. Both estimates are plotted and in fact look very similar (  
                                                 
242
 Ibid. 
Chapter 1. Reassessing the Xianfeng Inflation                                                                                            84 
 
84 
 
Appendix D 1-2). Both money growth series are plotted against the wheat price index 
(Appendix D 1-3 and Appendix D 1-4). During the paper’s discussion, only Appendix 
D 1-3 is used, since as it gives the lowest estimates of the money growth.  
 
Further discussion on the estimate 
The estimate is lower than the actual figure due to the lack of information on 
government silver notes, and banknotes. The amount of silver notes is unknown, but we 
do know that the issue of silver notes was limited and many of them were sent to other 
provinces (and never flowed back). As silver notes were rarely seen in the market and 
its total issue was quite limited, the exclusion of silver notes from the figures for money 
increase do not impact too much on the final outcome. As official banks also issued 
banknotes which were not sent directly to the Treasury, estimates of banknotes in the 
treasury records probably underestimate the total amount. In addition, the amount of 
private banknotes is also unknown.  
 
However, this problem does not affect the use of this estimate for the purpose of the 
chapter (in comparing and demonstrating the separate development of money growth 
and price rise). In fact the calculation uses a relatively big monetary base and a 
minimum estimation of the increase of annual money supply, and it shows a lower-
bound estimate. It demonstrates that most of the time money increased much faster than 
the increase of price level (hence supporting the argument that some of the money was 
not really taken as money, and that price rise did not respond to the quantity of money, 
but more to the signal of the government on whether it would honour its debts). The 
actual money stock would be even higher, strengthening the argument of the chapter.  
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Appendix D 1-2 Estimates of the annual money stock in Beijing (indexed 
1821=100), 1821-70 
 
Source: Yan (2008); Appendix B 1-4.  
 
Appendix D 1-3 Index of money stock and price in Beijing (assuming that the 
money stock in Beijing took 1.78% of the national total), 1821-1870 (1821=100) 
 
Source: Peng (2008; 2011), Appendix D 1-2. 
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Appendix D 1-4 Index of money stock and price in Beijing (assuming that the 
money stock in Beijing took 1.276% of the national total), 1821-1870 (1821=100) 
 
Source: Peng (2008; 2011), Appendix D 1-2. 
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Appendix E: Sample images of monies circulating during Xianfeng’s 
Reign  
 
Appendix E 1-1 Image of the big cash in Xianfeng’s Reign (Qing dynasty, issued 
AD 1854) 
 
              
Source: online sources 
243
  
Front (reading from top to bottom, then from right to left): xian feng zhong bao (‘heavy treasure of 
Xianfeng’); 
Back (reading from top to bottom): dang shi (‘as ten’); (read from right to left): (as ten in Manchu). 
 
 
Appendix E 1-2 Image of the standard copper cash in Daoguang’s reign (Qing 
dynasty, issued around AD 1821–50) 
 
Source: online sources
244
 
Front (reading from top to bottom, then from right to left): Dao guang tong bao (‘common treasure 
of Daoguang); 
Back (reading from right to left): (name of the mint in Manchu).   
                                                 
243
 Big cash of Xianfeng, [date of access: 27 Mar 2015] 
(http://www.dfsc.com.cn/collection/2008/0723/Content_353.html)  
244
 Standard cash of Daoguang, [date of access: 27 Mar 2015] 
(http://www.shoucw.com/shop/view.aspx?id=29694) 
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Appendix E 1-3 Image of the silver note (Qing dynasty, issued AD 1854) 
 
Source: British Museum 
 
At the top: Hu bu guan piao (‘Official Paper Notes of the Board of Revenue’);  
Down the centre: the denomination (‘1 tael'); 
Right-hand side: the serial number, left-hand side: the date of issue;  
The blue block of text below gives instructions for use (‘issued by the Board of Revenue; may be used as 
real silver taels; can be used for government payments at a proportion according to regulation; forgers 
will be punished with the utmost severity.’)  
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Appendix E 1-4 Image of the copper note (Qing dynasty, issued AD 1857) 
 
Source: British Museum 
 
At the top: Da qing bao chao ('Great Qing Treasure Certificate');  
Down the centre: the denomination ('1000 wen'); 
Right-hand side: the serial number, left-hand side: the date of issue;  
The blue block of text below gives instructions for use (‘issued by the Board of Revenue; may be used as 
real silver taels; can be used for government payments at a proportion according to regulation; copper 
notes with the amount of 2000 wen can be exchanged for a silver note of 1 tael’). 
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Appendix E 1-5 Image of the official banknote (Qing dynasty, issued AD 1850s–
1860s) 
 
Source: Archive Branch, Peking University Library 
 
Top left-hand side: stamp (on rules of circulation, not easily legible); 
Bottom left-hand side: stamp of the issuing bank: Qian yi guan hao (an official bank under the Qian 
Group);  
In the centre: figures showing the real values of each transaction, signatures and stamps of the persons 
responsible for the transactions.  
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Appendix E 1-6 Image of the official banknote (Qing dynasty, issued AD 1840s–60s) 
 
Source: Archive Branch, Peking University Library 
 
Top left-hand side: stamp (on rules of circulation, not easily legible); 
Bottom left-hand side: stamp of the issuing bank: Tian zhen yin qian hao (a bank under the Tian Group); 
In the centre: figures showing the real values of each transaction, signatures and stamps of the persons 
responsible for the transactions.  
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Appendix E 1-7 Image of the private banknote (Qing dynasty) 
 
Source: Library of the Economic institute, CASS 
 
Top the centre: Pin tie qu yin (‘we redeem silver upon presentation of this paper’);  
Down the centre: the amount (‘4 tael’) and specification on denomination (seems ‘market tael’, not 
written clearly); 
Right-hand side: parts of two stamps (the paper containing the remaining part of the stamps should be 
kept as a record within the private bank), left-hand side: the date of issue;  
Bottom left: Jin yi hao (name of the bank, a remittance bank by shanxi bankers). 
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Chapter 2 The Big Problem of 
Small Change in Late Imperial 
China (1890-1910): 245 
 
Silver inflow, rural deflation, and how it could be solved 
by steam power technology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
245
 The title of the chapter is inspired by the work of Sargent and Velde (2002), Thomas J. Sargent and 
François R. Velde, The Big Problem of Small Change(Princeton, N.J. ;Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2002)., which was in turn inspired by Carlo Cipolla. Carlo M.  Cipolla, Money, Prices, and Civilization in 
the Mediterranean World: Fifth to Seventeenth Century(Princeton: Princeton University Press 1956, 
1956).  
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Silver had long been the currency for China’s overseas trade until the mid-1930s. China 
was not a silver producing country and its silver supply relied on imports from abroad. 
One focus of research on Chinese economic history is therefore the relationship between 
silver (its international price and supply) and China’s economic condition (economic 
growth and trade). Therefore one focus of research on Chinese economic history is the 
relationship between silver (its international price and supply) and China’s economic 
condition (economic growth and trade). For instance, whether the silver inflow/outflow 
leads to economic boom/depression is a continuous subject of debate among scholars.
246
 
Proponents of the classic bimetallic system would suggest that having two metals 
dampens the shocks resulting from a shortage of one of the metals and therefore 
stabilises the currency. Besides the movement of silver, the price of silver also affects 
trade and economy. Theoretically, ‘cheap silver’ (a cheap price of silver in international 
market) can be taken as a sudden and exogenous currency devaluation, and would 
indicate favourable terms of trade for silver standard countries as the devaluation would 
encourage exports.
247 , 248
 However, events in China that developed since the 1870s 
contradicted the theory. With the wide adoption of the gold standard in major 
economies, silver was demonetised and the price of silver plunged.
249
  But compared to 
other Asian countries such as Japan, Vietnam or India, China benefited little from the 
depreciation of silver.
250
 In fact, the Imperial Maritime Customs statistics even show 
that during this period the price of Chinese exports quoted in silver increased, and that 
                                                 
246
 For an analysis using historical events see William S. Atwell, "Notes on Silver, Foreign Trade, and the 
Late Ming Economy," Late Imperial China (Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i) 3, no. 8 (1977). Mio Kishimoto-
Nakayama, "The Kangxi Depression and Early Qing Local Markets," Modern China 10, no. 2 (1984). For 
more recent debate see papers of Von Glahn, Irigoin, Kishimoto and Lin in Asian Historical Economics 
Conference (Hitotsubashi University, Japan, 2012).  
247
 Jeffrey B.  Nugent, "Exchange-Rate Movements and Economic Development in the Late Nineteenth 
Century," Journal of Political Economy 81, no. 5 (1973): 1110-14. 
248
 Milton  Friedman, "Franklin D. Roosevelt, Silver, and China," The Journal of Political Economy 100, 
no. 1 (1992): 62-83. 
249
 The new silver deposits discovered in the Rocky Mountains also contributed to the price drop. The 
demonetization of silver not only led to a drop in the price, but also increased the volatility of the price. 
250
 During 1872-96, the average annual growth rates of export (%/annum) for these countries are 5.6, 1.7, 
9.8 and 0.5 respectively. Nugent, "Exchange-Rate Movements and Economic Development in the Late 
Nineteenth Century," 1123. 
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while exports did increase, imports increased more, resulting in an enlarged trade 
deficit.
251, 252
  
 
This paper considers the positive effect of ‘cheap silver’ on China’s trade to be limited 
for several reasons. First, the increase of both exports and imports should also be 
attributed to China’s trade expansion during this time period: the number of treaty ports 
was extended from eighteen cities along the coastal and border line (by 1870) to almost 
all strategic trading venues throughout the country.
253
 Second, the demonetisation of 
silver made the gold price of silver not only low but also volatile, and an unstable 
exchange also offset some of the benefit from silver depreciation
254
 Moreover, it was 
observed that during this period, the price of Chinese exports generally increased, 
further offsetting the depreciation benefit.
255
 This is because China was not on a pure 
silver standard, but a dual metallic standard composed of silver and copper. Most 
Chinese exports at the time were rural products quoted in copper cash; the prices were 
then translated into silver at the point of export.
256
 A depreciation of the silver means a 
cheaper exchange rate between silver and copper cash. Therefore when rural price 
(quoted in copper cash) remained stable, the export prices quoted in silver would 
increase instead.  
 
This paper argues that the ‘cheap silver’ phenomenon had at least two potential impacts 
on Chinese economy: trade impact and monetary impact. Apart from currency 
depreciation and potential silver inflow, ‘cheap silver’ impacted Chinese through other 
more subtle but perhaps more fundamental mechanisms: the sudden and permanent drop 
in the price of silver greatly destabilised the price relationship between copper and 
silver, and therefore challenged the monetary system and pushed it for a change. Studies 
                                                 
251
 C. F. Remer, "International Trade between Gold and Silver Countries: China, 1885-1913," The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 40, no. 4 (1926). 
252
 Figure 2-4 provides more detailed information on trade.  
253
 By 1896 after Treaty of Shimonoseki, the number of treaty ports increased to 1896 and by 1910 (end 
of the period under investigation of the paper) it grew to 82. The number of treaty ports kept increasing 
during Republican China (1912-49), and the total number amounted to 105.  Yan, Selected Statistics in 
the Economic History of Modern China, 41-48. 
254
 Nugent, "Exchange-Rate Movements and Economic Development in the Late Nineteenth Century," 
1115. 
255
 Remer, "International Trade between Gold and Silver Countries: China, 1885-1913," 614-16. 
256
 Yu-kwei Cheng, "Change in Silver and Copper Cash Prices and Their Relationship with Price and 
Foreign Trade in China in the Late 19th Century (Shi Jiu Shi Ji Hou Qi Yin Jia Qian Jia De Bian Dong 
Yu Wo Guo Wu Jia Ji Dui Wai Mao Yi De Guan Xi) " Research In Chinese Economic History (Zhong 
guo jing ji shi yan jiu) 1, no. 2 (1986). 
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on bimetallism also suggest a potential source of instability from which a monometallic 
system is immune: precisely due to the existence of two metals, a shock in the supply of 
either metal will lead to a discrepancy between the mint ratio and the market ratio.
257
 In 
the case of China, the market relied heavily on the use of ‘small money’ (i.e., copper 
cash) for daily transactions and for all exchanges in rural area, while the economy 
suffered constantly from a shortage of copper cash because of the high cost of minting 
them. A drop in the price of silver aggravated the shortage of cash: the mint 
consequently suspended copper coinage due to the increased cost; and the existing cash 
as ‘undervalued money’ were melted down. The trade impact of ‘cheap silver’ might be 
restricted by the limited scope of international trade,
258
 while its monetary impact 
seemed to be nationwide as arbitrage in money market was quicker than arbitrage in 
goods market with imperfect market integration. In addition, the provision of coinage 
was a centralised decision implemented by regional governments throughout the 
country.  
 
Therefore the ‘cheap silver’ presented an opportunity for China (silver depreciation 
should have promoted exports; also a potential silver inflow would have provided more 
liquidity for trade and production) that China was then not able to grasp. The ‘cheap 
silver’ rather loomed as a challenge for the stability of China’s monetary system: 
despite a silver inflow to treaty ports and urban centres, its vast rural population was 
suffering from a shortage of money (the copper cash) leading to potential deflation. 
Only when the copper sector was adequately depreciated could the trade benefit be 
realised. The only way to fully appreciate the benefits of silver devaluation is to 
adequately devaluate the copper sector as well (i.e. to find a way to produce a sufficient 
                                                 
257
 Then a ‘bimetallic arbitrage’ occurs, which in turn results in a de facto monometallic standard. 
Lawrence H. Officer, "Bimetallism," in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online, ed. Steven N. 
Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume.(Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
258
 Brandt’s work has shown that areas adjacent to treaty ports became increasingly integrated to 
international market and the agriculture activities adjusted (to grow more cash crops) according to 
demands from the international market, i.e.: their rural economy had a developed export sector. These are 
normally coastal areas with much more developed financial institutions. For most hinterland area, where 
trade was still carried out by middlemen who travelled and collected rural produces, it seems that 'cheap 
silver' did not have much positive impact: as before the travel, the middlemen had to spend more silver 
than before in order to exchange for the same amount of copper cash. And farmers would be less likely to 
accept other forms of money when they are farther away from commercial cities or from the well-
developed financial facilities. Contemporary reports show that some specific trade disappears as the 
middlemen cancelled the trip when they found it unprofitable. Loren Brandt, Commercialization and 
Agricultural Development: Central and Eastern China, 1870-1937(Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989). Junya Ma, "Traditional Finance and China's Agricultural Trade, 1920-1933," Modern China 
34, no. 3 (2008). 
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quantity of small coins at affordable cost). However, it has been a long term dilemma 
for premodern societies to provide debased small coins to the public: it might be 
discounted in the market and might well invite counterfeiting.
259
 This dilemma had 
persisted in premodern societies and was only solved by the introduction of new 
coinage with steam power technology: unlike the ancient cases of debasement which 
immediately invited counterfeiting, the new technology cast high-quality, standardized 
coins with machined edges. Therefore the new technology provided a way to coin 
sufficient token coins at an affordable cost without inviting forgery. 
 
This paper looks into archives of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service and identifies 
a monetary shortage, despite the inflow of silver at the time. It argues that the 
introduction of debased copper coinage manufactured by steam power technology 
successfully solved this monetary problem (the new technology allowed the state to 
mint sufficient copper coins at an affordable cost, and at the same time to avoid 
counterfeiting, which normally followed debasement). Since the new coinage was 
introduced across China in different regions at different paces, the paper uses a 
differences-in-differences estimation on regional price data to test the impact of the 
institutional shocks on the regional economy before and after the introduction of the 
new coinage, and demonstrates that the introduction of new copper coinage helped to 
ease the monetary stringency in the countryside and acted as a positive shock to the 
economy. The paper also suggests that despite the technological innovation that 
endorsed the credibility of the new coinage, the lack of adequate institutional innovation 
(to check on the government’s over-issue of coins) finally led to monetary chaos at a 
later stage of China’s history. 
 
This paper is closely related to a broad literature on monetary history and theory. First, 
existing historical literature on machine-made copper coins overwhelmingly emphasizes 
the negative impact of this currency (Liang, 1910; Ho, 1993; Liang 2001; Lai 2013), 
while ignoring the positive aspects. The original discussion of Qichao Liang, one of the 
most influential intellectual and political figures during late Qing and early Republican 
China, focused on the seigniorage revenue motive behind the mints and the over-issuing 
                                                 
259
 Angela Redish, "The Persistence of Bimetallism in Nineteenth-Century France," The Economic 
History Review, New Series 48, no. 4 (1995): 719-20. 
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of copper coins that caused inflation.
260
 Ho discusses in detail the shortage of copper 
cash as justifying the new copper coinage, indicating the urgent need to increase the 
supply. But instead of further exploring the positive aspects, Ho’s paper focuses on the 
impact of coinage on local fiscal revenue and on people’s lives during the inflationary 
period.
261
 The inflation in fact ensued five years after the introduction of new copper 
coins and the issue was more of a problem in the Republican period than in the late 
Qing period. The copper coinage was to begin with a great success and was well 
received. 
 
Second, one of the big questions raised by researchers on the Chinese monetary system 
is the relationship between China’s silver standard and its international trade. Many 
believe that ‘cheap silver’ (a drop in the price of silver in the international market which 
normally resulted in a silver inflow) would indicate favourable terms of trade for China, 
whereas expensive silver would discourage the export trade (Friedman 1992).
262
 One 
example is the fall of the Ming dynasty in 1644, which in many studies is associated 
with the drastic fall in silver imports during the same period (Atwell 1977).
263
 The 
‘Kangxi Depression’ during the early part of the Kangxi period (1661-1722) is also 
attributed to the reduced silver inflow due to the prohibition on foreign trade and the 
subsequent monetary stringency (Kishimoto-Nakayama 1984).
264
 This generalised view 
is, however, often contested (Von Glahn 1996a, 2012; Kishimoto 2012). The case of the 
Daoguang depression, for example, has recently been revisited and many have argued 
with convincing evidence that the silver outflow is not necessarily directly linked to, nor 
a definite cause of, the alleged economic depression.
265
 The historical period under 
investigation of this paper offers another example: the drastically large quantity of 
inflowing silver did not benefit Chinese exports. On the contrary contemporary reports 
show that the economy and trade had been adversely affected.
266
 Many more factors 
                                                 
260
 Liang’s work was first published in 1910, and is re-printed in Liang, "Concise History of the Excessive 
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other than the direction of the silver flow should be taken into account.
267
 This paper 
shows that the peculiar monetary system should be taken into account, and that the 
copper sector – functioning more like the domestic part of the bimetallic standard – and 
the relationship between copper cash and silver must not be overlooked. 
 
Third, the paper supports the literature on the problem of small changes in premodern 
monetary system and how technology facilitated the monetary modernisation (transition 
from bimetallic system to monometallic one) by making token money widely circulated 
and accepted. There is a large body of literature regarding the role of small coins in the 
money standard of medieval Europe. Coins of smaller denomination provide an ‘extra 
liquidity service,’ unlike larger coins,268 although the cost of producing smaller coins is 
higher (Sargent and Velde 2002). This case often resulted in a chronic shortage of small 
coins.
269
 Theoretically valid, this view is often challenged by the observation of specific 
historical periods (Munro 1988; Volckart 2008). It is pointed out that lower- value coins 
in the past were by no means of very small denomination.
270
 And the chronic shortage 
of low-denomination coins seems to be more in theory than in history.
271
 The 
production of such coins in terms of their intrinsic metallic content gives rise to another 
dilemma (Redish 1995). When the intrinsic value is high (higher compared to its legal 
tender value), the coin may be melted; but when the intrinsic value is low, it may be 
counterfeited.
272
 These lines of analysis apply well to the case in China. The specific 
period under scrutiny in this paper is in fact a period in which numerous attempts were 
made to resolve the big problem of small change, and the new copper coinage 
accidentally ticked the correct ‘standard formula’. The ‘tokenisation’ of the small coins 
in fact prepared China to move onto a pure silver standard instead of a dual metallic one. 
Redish (1995) argued that France remained on a bimetallic standard instead of adopting 
                                                 
267
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the Gold Standard because of the government resistance of adopting steam power 
technology to mint token coins. Her paper looks into this issue through a careful 
examination of government documents. This paper strengthens this line of argument 
through statistical analysis as well as studies on contemporary reports.     
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2.2 provides an institutional 
context for the shortage of copper cash; Section 2.3 discusses the minting of new 
coinage made possible by steam power technology and analyses the reasons behind the 
relative success of the new copper coinage; Section 2.4 carries out a simplified 
empirical test to gauge how far the technological shock generated positive effects on the 
economy; Section 2.5 concludes the paper. 
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2.2 Bimetallic System: Cheap Silver and 
Copper Cash Shortage 
 
2.2.1 The monetary system in imperial China  
2.2.1.1 Evolution of the monetary system: foreign silver, domestic copper 
That imperial China had a silver/copper bimetallic system is a highly simplified, if not 
distorted, conceptualisation. China was originally on a bronze coin standard (a 
monometallic standard), which with international trade and large inflows of silver, later 
evolved into a system with two metallic monies.  
  
Copper cash (a type of bronze coin) was adopted as the common currency in China as 
early as the third century B.C. The bronze coin standard dominated China for almost ten 
centuries before the diversification of the currency system, which started to include iron 
coins, paper notes and silver ingots. China was not a silver producing country but from 
the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries, with the development of trade and the influx of foreign silver, 
the latter became an important part of the monetary system.
273
 However, while copper 
cash provision was a state monopoly (and the major supply of copper was from state-
owned copper mines), the supply of silver depended completely on markets and trade. 
There was no coinage of silver and the metal often circulated in the form of ingots.  
 
During the Qing Dynasty the makeup of Chinese currency consolidated into a system 
comprising copper cash and silver. Copper cash full-bodied copper coins. A piece of 
standard cash is a round coin with a square hole in the centre.
274
 All coins bear the same 
face value of 1 wen,
275
 and a string of copper cash consists of 1000 pieces of copper 
cash and can be used for larger payments.
276
 Silver circulated in the form of both silver 
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275
 A typical piece of copper cash in the 18
th
 century, for example, would weigh 0.12 liang, containing 50-
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276
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ingots and silver dollars. Silver was more valuable than copper and was used in large 
transactions and interregional trading; it was measured by weight in terms of tael.
277
  
 
2.2.1.2 Comparison with the bimetallism in Europe 
In some significant respects the monetary system in late imperial China differed from 
the European bimetallic system: the supply of money (whether the state or the market 
decided the amount of money supply); the exchange rate between two monies (whether 
exchange rate was flexible or fixed); and the function and interaction of two monies 
(whether they were inter-changeable during a transaction, or rather occupied different 
markets and serve very distinct functions in the economy).  
 
In Europe, both gold and silver were legal tender and could be used for any transaction 
payment.
278
 The state mint defined the seigniorage charge of minting as well as the 
content of pure metal in each coin and therefore there was a fixed legal price ratio (mint 
ratio) between two types of coin. Private parties could bring metal of any quantity to the 
state mint for coinage. Coins could be freely melted,
279
 imported or exported, so that the 
fixed exchange rate was effectively maintained (i.e. free coinage).
280281
  
 
                                                 
277
 Tael, or liang, was used for both the unit of weight and the unit of account. The concept seems similar 
to that of a ‘pound’ and a ‘pound sterling’. A tael was rather a ghost unit that varied over time and space. 
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278
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European state attempted to influence the supply of money (for example, by restricting the minting 
output). Oliver Volckart, The Monetary Policy in German Teutonic States and the Duchy of Prussia from 
1370 to 1550 (Die Münzpolitik Im Deutschordensland Und Herzogtum Preußen Von 1370 Bis 1550) 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1996), 131 and 346. 
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 Officer, "Bimetallism." 
281
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coins were issued and the market ratio between two metallic coins might fluctuate. Peter Spufford, 
Wendy Wilkinson, and Sarah Tolley, Handbook of Medieval Exchange ed. Royal Historical 
Society(London: Boydell and Brewer 1986), 1-25. 
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In China, only copper cash was coined and the copper cash circulated by tale. Silver 
generally circulated by weight as uncoined metal.
282
 Copper was minted (the amount 
was not freely determined by the public), while silver was freely used but not minted.
283
 
The government monopolized copper mining and the minting of copper cash. Copper 
cash was cast in a number of state mints (two in the capital and one in almost each 
province) situated in each region, and the circulation was rather regional.
284
 Private 
melting and minting were illegal. China’s domestic production of silver was low and 
therefore the silver stock was accumulated through international trade.
285
 As silver 
circulated by weight and in all forms (ingots, and silver dollars imported from Latin 
America), with the supply determined by the market, it could be melted, cast (into some 
particular form, but not into a coin with a face value), imported and exported by private 
individuals.  
 
Silver and copper cash served in different types of transaction and also in different types 
of market. As they differed significantly in value, copper cash was used in retail 
markets and for paying daily wages, and silver was used in large transactions such as 
land purchase, wholesale, interregional and overseas trade. In rural areas, copper cash 
was usually the only accepted form of money. The use of silver was more frequent in 
areas associated with higher trading activities.  
 
The actual exchange rate between silver and copper cash fluctuated, depending on the 
relative supply and demand of each currency. King (1965) characterizes this system as a 
‘parallel bimetallic system’, which diverged from the ‘classic form’ of bimetallism.286 
Despite the endless attempts by the state to fix the ratio at 1 silver tael equivalent to 
1000 wen, this principle was actually reflected more in government fiscal conduct 
(taxation and government spending) than in market behaviour.
287
 This is not to say, 
however, that the government official exchange ratio had no effect on the functioning of 
the market. On the contrary, the impact of the interplay between the government and the 
                                                 
282
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market is an interesting subject of investigation. For example, the imposed (and 
inadequate) official ratio was one of the reasons behind the illegal melting and 
counterfeiting activities which seem to have been rampant throughout the dynasty. 
History holds several examples of official rate modification, aiming at closing the gap 
between the official and market rates.
288
  
 
2.2.1.3 The innate instability of the Chinese bimetallic system 
In the case of Europe, the viability of an idealised bimetallic system depends on 
effective private arbitrage, which requires a large size of specie supply in the public’s 
hands and free minting. When these conditions could not be fulfilled thus the bimetallic 
arbitrage was no longer feasible, the monetary system became a ‘limping 
bimetallism’.289 Judging from these criteria the Chinese bimetallic system was ‘born 
limping’ and the system itself was indeed very unstable from within.  
 
In a bimetallic economy like China’s, where either type cannot be imported and 
exported freely, a flexible exchange ratio would be the key to maintaining the system.
290
 
This practice, however, would be at the expense of convenient means of exchange and 
predictable market activities.   
 
The self-adjusting mechanism of the parallel bimetallic system lies in the exchange ratio, 
and the system may be very costly to maintain when the change of the ratio becomes 
frequent and volatile. For most of the time, the Chinese system was contained because 
markets were far from integrated, and the two currencies were only loosely linked in 
seasonal wholesale markets. Even if there had been a gradual change in the quantity of 
one metal, the change would have been reflected only on a seasonal basis. Conditions 
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changed, however, in the 19
th
 century: the integration into the international market made 
the movement of silver more frequent and sudden; the subsequent development in 
exports tied different markets closer together; the fluctuations of the exchange ratio 
were more easily observed and the financial arbitrage became more frequent because of 
the readily available modern communication and transport.  
 
In my view, this system could have been sustained only so long as the silver/copper 
cash ratio did not fluctuate too greatly, or too frequently. Throughout history, this 
condition was satisfied thanks to some special conditions. First, given a big and 
relatively closed economy, cases of a sudden and large change of the quantity of either 
metal were rare. Second, silver and copper cash functioned on different levels of the 
market and did not confront each other very often. Third, despite the official rate, the 
market exchange ratio between silver and copper cash adjusted according to the relative 
supply and demand of the region and reached a local equilibrium. At the same time, 
because the domestic market was far from integrated, the different local equilibria rarely 
if ever confronted each other; therefore the discrepancies in terms of exchange ratio in 
different regions did not impose a huge challenge to the economy overall. In this way 
the exchange ratio between silver and copper cash was loosely defined and remained 
flexible; it allowed modification which were not too frequent nor too drastic. Hence the 
soundness of the bimetallic system.  
 
However, the stabilising factors would change in the 19
th
 century: the relative supply of 
the two metals would gradually change; the relative price of the two metals would 
change, sometimes drastically; China would be increasingly connected with the 
international market and at the same time the domestic market would be more and more 
integrated with higher trading activities. The relative quantity of two metals changed 
because the domestic copper mines were almost depleted and the copper supply for the 
state mints relied on imports. The supply of silver, in contrast, increased with the 
increasing activity in overseas trade. With the adoption of the gold standard and the 
subsequent demonetization of silver (coupled with the discovery of silver in the Rocky 
Mountains), the price of silver fell dramatically and permanently, and so did the relative 
pricing of copper and silver (in particular when the supply of both metals relied on the 
international market). The exchange ratio between silver and copper cash would also be 
permanently affected. Moreover, in 1840 China was forced to open itself to overseas 
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trade. With a stronger link to overseas markets (and also when the supply of both metals 
relied almost solely on import), the silver/copper cash exchange ratio became subject to 
constant fluctuation, worst in the urban areas and trade centres. Finally, with the 
development of telecommunication and banking networks and therefore a more 
integrated domestic market, the regional variation of the exchange ratio revealed itself 
as a more serious problem for monetary stability. 
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Figure 2-1 Annual London silver price (pence per troy ounce of silver) 1840-1912 
 
Source: Global Financial Data. 
   
Figure 2-2 Percentage change in London silver price, 1840-1912 
 
Source: Global Financial Data. 
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2.2.2 Copper cash shortage – the big problem of small change 
2.2.2.1 The big problem of small change in China 
A big problem of small change for a commodity money regime has been a chronic 
shortage of it.
291292
 Given that petty coins – coins of smaller denominations – can be 
used in big transactions while big coins cannot be used in small transactions, petty coins 
render extra ‘liquidity services’, and therefore the demand for petty coins is generally 
higher than for coins with higher denominations.
293
 At the same time, however, the cost 
of striking a coin is more or less the same, whatever its denomination. In terms of its 
face value, the cost of producing a small coin is therefore proportionately higher than 
that for big ones. Studies on the medieval European monetary system show that the 
supply of petty coins tended to be insufficient.
294
 William Lowndes, the secretary to the 
Treasury of Great Britain summarized the monetary issue in early eighteenth century 
Britain: ‘take care of the pence, and the pounds will take care of themselves’.295  
 
This problem of small change is a feature of the Chinese monetary system, too. Copper 
cash has been the money of common use for centuries. Copper cash is small money but 
by no means only subsidiary money. For common people with moderate needs, copper 
cash was the principal means, or even the only medium of income and payment.
296
 This 
is even truer in the countryside. It has been observed that even in the 1890s copper cash 
was still ‘the real coin of the country: the entire trade is conducted in it. The farmer will 
take nothing else for his produce. Produce is bought, goods are sold, and prices are 
quoted in cash.’297 
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292
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Throughout Chinese history, the production of copper cash was most of the time a state 
monopoly, and the governments in each dynasty often made it a point of honour to 
maintain the coinage.
298
 However, this seemingly benevolent conduct was in reality 
more than often hampered, whenever the cost of production was too high. As a result 
since early times the empire has suffered from chronic shortages of currency. Even 
during the North Song dynasty (960-1127), when the annual production of copper cash 
reached its overall peak, China was still afflicted by ‘currency famines’.299 The Ming 
dynasty (1368-1644) set out (not very successfully) to replace metallic monies with 
government maintained paper currency, and did not provide adequate copper coinage.
300
  
 
In addition, the shortage of copper cash in China seems to have been much more 
troublesome than in Europe, because silver and copper cash are far from perfect 
substitutes for each other especially in China. While silver helped enlarge the whole 
money stock in China and facilitated long-distance trade, it was copper cash that 
appeared to be the fully functioning currency. Copper cash was almost the only 
currency accepted in rural areas, while in urban areas, it was still in practice the only 
money used in daily transactions. The wider use of silver and the increased inter-
exchangeability of these two monies took place at a very late stage. In 1899 in Jiaozhou, 
a Northern port city, the dominant currency was still copper cash:
301
  
 
‘The currency of this region is copper cash, sycee silver,
302
 and dollars. […] The last 
do not enter into mercantile transactions outside of the German territory. Sycee silver 
only enters into transactions between merchants, bankers, and the Custom House. […] 
Copper cash is the real coin of the country: the entire trade is conducted in it. The 
farmer will take nothing else for his produce. Produce is bought, goods are sold, and 
prices are quoted in cash, or tiao - i.e., strings of 1,000 cash.’ 
 
2.2.2.2 Copper supply and mint output in Qing Dynasty  
During the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), the government expanded its coinage provision 
beyond the totals of its predecessor, but the overall copper cash supply during the 
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299
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300
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dynasty was still insufficient, in particular when juxtaposed with more significant 
population growth. There was a slight deflationary trend in the prices quoted in copper 
currency.
303
 During the early Qing period, the copper supply mainly relied on cheap 
imports from Japan. The copper imports shrank greatly at the beginning of the 18
th
 
century, due to Japan’s restriction on its copper exports.304 Fortunately, from the early 
18
th
 century to the early 19
th
, the Chinese state was able to secure a supply of cheap 
copper from Yunnan province, and the mint output was maintained at an adequately 
high level.
305
  
 
However, the mint output started to decline in the early 19
th
 century, mainly due to the 
exhaustion of the copper supply as well domestic disturbances. The copper mine in 
Yunnan was so over-exploited that from 1810 onwards its output started to decline. In 
1853, the route by which copper from Yunnan was transported to major mints was cut 
by the Taiping rebellion group,
306
 further curtailing the mint output. The copper mine 
was seriously damaged during the Mohammedan rebellion (1853-74) in Yunnan 
Province. Copper production was suspended even after the rebellion. It was only 
resumed in 1887, after more than a decade of reconstruction but the production level 
dropped to only around 13% of its original level in the mid-18
th
 century.
307
 
Subsequently the copper supply to the state mints relied on imports from overseas, 
mainly from Japan.
308
 With the increased cost of raw material, the mint output was 
further reduced. The gap between the supply and demand of copper cash continued to 
widen in the latter half of the 19
th
 century. 
 
A shortage of copper for the mints had already been noticed during the reign of 
Emperor Daoguang (1821-50).
309
 As early as the 1840s, the scarcity of copper cash was 
already a concern of top government officials.
310
 During the Taiping Rebellion of the 
1850s and 1860s, the government issued new types of seriously debased copper cash, 
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most of which were rejected by the market.
311
 After the 1860s there was no systematic 
coinage of standard cash in large quantities.
312
 The exact quantities of annual national 
copper coinage are not available, but the surviving documentation on the mint output in 
Beijing is suggestive enough. The two mints in the capital, Baoquan and Baoyuan, were 
the two most important in the country. They enjoyed priority in terms of copper 
provision and were responsible for almost half the total mint output. Copper cash 
produced by the two mints were deposited in the state treasury before being used in 
government expenditure. The record of treasury books therefore is indicative of the 
copper coinage in the capital area, but the statistical series is incomplete: many years 
have missing records and records are especially incomplete during the period from the 
1870s to the 1910s, probably due also to the low production level of the two royal mints. 
Figure 2-3 (p.112) shows that the trend of the radically reduced production is still more 
than visible: after 1860s, copper coinage in these two major mints became infrequent 
and much smaller in scale: within a century, from 1751 to 1850, the average mint output 
was around 1,178,923 strings per year; after 1860 the annual coinage dropped to 
217,249 strings per year, less than one fifth of the former output. The mint output was 
nil in 1883, 1891 and 1892. There was a brief revival of coinage in 1896-99, following a 
heavy demand for copper cash in market, but the annual output still scarcely reached a 
quarter of the output of a normal year (the annual average of 1751-1850).
313
 The output 
level in other provincial state mints would only have been lower, if not nil.  
 
This insufficient provision of copper cash induced a series of problems, both monetary 
and real. The scanty supply of copper cash would destabilise the exchange rate between 
silver and copper, confuse the market and impede long distance trade that involved 
exchanges between the two currencies. In rural areas where copper cash was the only 
currency acceptable, the shortage of means of exchange might discourage trade 
activities (especially long distance trade). More important, with a relatively established 
                                                 
311
 The debased copper cash is called ‘daqian’, or ‘big cash’, with extremely high face value but little 
copper content, due to the scarcity of copper supply and the urgent need of financing military action. King, 
Money and Monetary Policy in China, 147-9. 
312
 Peng, A Monetary History of China, 528. 
313
 The treasury’s books were compiled each year by the Qing Court, but parts of the archive were lost. 
What we see today are records only of the years that are still preserved. It should be noted that there was a 
sudden increase in terms of copper cash production during 1850-60. This was due to the issue of largely 
debased coins (with very high face value) and the mint output was artificially increased, as the output was 
a mixture of copper coins of different denominations, and the record shows only the total nominal value. 
The statistics here are taken from the book of Shi. Shi, Treasury Statitstics pp.167-253. 
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silver/copper cash ratio and an ever decreasing quantity of copper cash, copper cash 
became overvalued and risked being driven out of the market. Government reports show 
that copper coins were being melted and the production of illegal counterfeit copper 
cash (with less copper content) was rampant.  
 
This situation became even more serious towards the end of the 19
th
 century. Because of 
the changes in commodity prices, copper cash coinage became even more costly for a 
government that was already facing huge deficits. Mint production was virtually 
suspended despite an ever growing market demand for more copper coins. The 
following subsections illustrate the aggravated situation and analyse the cause and 
consequences of this monetary phenomenon, as shown in contemporary narratives.  
 
Figure 2-3 Mint outputs of the Baoquan and Baoyuan Mints in Beijing, 1751-1912 
(millions of strings of copper cash) 
 
Source: Imperial Treasury Records, CASS 
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2.2.3 Turn of the century: challenges to the monetary system and its 
economic consequences 
2.2.3.1 Gold standard, cheap silver and copper cash shortage 
During the latter half of the 19
th
 century, changes in the supply of both silver and copper 
became more volatile, for two reasons: developments in trade and the demonetization of 
silver.  
 
Foreign trade expanded at a quickened pace in the mid-19
th
 century, after China’s defeat 
in the Opium Wars (1839-42 and 1856-60) and the subsequent agreement to open 
various treaty ports.
314
 Trade statistics (Figure 2-4, p.116) show that the value of total 
trade (net import plus export) was 95 million taels in 1864. Foreign trade expanded 
steadily: by the end of 1889, total trade value had increased to 207.8 million and by the 
end of 1899 it was already 460.5 million.
315
 As foreign trade transactions were settled in 
terms of silver, the silver stock in China was increasingly affected by the trade 
expansion. Meanwhile, with most Chinese exports being produced outside towns, the 
development of foreign trade also promoted rural production, new trade routes and the 
emergence of intermediate markets connecting rural and urban areas. With this trade 
integration both internally and internationally, the whole market became more sensitive 
to changes in the supply of any metal, as well as to the changes in silver/copper cash 
exchange ratio.  
 
The big change in the silver sector was prompted by the wide adoption of the Gold 
Standard in the 1870s and the demonetization of silver: after the Franco-Prussian War 
(1870-71) Germany was able to adopt Gold Standard. France, together with the Latin 
Monetary Union, also switched to the Gold Standard in late 1870s.
316
 This ‘gold wave’ 
continued in periphery countries and, towards the end of the century, extended to many 
                                                 
314
 Studies on the international commodity market (of rice and cotton in particular) show that since the 
late 19
th 
century, commercialised areas in China (especially Shanghai and other centres connected to it) 
were increasingly integrated into the world market: the agricultural prices and outputs were affected by 
overseas supply and demand. Brandt, Commercialization and Agricultural Development, 1-38. A. J. H.; 
Latham and Larry Neal, "The International Market in Rice and Wheat, 1868-1914 " The Economic 
History Review 36 no. 2 (1983). 
315
 Liang-lin Hsiao, China's Foreign Trade Statistics, 1864-1949 (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research 
Center, Harvard University : distributed by Harvard University Press, 1974), 22. Hsiao’s data was 
collected from statistics originally published by the Imperial Maritime Customs Service. Systematic and 
comparable trade statistics were available only after 1864, and statistics on the movement of treasure 
(gold, silver and copper) were available after 1888.   
316
 Flandreau, The Glitter of Gold, 175-77.  
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Asian countries like Japan, and India.
317
 Figure 2-1 (p. 107) illustrates the permanent 
change in the price of silver in the London market; between 1840 and 1870 it remained 
at more or less the same level (at around 60 pence per troy ounce). After 1870, the price 
of silver dropped and never bounced back. After demonetisation, silver became a 
common commodity: not only did the price drop to less than half of its original price, 
but the price movement was also increasingly volatile after 1870 (Figure 2-2, p.107). 
The silver price in the London market dropped even more drastically after 1890, from 
48.375 pence per ounce of silver in 1890 to 27.844 in 1904. After 1900, the price 
fluctuated between 20 and 30 pence and the movement was even more volatile.
318
  
 
As noted, large quantities of silver had flowed into China since the beginning of its 
drastic drop in price (the ‘cheap silver’ phenomenon), despite the enlarging trade deficit. 
319
. The actual number would be difficult to pin down, due to the unrestrained 
smuggling. The customs statistics nevertheless show that silver imports soared during 
the last decade of the century and in particular in 1894-95. From 1888 to 1900 the total 
inflow through Customs alone was 88.771 million H. K. taels (Figure 2-5, p.116).
320
 It 
is estimated that from 1871 to 1913, the total value of silver that flowed into China 
amounted to 241 million H. K. taels.
321
 (Some statistics indicate the magnitude of this 
inflow: the average annual government income in 1885-94 was around 83.6 million 
taels,
322
 and the total silver money stock in China by the end of the Qing Dynasty was 
believed to be around 936 million taels.
323
)  
 
Given that China suffered from a trade deficit in the 1880s, the silver inflow probably 
occurred against a gold outflow, not as a consequence of increased exports. In addition, 
                                                 
317
 Some of the periphery countries were on a ‘gold exchange standard’. Japan was able to adopt the Gold 
Standard because of China’s huge payment of war reparation after the First Sino-Japanese War (1895-96). 
Michael D. ; Bordo and Hugh Rockoff, "The Gold Standard as a "Good Housekeeping Seal of 
Approval"," The Journal of Economic History 56, no. 2 (1996). 
318
 "Global Financial Data." 
319
 Ho, "From Cheap Silver and Copper Famine to Depreciation of the Copper Coinage," 398-9. 
320
 It was only after 1888 that the Imperial Maritime Customs Service systematically collected and 
published figures on the movement of treasure, probably in response to an unusual surge of movement in 
precious metals. Figures here are cited from: Hsiao, China's Foreign Trade Statistics, 1864-1949 128. 
321
 Charles F. Remer, The Foreign Trade of China (Taipei: Cheng-wen Publishing Company, 1967, 
reprinted ed.), p. 215. Cited from Ho, "From Cheap Silver and Copper Famine to Depreciation of the 
Copper Coinage," 399. 
322
 Chen, Papers on the History of Qing Public Finance, 127-8. 
323
 The original estimation by Peng was 1.3 billion silver dollars, which this paper converts into tael 
denominated by the conventional exchange rates between silver tael and silver dollars (one silver dollar 
equals 0.72 silver tael), Peng, A Monetary History of China, 592. 
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foreign direct investment and money remittance of overseas Chinese were also two 
important sources of capital imports. Latham mentioned that the Chinese migrant 
workers in the United States would put silver in with the bodies of deceased family 
members sent back to be buried in their home villages. This fact suggests that the actual 
capital import (silver inflow) might well exceed the figure captured by the Imperial 
Customs Statistics (Figure 2-5). Although Dernberger argues that despite the fact that 
China enjoyed a continuous capital inflow, most of it was used for current consumption. 
The total import for producer goods constituted a mere 6% of the total important in 
1880, and 8% in 1913.
324
   
 
 
  
                                                 
324
 Robert F. Dernberger, "The Role of the Foreigner in China's Economic Development, 1840-1949," in 
China's Modern Economy in Historical Perspective, ed. Dwight H. Perkins(Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1975), 35. 
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Figure 2-4 China's foreign trade (in millions of Haikwan Tael), 1864-1912 
 
Source: Hsiao, Liang-lin, 'China's Foreign Trade Statistics 1864-1949'. 
 
 
Figure 2-5 Net silver inflow through the Imperial Customs Service ( millions of 
H.K.Tael), 1888-1912 
 
Source: Hsiao, Liang-lin, 'China's Foreign Trade Statistics 1864-1949'. 
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As well as the volatile price decrease in the silver sector, there were changes to the 
copper sector too. It is observed by contemporaries that copper cash were increasingly 
‘dear and scarce’ across the country. The Commissioner of Customs in Chongqing 
(Chungking) reported in 1895 that copper cash was growing more and more expensive 
compared to silver:
325
  
 
‘The long-continued and widespread ‘dearness’ of copper cash relatively with silver 
deserves very serious consideration. […]; whereas Hk.Tls 1 exchanged, on the average, 
for 1,639 cash in 1891 and 1,538 in the first nine months of 1895, in December it 
would buy only 1,389 cash.’ 
 
The sudden fall in the price of silver irreversibly altered the market ratio between 
copper cash and silver tael. Towards the end of the 19
th
 century, with two important 
neighbouring countries (Japan and India) also adopting the Gold Standard, the 
instability issue grew unprecedentedly acute. As the metal for copper cash minting 
relied on imports, the market ratio between copper cash and silver tael was directly 
influenced by their pricing in the international market. The situation of the ‘dearness’ of 
cash was especially acute in commercial centres and port cities, because the pricing of 
both metals were more directly influenced by the fluctuations in the international 
pricing of the two commodities.   
 
Figure 2-6 Silver/copper cash exchange ratio (wen/tael), 1801-1911.   
 
Source: Peng (2008, 2011) 
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The dearness of cash soon turned into cash stringency, resulting from a series of 
instances of policy misconduct, a rigid official ratio and a ban on counterfeiting. As 
previously mentioned (in section 2.2.1 on the monetary system), the government 
maintained an official rate between silver and copper cash which was deviating more 
and more from the market ratio (the official silver/copper cash ratio was much higher 
than the market one). Silver was increasingly overvalued, while copper cash was 
seriously undervalued. The general Gresham’s Law predicts that overvalued money 
(bad money) will prevail while undervalued money (good money) will be hoarded, 
melted down or exported. A more nuanced version of the Law would further suggest 
that when money in small denominations is undervalued, it is more likely to be scarce 
because ‘the use of good money at its market price is too expensive’ (i.e. the price of 
distinguishing good from bad money).
326
 In China counterfeiting activities would 
normally also follow: melting down the high-quality copper cash turned out by the 
government mint and producing illegal copper cash with much lower copper content.
327
 
Although counterfeiting was illegal, it was nevertheless a de facto market response to 
the official silver/copper cash ratio – by adjusting the copper content of the money it 
actually helped maintain the official rate (between one tael and one wen). The volatile 
market ratio between silver and copper cash was admittedly harmful to normal 
commercial activities, but the government response at that time was counterproductive: 
instead of adjusting the official rate to be close to the market rate, it reinstated the 
original official rate and also banned counterfeiting. The Commissioner of Shanghai 
Customs observed in 1895 that:
328
 
 
‘Last year, it having been found that a dollar’s worth of cash contained metal that 
would sell for more than a dollar, cash were melted down; and the dollar value fell 
(from 960-1000 to 920-930, and then to 840 of cash). […] the various provincial 
authorities have endeavoured, but of course in vain, to remedy this by issuing 
proclamations prohibiting melting and fixing a rate of exchange with silver.’  
 
                                                 
326
 Arthur J. Rolnick and Warren E. Weber, "Gresham's Law or Gresham's Fallacy?," Journal of Political 
Economy 94, no. 1 (1986): 185-6. 
327
 There are many examples in history of debased coins being minted illegally and used to meet the 
market demand, when the government failed to produce sufficient copper cash. Sui-wai Cheung, "Copper, 
Silver and Tea - the Quesiton of Eighteenth-Century Inflation in the Lower Yangzi Delta," in The 
Economy of Lower Yangzi Delta in Late Imperial China : Connecting Money, Markets, and Institutions, 
ed. Billy K. L. So(London: Routledge, 2013), 119-20.  
328
 RTTR (1895), 203.  
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As a result large quantities of copper cash were melted, but instead of being cast into 
coarser coins (at least to provide the market with more liquidity) they were used to 
make utensils, or melted and sold as import substitutions, or exported. It was a vicious 
circle that made copper cash even more expensive and scarce. In the city of Ningbo, 
150 kilometres from Shanghai, the Customs Commissioner reported:
329
  
 
‘I am told by a good authority that the chief cause of the scarcity of copper cash 
throughout China is that the largest and best are melted down and made into pipes, 
manufacturers finding that they can obtain the copper on more favourable terms in this 
way than by purchasing the metal in bulk.’ 
 
Besides Gresham’s Law operating in the market, insufficient supply (which another 
result of relative price) was another cause of the scarcity of copper cash. Insufficient 
cash supply leading to the high value of copper cash relative to silver had been a long-
standing problem before the 1870s. The cheap silver since the 1870s meant a fall in the 
purchasing power of Chinese currency compared to that of other gold standard countries. 
Imports, including copper, were severely discouraged. Copper coinage became totally 
unprofitable and most mints virtually ceased production, aggravating the monetary 
stringency. The general secretary of the Imperial Customs Service gave a clear 
summary of the copper cash issue:
330
 
 
‘A real difficulty the government has to face is the scarcity of copper cash – a 
difficulty which is likely to increase, as the intrinsic value of the cash as metal is 
actually greater than that of the silver for which they at present exchange. The copper 
money purchasable for a tael of silver costs the Government for metal (copper and 
zinc) not less that Tls. 1,354, which does not include the cost of minting. This 
condition has not only restricted coinage but has resulted in a serious disappearance of 
the coins, due to melting down for the sake of the copper. The number of cash 
exchanged for a tael in Shanghai has fallen since 1892 from 1,400 to 1,170, and a 
further fall is to be feared.’ 
 
The ‘dearness’ (in terms of their silver prices) and the subsequent ‘scarcity’ of cash 
were universal and were described in port cities all over the country, from big ports 
                                                 
329
 ‘Trade Report of Ningpo’, RTTR (1895), 269. 
330
 RTTR (1898), 3. Possibly because of the spelling habit of the time, figures quoted in this original text 
such as 1,354, 1,400 and 1,170 should be understood as 1.354, 1.400, and 1.170 respectably.  
Chapter 2. The Big Problem of Small Change in Late Imperial China                                                     120 
 
 
  
along the coast (Shanghai) and rivers (Chongqing) to trade points in the remotest areas 
of southeast China (Simao and Tengyue in Yunnan province): Chongqing,
331
,
332
 
Shanghai,
333
 Ningbo,
334
 Wuhu,
335
Guangzhou,
336
Yantai,
337
Yichang,
338
Wuhan,
339
 
Qingjiangpu,
340
 Suzhou,
341
 Fuzhou,
342
 Shantou,
343
 Beihai,
344
 Niuzhuang,
345
 Tianjin,
346
 
Xiamen,
347
 Wuzhou,
348
 Qiongzhou,
349
 Longzhou,
350
 Simao,
351
 Jiaozhou,
352
 Kowloon,
353
 
Tengyue,
354
 Changsha.
355
  
2.2.3.2 Economic impact of the monetary adjustment 
 
It is generally perceived that the cheap silver phenomenon of this period benefited silver 
standard countries by encouraging export and by pumping liquidity into the economy. 
The cheap silver price acted as currency devaluation which would encourage export. 
The subsequent trade surplus, together with the demonetization and devaluation of 
silver, might also result in a continuous flow of silver into countries on a silver standard, 
thus adding liquidity to the market. These two consequences (devaluation and money 
inflow) brought by the ‘cheap silver’ phenomenon should have been extremely 
beneficial for China. However, contemporary reports seem to suggest that China did not 
                                                 
331
 RTTR (1895), 46-9; RTTR (1897), 71; RTTR (1898), 80.  
332
 One Haikwan tael could be exchanged for 1,738 cash and in 1895 it was only 1,398. ‘Trade Report of 
Kiukiang’, RTTR (1895), 126-7. 
333
 RTTR (1895), 203; RTTR (1896), 239; RTTR (1897), 234-7.  
334
 RTTR (1895), 269; RTTR (1896), 300; RTTR (1904), 106.  
335
 RTTR (1895), 151; RTTR (1896), 185; RTTR (1898), 193; RTTR (1902), 289-90; RTTR (1903), 322-5.  
336
 ‘Trade Report of Canton’,  RTTR (1895), 432-3; RTTR (1896), 435-8; RTTR (1899), 557.  
337
 ‘Trade Report of Chefoo’, RTTR (1896), 54; in 1897 copper cash were even imported from Hong 
Kong due to the scarcity issue, although the situation in local market was not improved, RTTR (1897), 49-
52; RTTR (1898), 55.  
338
 Exchange rate with Hk.Tls dropped from 1644 in 1891 to 1292 in 1896, ‘Trade Report of Ichang’, 
RTTR (1896), 90-1. 
339
 ‘Trade Report of Hankow’, RTTR (1896), 125-6; RTTR (1897), 124. 
340
 ‘Trade Report of Chinkiang’, RTTR (1896), 209; RTTR (1897), 206-7; RTTR (1899), 263; RTTR 
(1902), 334. 
341
 ‘Trade Report of Soochow’, RTTR (1896), 291. 
342
 ‘Trade Report of Foochow’, RTTR (1896), 362.  
343
 ‘Trade Report of Swatow’, RTTR (1896), 415; RTTR (1897), 372; RTTR (1899), 489. 
344
 ‘Trade Report of Pakhoi’, RTTR (1897), 614-5.  
345
 ‘Trade Report of Newchwang’, RTTR (1898), 1-8; RTTR (1899), 8-9; RTTR (1901), 8.  
346
 ‘Trade Report of Tientsin’, RTTR (1898), 29; RTTR (1899), 32.  
347
 ‘Trade Report of Amoy’, RTTR (1898), 401.  
348
 ‘Trade Report of Wuchow’, RTTR (1898), 503-4.  
349
 ‘Trade Report of Kiungchow’, RTTR (1898), 613.  
350
 ‘Trade Report of Lungchow’, RTTR (1898), 656. 
351
 ‘Trade Report of Szemao’, RTTR (1898), 679. 
352
 ‘Trade Report of Kiaochow’, RTTR (1899). 88.  
353
 RTTR (1899), 595. 
354
 ‘Trade Report of Tengyueh’, RTTR (1902), 913-6.  
355
 RTTR (1904), 232-3.  
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benefit much from the ‘cheap silver’ phenomenon. This section seeks to unravel this 
myth and to suggest that China was affected differently because it was on a dual 
metallic system instead of a pure silver standard. For China in particular, ‘cheap silver’ 
had a special and profound impact on its economy by destabilising the monetary system 
(i.e. aggravating the cash shortage problem). The effect of cheap silver combined with 
the scarcity of cash on the economy can be complicated. This section will start with the 
conventional view of the positive impact of cheap silver, followed by the investigation 
on how China benefited relatively little during this period. 
 
Since the 1870s, silver was both currency in China and a commodity in the international 
market, the international price of silver was therefore considered indicative of the 
exchange rate of the Chinese currency. Cheap silver indicated therefore favourable 
terms of trade for China, whereas expensive silver would discourage the export trade.
356
 
Theoretically, ‘cheap silver’ can be taken as a sudden and exogenous currency 
devaluation, and would indicate favourable terms of trade for silver standard countries 
as the devaluation would encourage exports.
357  
 
In addition, the potential silver inflow following the demonetization and price drop of 
silver should have been extremely benefiting to countries like China, as for most of the 
time in history China’s market had been suffering from shortage of money, for both 
large (China was not a silver producing country and the supply of silver depended on 
overseas trade) and small transactions (insufficient public provision). It is generally 
perceived by many Chinese historians that the inflow of silver (more liquidity and mild 
inflation) have boosted production, while a silver outflow would have induced money 
stringency and therefore a deflationary pressure on the economy.
 358 
                                                 
356
 Friedman has a vivid illustration of the way in which this mechanism worked in early Republican 
China (1911-49). This mechanism is theoretically very convincing. In reality the mechanism probably 
describes more accurately the situation of the 1910s and 1920s than in earlier periods (1870s-1900s), as in 
the earlier period China was on a dual metallic standard, while in the Republican Era with the 
‘tokenisation’ of the copper sector China as technically a truly silver standard (monometallic). Whether 
the mechanism could be applied to the situation in the 1930s is also contested. Brandt and Sargent (1989) 
argues that with the rapid development of modern banking and much wider circulation of banknotes, the 
immediate effect of silver outflow on monetary base would be dampened. Friedman, "Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Silver, and China," 71-3. Brandt, Commercialization and Agricultural Development.  
357
 Nugent, "Exchange-Rate Movements and Economic Development in the Late Nineteenth Century," 
1110-14. 
358
 For example the fall of the Ming dynasty in 1644 is sometimes associated with the drastic fall in silver 
imports during the same period (Atwell, "Notes on Silver, Foreign Trade, and the Late Ming Economy."). 
The ‘Kangxi Depression’ during the early part of the Kangxi period (1661-1722) is attributed to the 
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The positive impact of cheap silver was found true in many silver standard economies 
during this period.
359
 However, although contemporary studies show that ‘cheap silver’ 
benefited most silver standard countries, China seemed to benefit very little compared 
to other countries like Japan and India.
360
 
361
 With China’s bimetallic system, the effect 
of ‘cheap silver’ on both export and liquidity provision was not as straight forward as 
for countries on pure silver standard. An examination on contemporary reports and 
memoirs on China reveals a different picture: export prices did not all drop in line with 
the drop in price of silver; the volatility of silver price following the silver 
demonetization also hindered trade; more importantly, despite the silver inflow, cheap 
silver aggravated the copper shortage problem.  
 
First, under China’s bimetallism the link between currency devaluation and export is 
less obvious. Most of China’s exports were rural produces, and copper cash occupied 
the lower level markets (rural market and market for daily transactions). In fact, the 
price of Chinese exports depended also on copper cash as much as, if not more than, on 
the price of silver.  
 
As most Chinese exports were goods produced in small rural households, they were first 
collected by middlemen who paid with copper cash. These goods were then exchanged 
for silver priced according to the actual silver/copper cash exchange rate, and exported. 
Because copper cash was the sole currency and also because money circulation in rural 
areas was limited, price levels were rarely volatile as a result of sudden movements of 
                                                                                                                                               
reduced inflow of silver due to the prohibition on foreign trade and the subsequent monetary stringency 
(Kishimoto-Nakayama, "The Kangxi Depression."). The economic depression during the Daoguang 
period (1821-50) was also believed to have been triggered by the silver outflow following the opium trade. 
This generalised view is often challenged. The case of the Daoguang depression, for example, has 
recently been revisited and many have argued with convincing evidence that the silver outflow was not 
necessarily directly linked to, nor a definite cause of economic depression; many factors (domestic 
economic conditions, the demand for money, the bimetallic system, the market structure and the 
disaggregated currency circuits) other than the direction of silver flow should be taken into account in 
examining the Chinese monetary situation. For recent discussions please refer to Von Glahn, "China's 
Seventeenth-Century Monetary Crisis." "Monetary Demand and Silver Supply in 19th Century China."  
Mio Kishimoto, "Foreign Silver and China's Domestic Economy During the First Half of the 19th 
Century,"ibid. 
359
 Nugent, "Exchange-Rate Movements and Economic Development in the Late Nineteenth Century." 
360
 Nugent’s paper shows that during 1872-96, the annual growth rates of Japan, Vietnam, and India were 
16.9%, 9.8% and 1.7% respectively, while the figure of China was 0.5%. Ibid., 1123. 
361
 We also have to pay attention to the fact that during this time period (1870-1911) the growth of 
China’s export benefited largely from a continuous trade expansion (number of treaty ports more than 
tripled), the better management of the Customs Service by the British which increase the customs revenue 
by attacking pirates and putting junk trade under tariff control (i.e. a better capture of existing trade 
statistics). 
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large amounts of money (except for harvest seasons). Thus retail prices in rural areas 
remained relatively stable. The export price vis-à-vis foreign currency from gold 
standard economies therefore remained more or less unchanged, while export prices in 
terms of silver even increased. The Customs Commissioner in Wuhan (Hankow) 
explained this purchasing mechanism through a vivid example:
362
  
 
‘The rise in value of cash vis-à-vis silver will decrease the Export trade, for it will 
increase the price of all Exports. Take Skins: the people who sell Skins in the interior 
to collectors require payment in cash; the collector, in turn, requires cash, and cash 
only; if he does not get enough cash as profit he will not collect Skins. The export of 
Skins became possible because these Skins were purchased with cash, which cash was 
purchased with silver, which silver was purchased with gold – the Skins being sold for 
gold in Europe. Now, however, the gain between gold and silver has to be balanced by 
the loss between silver and cash.’  
 
It was noticed in many ports that the prices of export goods quoted in silver increased. 
Take Chongqing (Chungking), for example; it was observed in 1895 that:
363
  
 
‘Retail prices, which are measured in cash, have nominally remained unchanged, but 
it takes more silver to buy the same number of cash to pay the prices. Measured in 
silver, therefore, the retail prices are higher, and as the world has found out, relative 
fluctuations in the measures of value do more harm than good to trade.’ 
 
Abundant similar descriptions of other locations can be found can be found in the trade 
reports of this period. Although not every customs house reported this phenomenon at 
the same time due to the regional diversity,
364
 the overall picture was still not an 
optimistic one. China’s exports did increase but the increase was rather limited 
compared to other silver standard countries of the same period.
365
 And when we 
examine more closely, the trade statistics show that during this period the price of 
                                                 
362
 RTTR (1896), 125-6.  
363
 ‘Trade Report of Chungking’, RTTR (1895), 46-9.   
364
 As China is extremely big, it has several macro-economic regions with their own dynamics. William G. 
Skinner, "The Structure of Chinese History," The Journal of Asian Studies 44, no. 2 (1985). 
365
 Nugent’s paper demonstrates the development of trade of 18 silver standard countries/regions 
including China and the study shows that China’s export performance was the worst amongst the 18 
countries. While the annual growth rate of Japan’s export was 16.9% during 1872-96, China’s record was 
a mere 0.5%. Nugent, "Exchange-Rate Movements and Economic Development in the Late Nineteenth 
Century," 1123. 
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Chinese export quoted in silver increased.
366
 In addition, import increase exceeded the 
increase in export, and the balance of trade turned negative after 1880; the trade deficit 
increased after 1895 and reached a historical high in 1905 (Figure 2-4, p.116). 
 
Second, the wave of silver depreciation came at the price of increased volatility in the 
price of silver, which might disturb both import and export. The general secretary of the 
Imperial Customs Service noticed as early as 1893 that the depreciation of silver (in 
terms of gold) curtailed not only imports but also exports:
367
  
 
‘[T]he division of the import trade […] has been characterised by an unprecedented 
retrograde movement, which can only be ascribed to the depreciation in the gold value 
of silver causing an immense curtailment, at their greatly enhanced prices, in the 
demand for textiles, Opium, etc. Indeed, if this decline continues, it will completely 
nullify the advantages expected to accrue from the opening of new ports and great 
markets, such as Chungking, where the value of Foreign merchandise imported has 
fallen off by over Hk.Tls 1,250,000 as compared with the figures of 1892. Nor has the 
depreciation in the gold value of silver stimulated the Export trade abroad to the 
extent anticipated. It would thus appear that, to the trade of China, the great 
appreciation of gold has proved ruinous to the Import business, and the instability of 
silver utterly disorganising to the Export trade.’ 
 
The report shows that the unstable exchange rate of the Chinese currency made pricing 
less predictable and therefore discouraged trade. Trade was more affected by the 
volatility of the price of silver than encouraged by the drop in price of silver 
(competitive depreciation).
368
 In addition, international trade took on a more 
                                                 
366
 In his report on trade between China and gold standard countries, Remer found that the relative price 
of principal exports generally increased over the whole period from 1885 to 1913. Remer, "International 
Trade between Gold and Silver Countries: China, 1885-1913," 614. 
367
 RTTR (1893), 1-2. The report was written by the then Statistical Secretary (position only beneath the 
Inspector General Sir Robert Hart) H. Kopsch. His other publications include 'The appreciation of gold: 
notes illustrative of the disastrous effect upon foreign commercial interests in the Far East and upon the 
industries and wage-earners of the west' (Shanghai: Eastern Bimetallic League; 1894), which might 
suggest that the anxiousness expressed in the report might be due to more than one reason.  
368
 Compared to the trade performance of other Asian countries/areas such as Japan and Indochina, 
China’s export behaviour was astonishingly mediocre and benefited very little. Besides the difference in 
terms of the monetary system mentioned before, the different trade performances should also be attributed 
to the economic structure of the countries, as well as the export composition. These areas enjoy similar 
currency devaluation, and they also competed for similar export market towards gold standard countries. 
But it seems that they benefited to different extents due to their different domestic conditions. Take Japan 
for instance: the country has been highly commercialized with high level of market integration even 
before the Meiji Restoration (1868). And the Meiji government emphasized on economic modernisation 
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complicated nature. The negotiation of export prices, for example, involves other factors 
such as dominant trading partners, and competing exporters in the international market. 
Therefore weak exchange alone would not necessarily strengthen exports (see  
                                                                                                                                               
and sponsored modern industries including those in direct competition with China like the silk industry. 
In 1860s, China’s raw silk export was three times as high as that of Japan. After the Meiji Restoration, the 
government introduced technologic transplantation from France and Italy, sponsored R&D to improve the 
quality of mulberry and silk worm species, invested heavily in the construction of public infrastructure 
(especially in railway and rural credit). During the same period China had no functioning railway at all, 
the cocoon quality in Yangtze area deteriorated, and the whole silk production remained a handicraft 
industry and silk trade relied on the ‘putting-out system’ (household production and products collected by 
merchants). Since 1880s Japan took over China and became the major exporter of raw silk in Asia. 
During 1890-1930, the Japanese export was three times that of China and occupied 80% of the total raw 
silk export. China. China became a net importer of Japanese raw silk. Therefore different from China, 
Japan since the late 1860s was a constitutional modern monarchy with unified currency, integrated 
markets. It became a new developmental state with strong fiscal capacity, and with specific interest in 
modern and export sector. Cheap silver arrived on time for Japan and added to its excellent economic 
performance throughout 1870s-1890s. China’s trade, on the other hand, not only benefited little due to the 
internal market and currency issue, but also suffered from the fact that a large part of its market share was 
taken by other neighbouring countries. Debin Ma, "Why Japan, Not China, Was the First to Develop in 
East Asia: Lessons from Sericulture, 1850-1937," Economic Development and Cultural Change 52, no. 2 
(2004).   
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Figure 2-7, Figure 2-8, p.128).  
 
Finally, the other subsequent impact of the cheap silver – the silver inflow – also had a 
mixed impact on the economy, due to the bimetallic system. Despite an increasing trade 
deficit, China received stable silver inflow until 1900 (Figure 2-5). This silver inflow 
was a mixed result of gold outflow,
369
 foreign direct investment and money remittance 
of overseas Chinese.
370
 China was regarded as very fortunate to enjoy a constant silver 
inflow as the country will be suffering from a monetary stringency resulting from the 
deficit and silver outflow.
371
 
 
However, China’s bimetallic system obstructed the liquidity to be enjoyed by markets 
of all levels. The excessive increase of silver stock made the silver/copper cash ratio 
plummet. With the monetary arbitrage between cheap silver and ‘undervalued’ copper, 
copper cash became dear and scarce. A scarcity of cash in rural areas might, on the 
other hand, discourage trade (especially long-distance exchanges), and theoretically 
might even lead to deflationary pressure on the economy.  
 
The scarcity of copper cash had a negative impact on daily transactions. The impact on 
inland rural areas was more serious: the rural population had an inelastic demand for 
copper cash, and the inflow of silver did not mitigate the monetary stringency caused by 
the scarcity of cash. Rural workers earned copper cash only and paid their taxes in 
silver at the official exchange rate. With the rural deflation they earned less copper cash 
but the official exchange rate between silver and copper cash remained high. Provincial 
governors’ reports in 1896 show that, while the government official exchange rate 
remained 2200 wen for a tael of silver, the market rate dropped to around 1600-1700 
                                                 
369
 The exchange ratio between gold and silver was 1:5 in ancient China. Gold started to flow out of the 
country with the development of overseas trade, and the outflow speed was quickened with the wide 
adoption of gold standard which further widened the exchange ratio between gold and silver.  
370
 Overseas remittances and their role in China’s balance of payments is an important and interesting 
topic. For example, Takeshi Hamashita refers to Chen (1923) on Chinese emigration and they sent money 
back to their hometown. Takeshi Hamashita, "Financial Structure of the East Asian Economic System 
with Special Reference to Hong Kong and Singapore " in The Evolving Structure of the East Asian 
Economic System since 1700, ed. A. J. H.  Latham and Heita Kawakatsu(London & New York: Routledge, 
2011), 100-04. 
371
 Dernberger, "The Role of the Foreigner." 
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wen per tael. Even in the most developed agricultural areas such as Hubei, Jiangsu and 
Anhui provinces, farmers were unable to pay their taxes.
372
  
 
The problem of copper cash shortage also aggravated problem in trade and export. In 
Chongqing in 1897 it was still the case that:
373
  
 
‘Owing to the dearness of cash, which are particularly scarce in this province, the 
prices of articles of export have been somewhat higher than last year.’ 
 
 
In short, with the market structure split by the use of different currencies, the increased 
liquidity was not able to penetrate the economy in a fast and effective fashion. The 
domestic distribution of silver inflow was imbalanced between coastal and inland, and 
between urban centres and rural area. In urban areas and trading cities, where people are 
more likely to deal with transactions with silver, the increased liquidity from silver 
inflow might benefit the economic activities (for instance, modern industry, transport 
and public utilities, banking and finance, etc.) as well as breed speculation. However in 
late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, the vast majority of population resided in rural area 
and most of the economic activities still took place in the countryside. While silver kept 
flowing into the country, it seems that this liquidity increase benefited little the place 
where money was most needed. And with the monetary impact of the cheap silver, the 
scarcity of copper cash grew even more serious, creating a money shortage in rural area. 
The solution was to increase the supply of copper coinage.  
  
                                                 
372
 Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 584-7. 
373
 RTTR (1897), 71.  
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Figure 2-7 Exchange rate of Chinese currency, Shillings per Customs teal 
(Haikwan tael, or Hk.Tls), 1862-1912 
 
Source: Hsiao, Liang-lin (1974).  
 
Figure 2-8 Percentage change of the Chinese tael exchange rate, 1863-1912 
 
Source: Hsiao, Liang-lin (1974). 
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2.2.3.3 Linking back to the bimetallic system and the internal monetary 
situation 
Starting in the 1850s critical changes in the Chinese economy (developments in trade, 
both home and abroad, transformed the closed economy into something more open, and 
also encouraged the integration of the domestic market) and the world market (changes 
in commodity prices) destabilised the silver/copper cash monetary system. The sudden 
drop in the price of silver led to permanent changes in relative prices, and hence 
changes in the quantity of the two metallic coins: the size of silver stock increased while 
the number of copper cash, instead of remaining constant, even shrank.  
 
As discussed above, regarding China’s bimetallic system (section 2.2), silver and 
copper cash were far from perfect substitutes for each other; an increase of silver would 
not automatically offset a reduction in the quantity of copper cash. Besides, the impact 
of the relative change of one metal (in price or quantity) is further complicated by the 
existence of a ‘multiplicity of markets’, in which silver was used in the ‘upper level 
market’ and copper cash was used in the ‘lower level markets’. In her recent conference 
paper investigating the impact of silver outflow in the Daoguang period (1821-50), 
Kishimoto cites strong evidence to show that the prices of rural products (in terms of 
copper cash) ‘show neither [an] obvious decline nor obvious rise throughout the 
Daoguang period’.374 The overwhelming evidence from the Customs reports (section 
2.3.2) shows that in the latter half of the 19
th
 century this situation remained: prices in 
the ‘cash-using’ rural market remained more or less the same. The impact of cheap 
silver (and in this case silver inflow as well) on the pricing and economic activities of 
the rural areas was therefore not direct. The indirect impact of cheap silver worked 
through other channels: the exchange ratio between the monies which would change the 
quantity of copper cash in circulation.  
 
Cheap silver in fact induced other monetary problems: by altering the silver/copper cash 
exchange ratio, it discouraged the state mint from continuing the copper coinage (it cost 
more silver to import copper and to manufacture coins from it); and meanwhile the 
                                                 
374
 Kishimoto, "Foreign Silver and China's Domestic Economy During the First Half of the 19th 
Century," 30. 
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government attempt to maintain the original official silver/copper exchange ratio made 
copper cash an ‘undervalued money’ (of which the intrinsic metallic value of the coin 
exceeds its official face value), thus driving them out of the market and contributing to 
the acute scarcity of copper cash. Since copper cash functioned as a currency of high 
frequency in daily transactions and the only currency in rural areas, the economy was 
hampered by the diminution in the number of copper cash, rather than encouraged by 
the silver inflow. Eventually rural prices might deflate, but the speed of adjustment in 
the rural markets would lag considerably behind the adjustment of the money market.  
 
In terms of the impact of monetary instability on the real economy, because most 
Chinese exports were rural products priced in terms of copper cash before being 
exchanged for silver as exports, the decline in the price of silver in terms of gold did not 
bring down China’s export price and therefore in most cases did not encourage rural 
exports from China. Moreover, the unstable exchange itself cast a shadow on price 
forecasts and therefore hindered trade activities. From contemporary records we can 
establish that in the 1890s the monetary situation became increasingly unstable, with a 
precipitous fall in the price of silver: copper cash grew increasingly expensive and 
scarce.  
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2.3 Local Minting initiative and New Coinages 
as Remedies 
 
The immediate reaction in many provinces was to ban the export of copper cash to other 
provinces. It was the most straightforward way, incurred no cost and involved less 
bargaining with the central government. However, the restriction on the free flow of 
copper cash blocked trade and interregional business, and created more regional 
disequilibrium.
375
 Acknowledging the failure of banning internal exports, provincial 
governors all started reviving their own local mints. This ‘new wave of minting’ started 
with a revival of debased copper cash coinage (too expensive and quickly abandoned), 
followed by the minting silver subsidiary dollars, and the introduction of new types of 
copper coin.  
 
2.3.1 Short revival of traditional mints 
 
The call from the market for the coinage of subsidiary money coincided with the central 
government’s wish to restore the traditional monetary system – by casting more (and 
debased) copper cash coins. Since the 1870s, the central government had been trying to 
restore its copper cash coinage, which had been interrupted by internal disorder. Having 
almost depleted its copper mine in Yunnan, the government decided in 1887 to import 
copper (mainly from Japan) for minting purposes. This decision greatly increased 
minting costs, in particular when the purchasing power of silver kept sliding. Therefore 
the official weight of a piece of copper cash was reduced in 1888 from the original 0.12 
liang to 0.1 liang and further reduced to 0.08 liang in 1899.
376
  
 
Provincial mints, which had long been suspended, were instructed to resume production. 
In the late 1890s additional mints, equipped with steam power, were also established in 
various provinces to coin both copper cash and silver dollars.
377
 However, this practice 
did not last long, due to high cost. The central government pushed this policy without 
                                                 
375
 Ho, "From Cheap Silver and Copper Famine to Depreciation of the Copper Coinage," 412-3. 
376
 Ibid., 394-7. 
377
 For example, Tientsin Arsenal and the Imperial Naval Yard in the north and Kiangnan Arsenal in the 
south were all established in 1896. RTTR (1896), 24 and 239.  
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any fiscal commitment: it was each provincial governor’s responsibility to finance this 
evidently loss-making business. Although the newly minted copper cash were greatly 
debased compared to those minted in previous decades, the cost still vastly exceeded the 
proceeds.
378
 The minting of copper cash was soon suspended.
379
   
 
2.3.2 New mints and new coinages at the local level 
2.3.2.1 Decentralisation, modernisation and the new coinage 
The late 19th century was an era of decentralisation: after a series of domestic 
insurgences and military defeats,
380
 the central government relied almost solely on 
regional military forces; and in return regional governors also gained more fiscal 
discretion. It was also a period when enlightened Chinese statesmen pushed forward 
modernisation projects within their jurisdiction. Recognising its military defeats 
(especially the defeat during the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95), the central 
government gave consent to these innovative experiments as long as the projects did not 
rely on central government financing.  
 
The consequence of the First Sino-Japanese War profoundly shocked the Manchu rulers 
both psychologically and economically. Being defeated by western powers might be 
still understandable, but being defeated by its closest neighbour (which used to be 
culturally and economically much more backward than China) is intolerable.
381
 
Economically, the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1896) pushed China for more economic 
openness, and also demanded an indemnity of 230 million silver tael to be paid in full 
within three years.
382
 Another consequence of the Sino-Japanese War was that Western 
powers learned from it to negotiate better ‘deals’ with China: after the Boxer Rebellion 
(1899-1901), China was demanded to pay a war reparation of 450 million tael (the 
                                                 
378
 A piece of standard copper cash in the high Qing period weight 0.12-0.14 liang; and weight of the 
cash minted by provincial mints during the 1890s ranged from 0.05 to 0.08 liang. Financial Archive 
Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 579-83.  
379
 Ibid., 567-78.  
380
 Notable domestic insurgences including the Taiping Rebellion (1850–64) centred in South China, the 
Nian rebellion (1851-68) in the north of Yangtze Delta, the Mohammedan rebellion (1853-74) in 
southwest China, and the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901) originated in the countryside to the north of 
Beijing. Major foreign defeats include the Opium Wars (1839-41 and 1856-60), the Sino-French War 
(1884-85), and the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95).  
381
 Marius Jansen, "Japan and the Chinese Revolution of 1911," in The Cambridge History of China, ed. 
John K.; Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 339-74.  
382
 This amount is more than three years of total government income. The war reparation demanded by 
Great Britain after the Opium War was only 19.44 million tael (equivalent to 27 million silver dollar).  
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Boxer Indemnity). The government paid the indemnity mainly by borrowing from 
foreign banks, and the foreign debts were consolidated into government securities 
(backed by maritime customs revenue) with 4% annual rate of return, payable within 39 
years.
383
  
 
The heavy debt burden was transformed into much higher taxation quota imposed on 
each province.
384
 As provincial leaders were directly appointed by the central 
government and would still like to demonstrate their loyalty to the central government 
by their performance (in order to get imperial support as well as promotion). At the 
same time, local governments enjoyed much more freedom in terms of its involvement 
in economic activities and policy innovation. These two forces – centralised personnel 
control and decentralisation of economic and fiscal power – boosted economic activities 
and institutional innovations at local level.
385
 The provision of money became one of 
the major targets for regional leaders as firstly the market needed liquidity for better 
development, and secondly, regional minting provided lucrative profits for the leaders 
to increase local revenue (for tax quota payment as well as for implanting other 
effective government policies). It is therefore true that the regional minting initiative 
was not only for the well-being of local life, but also profit-driven.
386
 But as the chapter 
develops it will show that these activities did also benefit local economy and 
(unexpectedly) pushed forward the modernisation process of the monetary system. 
 
Provincial mints used to be part of the state mint system which produced copper cash 
according to a centralised minting quota and received a certain amount of copper 
allocated by the state administration. It was realised that coinage should be one of the 
areas for modernisation (under the assumption that modernised currency and sufficient 
liquidity could promote the economy), and at the same time that the seigniorage 
                                                 
383
 Shigeki Iwai, A Study of the Fiscal System in Late Imperial China(Beijing: Social Sciences Academic 
Press (Chinese translation of the 2004 edition published by Kyoto University Press), 2004), 373-75. 
384
 Regional governments were mainly responsible of collecting taxes (mainly land tax and transit tax or 
likin) and sending all of them to the central government. After the Xianfeng crisis, the totally centralised 
fiscal system collapsed and local governments stopped sending the total amount to the central. Instead 
they only sent 'assigned quota' to the central government and this quota was negotiable. 
385
 The system can be understood by the framework of ‘Regionally Decentralised Authoritarian Regime’ 
(RDA) proposed by Chenggang Xu, which remains to be the fundamental institutional setting behind the 
economic reforms and development of today’s China.  Chenggang Xu, "The Fundamental Institutions of 
China's Reforms and Development," Journal of Economic Literature 49, no. 4 (2011).   
386
 This explains why local leaders tried silver minting before copper coinage, as silver coinage was 
obviously more profitable if the market accepted the use of silver coins at their face value.  
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revenues from minting would provide more resources to fund other projects. Therefore 
provincial governors all strived to gain greater liberty to operate their own mints. They 
had already successfully rejected the central government’s demand to fully revive the 
traditional copper cash coinage, due to high financial loss; they now carried out other 
experiments to renovate their mints with a view to continuing to keep them viable and at 
the same time making the minting profitable.  
 
The new wave of provincial coinage included the casting of silver subsidiary coins 
(from 1890 to 1901) and of a new type of copper coin (from 1900 until the Republic of 
China) with steam power. Both initiatives were introduced in the Canton mint in 
Guangdong Province and then spread to other parts of China. This was the first time 
that the Chinese state had minted silver (officially recognising silver as part of the 
currency system) and suggested that this money should not circulate in bullion. The new 
copper coinage was also the first to replace the standard copper cash (which had been 
circulating for many dynasties) with a brand new type of coin. Some monetary 
historians consider them to be a result of pure economic motivation which was 
attributed to fear of a future monetary chaos. Still, these two coinages indicate a great 
departure from the traditional monetary system and should be considered a milestone in 
Chinese monetary history. Moreover, an examination of the court debate (which lasted 
for decades before the establishment of the new mints) would suggest that these coinage 
innovations were indeed responses to market demand. Although contemporary reports 
show that, despite the initial good intentions, these two coinages had very different 
impacts on the market, not all of which were positive. The rest of section 3.2 seeks to 
give a succinct and objective outline of the adoption and consequences of the two 
coinages, based on a study of the imperial customs reports as well as other sources.
387
  
 
2.3.2.2 Silver subsidiary coinage 
In 1889, the first silver mint equipped with brand new steam powered machinery was 
set up in Guangdong Province under the slogan ‘get back the right to seigniorage (from 
foreign silver dollar providers)’. In 1890 it started to mint Chinese silver dollars388 as 
                                                 
387
 Compared to other sources, the Imperial Customs Reports provide the most impartial, systematic and 
continuous economic information at both national and regional levels.  
388
 Also called dragon dollars (long yang), as they bear a dragon design on the face, together with the 
name of the provincial mint.  
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well as silver subsidiary coins of 5, 10, 20 and 50 cents.
389
 It was the first time that the 
state authority had manufactured its own silver coins. Other provinces followed suit 
after 1896 – the year of China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japanese war – and by 1900 
there was at least one silver mint in every province (Appendix A 2-1). 
 
The silver coinage was a lucrative business. Compared to silver ingots which required 
weighing (and sometimes even the testing of finesse), standardised coined silver dollars 
were a more convenient means of exchange and attracted a premium in the market. 
Before 1890, the state minted no silver at all and the market was supplied with foreign 
silver dollars. Now, minting their own silver, the provincial government made a profit 
by manufacturing dollars similar to foreign silver dollars.
390
 The minting of small 
denominations was more profitable since they contain proportionately less silver.
391
 The 
concentration among provincial mints on minting small coins of 10 and 20 cents seems 
to suggest the profit-driven motivation of the local governments.
392
  
 
The coinage was welcomed by foreign observers, who considered it an improvement on 
the existing monetary system. A customs commissioner in Jiujiang (Kiukiang) 
commented that the ‘dearness of cash’ could be addressed by more coinage, and 
reckoned that this would be ‘a golden opportunity for the introduction, in judicious 
quantities and under proper guarantees from the Government, of the much-required 
subsidiary silver coinage and the gradual retirement from circulation of the cumbrous 
cash.’393 The secretary general of the customs service commented that the ‘extended 
minting of subsidiary silver coins’ was the obvious remedy to the monetary problem.394  
 
                                                 
389
 The fineness of most silver cents was around 0.800 while the finesse of a silver dollar is usually 0.900. 
Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 825-6. 
390
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The silver subsidiary coinage did address the problem of the widespread shortage of 
small money to a certain degree, and was welcomed in some cities but not all.
395
 In 
most rural areas it was not a recognised means of exchange. Due to a serious over-issue 
and uneven quality of small silver coins from different mints, small silver coins 
depreciated quickly and circulated at a discount. The silver coinage of most mints was 
suspended in 1901 by imperial mandate. 
 
An imperial customs report shows that in certain urban areas, silver subsidiary coins 
were welcomed. According to the Customs Report, in some northern cities, at least, 
with a ‘scarcity of cash and increase of population, the dollar and its subsidiary coins 
have become popular and are freely used all over Manchuria’. The subsidiary silver 
coins were ‘freely used at full value in small transactions’, although in large amounts 
the coin was ‘only accepted at a discount of from 3 to 6 per cent’.396 However in 
Suzhou, an eastern coastal commercial centre 100 kilometres from Shanghai, the market 
perception of the small silver coins was quite different. The customs commissioner 
commented that the silver subsidiary coinage was ‘a drug on the market here’. At the 
beginning of the year it was rated with dollars at 5 per cent discount; at the end of the 
year the discount had reached 8 per cent. Small coins do not fill the place of copper cash 
for general use.’397 In Chungking, an important inland treaty port along the Yangzi 
River, it was also reported that:
398
  
 
‘Hupeh Dollars and subsidiary coinage were again imported to the value of $50,000, 
making, with last year’s amount, $100,000 in all that has entered this province, but 
have not found much favour with the people. The only way to put these coins into 
circulation is by enforcing all Government offices to pay their staff and receive taxes, 
Likin, etc., in them. The use of subsidiary silver coins would tend to relieve the 
present dearth of cash.’ 
 
 
It seems that subsidiary silver coins did mitigate the monetary stringency caused by the 
lack of small currency. However, even in places where small silver coins circulated, the 
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market was over-supplied with small silver coins of heterogeneous quality bearing 
different mint names. People treated the coins according to their intrinsic value instead 
of using them as fractions of silver dollars.
399
 In fact not only the small silver coins, but 
also the Chinese silver dollars in general, even those of best quality (from Guangdong 
and Hubei), were treated most of the time as silver ingots:
400
  
 
‘[The mint is] produced more dollars and less subsidiary coin [in 1896 compared to 
previous years]. The dollars are chopped, defaced, and deformed, and simply accepted 
at bullion value.’ 
 
Because of the chaos added by the unlimited minting of silver coins of uneven quality, 
the emperor decreed in 1901 that all provincial mints, except those of Guangdong and 
Hubei, should immediately stop work.
401
 
 
2.3.2.3 New copper coinage 
The new copper coinage started in 1900 and was again initiated in Guangdong. The new 
copper coinage was very different from the traditional version and was regarded as a 
great technological and institutional advance. The traditional copper cash were cast in 
moulds; they were round coins with a square hole in the middle and bore no 
denomination. The new copper coins had no holes; they were mechanically struck and 
had different denominations, namely 2, 5, 10, and 20 wen. They contained around 95% 
pure copper and 5% coarse metals (zinc and lead). The weights of 2-wen, 5-wen, 10-
wen and 20-wen copper coins were 0.04 liang, 0.1 liang, 0.2 liang, and 0.4 liang 
respectively.
402
 Most of the coins were was 10-wen pieces.
403
 With much higher 
denominations than copper cash had, the new copper coinage was also a profitable 
business.
404
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The central government was at first sceptical about this new copper coinage for reasons 
of its own. First, these coins apparently were of had very different design from the 
traditional copper cash that had been in circulation for dynasties. The market might not 
recognize this new type of coin at all. Second, in terms of copper content, a 10-wen 
copper coin contained as much copper as 2 copper cash did.
405
 The new copper coin 
was an official debasement.
406
 Similar copper cash debasements could be found in 
Beijing only decades ago and they were a monetary disaster. The previous time in the 
1850s, the coinage of ‘big cash’ with face values ranging from 10 to 1000 wen was 
introduced in the Beijing area; they soon depreciated and prompted rampant 
counterfeiting activities. With this disastrous memory in mind compounded with the 
recent chaos made by small silver coins, the central government was far from eager to 
try this method again.  
 
The central government had been putting off the minting proposal, which could have 
started in the early 1890s. The first new copper coinage was in fact introduced in secret 
when Beijing was under siege and the central government was in disorder.
407
 But to 
everyone’s dismay, the coinage was a huge success. The new coinage had been adopted 
in all the other provinces within ten years. It is reported that in many cities people 
queued outside the office throughout the first day of issue and the office had to impose a 
quota on the number of coins that could be exchanged per person per day.
408
  
 
In theory and in history these debased new coins would either quickly depreciate or 
drive copper cash (the good money) out of the market (to be melted, hoarded or 
exported).
409
 The new copper coin was a de facto debasement compared to the 
traditional copper cash in terms of copper content per unit of account (i.e. per wen). 
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Despite all this, however, historical evidence shows that these new copper coins neither 
depreciated nor drove out the traditional copper cash.  
 
The chief statistics secretary of the Imperial Customs Service compared this new copper 
coinage with previous debased issues and reached a positive conclusion:
410
  
 
‘the Mints have been devoting their energies to the production of copper coins […]: 
the cent, or 10-cash piece, a token coin new to China except for the 10-cash pieces 
dating from the reign of Hsien Feng (1851-61) and now current only at Peking. These 
coins, accepted by the capital, were rejected by the rest of the Empire; but the success 
of the new cents has been pronounced. […] The people have taken them readily as 
being uniformly correlated to the cash and not to the dollar; and so great has been the 
demand that the authorities of the provinces minting them have had to impose 
restrictions on their transport to other provinces.’ 
 
First, because their standardised quality greatly facilitated exchange and the 
longstanding shortage of small changes, these new coins were readily accepted by the 
market and even circulated above their face value. The customs commissioner in 
Shanghai commented in 1901 that the ‘10-cash Copper Coins, struck at the provincial 
mint of Soochow, were introduced and seem to have found favour, despite the fact that 
intrinsically they are scarcely worth eight good cash’.411 The commissioner in Hankow 
– a major trade city along the Yangtze River – also reported in 1902 that the ‘5-cash and 
10-cash copper pieces […] have found considerable favour with the people’ and ‘the 
coin is freely used’.412  
 
Interestingly, instead of being melted or hoarded, copper cash also turned out to be the 
subsidiaries of copper coins of larger denominations. The customs in Yichang (Ichang) 
observed in 1904 that:  
 
‘Copper cash rates fluctuated considerably during the year; but the 10-cash brass and 
copper coins, issued in such vast quantities by the provincial Mints during the past 
three years, seem to be relieving the stringency at last. These coins are now to be 
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found in the remotest country districts and are accepted readily everywhere at their 
face value.’  
 
One of the reasons for the coexistence of the two currencies is that after several decades 
of ‘cheap silver and scarce cash’, good standard copper cash had already disappeared 
from the market. The copper cash that remained in circulation were no longer the once 
‘standard copper cash’; they were either debased or spurious cash containing copper in 
various proportions. Since cash was legal tender of very small denominations, 
verification would be too expensive to conduct for each transaction. Therefore in spite 
of a possible gap in intrinsic value between these cash and the new copper coins, the 
market preferred to take them at face value.    
 
Hence, instead of driving out other money and inducing an immediate inflation, the 
debased copper coinage assisted by modern minting technology successfully resolved 
the problem of small change: it provided more monies of small denomination at 
affordable cost, and mitigated the monetary shortage issue, in the countryside in 
particular.  
 
The co-existence of copper cash and copper coin forms a landmark in Chinese monetary 
history: this is perhaps the first time in Chinese monetary history that monies were 
largely taken at their legal tender value instead of their intrinsic metallic content. This 
value of exchange came from the uniformity of standard guaranteed by the new minting 
technology and the limitation of coinage size endorsed by the state credibility.  
 
The good name of the new copper coins, however, did not last long. The new minting 
technology could prevent counterfeiting (which would lead to the over-provision of 
money and therefore inflation) from the outside, but it could not prevent the government 
itself from over-issuing for seigniorage profit. Uncoordinated coinage competition 
between provincial governments further aggravated the situation of oversupply. In 1905, 
reports started to claim that copper coins had saturated the market, and that the market 
had started to discount them.
413
 When copper coins were introduced, one silver dollar 
could only be exchanged into 80 copper coins, despite the mint suggestion that the 
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exchange ratio should be set at 1:100 (dollar/coin). From 1905 on, a dollar can be 
exchanged with more than 100 coins.
414
 The central government first set a cap on the 
imported copper ingots each province might purchase;
415
 and in 1910, legislation was 
passed to centralise the copper coinage and officially make copper coins a subsidiary 
currency.
416
 The long-term effect of the legislation is unfortunately unknown, for the 
imperial dynasty was overthrown in the next year.  
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Figure 2-9 Import price of copper ingots and slabs (Tael/Picul), 1886-1912 
 
Source: Hsiao, Liang-lin (1974).  
 
 
Figure 2-10 Quantity of imported copper ingots and slabs (in 1000 piculs), 1886-
1912 
 
Source: Hsiao, Liang-lin (1974).  
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2.3.3 Evaluation of the new coinages 
2.3.3.1 Contemporary criticism of the coinages 
Most previous literature criticised the local minting activities and historians seem to 
take this view as a foregone conclusion without much questioning: these regional mint 
innovations were allegedly profit-driven and they only aggravated the already chaotic 
monetary system of the country. Provinces adopted the new coinage at different times, 
making regional markets more fragmented. The qualities of the new coins varied from 
province to province, with the prospect of competitive depreciation. The drive for profit 
tempted governments to over-issue the coins and provoked inflation.  
 
However, the previous literature only emphasized part of the obvious truth and 
overlooked the positive effect during this wave of monetary modernisation. Most of the 
criticisms focus either on the motivation of the provincial government (that their 
intentions were not pure) or the undesirable consequences (inflation and monetary 
chaos).
417
  
 
Regarding the first criticism, it should be pointed out that no political action (including 
the making of monetary policies) can ever be purely benevolent. In fact, it is policies of 
the opposite type of (policies driven purely by ideology or passion, instead of being 
economically sound) that we should fear. In the 19
th
 century traditional Chinese scholars 
still believed that money was a public good and should be provided by a benevolent 
state, without realising that such an unaffordable belief had already in the previous 
dynasty made it impossible for the state to provide sufficient currency. In addition, court 
debates on monetary innovation and the adoption of new minting technology had lasted 
for decades before they were actually implemented by provincial governors.
418
 The 
debates centred on the backward currency system, the huge market need and the 
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insufficient supply due to high minting costs, suggesting that the new coinage indeed 
represented local attempts to meet local market needs instead of being purely profit-
driven. The inconsistent provincial initiatives are of course far from ideal as reforms. 
But given a central government which was neither willing nor able to conduct any 
reform, experiments at the provincial level and wide adoption could provide a solution, 
albeit not the best.   
 
With regard to the latter criticism, contemporaries making their judgement were more 
likely to be influenced by the disastrous end, forgetting the other side of the story. Take 
criticisms on the new copper coinage, for instance: Copper coinage became a serious 
monetary issue more than ten years after its introduction, not in the Qing dynasty but 
during the Chinese Republic, and drastic institutional changes had taken place in the 
meantime. The most powerful attack on the copper coinage came from Qichao Liang 
(1873-1929), an influential political and cultural figure during the late Qing and early 
Republican period. All later research on this topic was to a certain degree influenced by 
his work. However, Liang’s original article, less than 10 pages long, was written as a 
political column for a newspaper, condemning the fragmentation of the political 
framework and the predatory fiscal behaviour of regional warlords during Republican 
China. The serious inflation that he addressed occurred in the Republican era rather than 
rather than in Qing dynasty. In addition, his criticism was later proved to be exaggerated, 
as the whole work was based on his own estimation of mint output instead of the actual 
figures.
419
  
 
2.3.3.2 New coinages as necessary experiments 
The aim of an ideal monetary reform is to provide a stable currency which meets the 
requirements of a wide range of transactions, at an affordable cost. It is true that neither 
coinage (of small silver coins or copper coins) at provincial level was a perfect answer; 
nor were these measures the end of the monetary evolution. But they were both 
necessary and natural steps towards a more advanced system, and therefore deserve fair 
re-examination. They were as a matter of fact two attempts to transform the existing 
bimetallic system into a monometallic one, and thus reduce the problem raised by a 
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change in the supply of either metal within the system (the innate instability of the 
Chinese system, as discussed in section 2.2.1).  
 
The silver coinage represents the state’s first attempt to include the silver sector under 
the control of its monetary system, acknowledging the value of seigniorage. The 
original goal of silver coinage was to provide the market with its own coined dollars and 
other subsidiary coins linked to the dollar standard. If successfully implemented, it was 
to lead to a monometallic monetary system with the silver dollar as the unit of account. 
Because of the higher minting cost of small coins, small silver coins tend to contain less 
silver than silver dollars do. Otherwise, small silver coins would be too costly to 
produce and there would be less incentive to provide silver coins of small 
denominations. However, in an economy which was accustomed to using silver bullion 
(and in which silver bullion as well as foreign silver dollars of varying fineness were 
still allowed to circulate side by side with domestic silver coins), the market would 
distinguish silver coins according to their metallic content rather than their face value, 
and coins with s lower silver content would soon be discounted. Without the 
technological endorsement and certain institutional arrangements (control over the 
amount issued and convertibility with normally the more precious metal), silver should 
not be the first choice for small money under the Chinese contest (where silver was the 
more precious metal, where silver as ingot was circulating all the time). 
 
The dilemma of small silver coins is a common problem experienced in a monometallic 
currency system in which one metal is used as currency and is cast into coins of 
different denomination and varying fineness. One way to circumvent this dilemma is to 
adopt multiple media of exchange. Another way is to issue fiduciary monies convertible 
to silver dollars, such as convertible bank notes or token coins. The convertibility of 
fiduciary monies must be guaranteed; and they must also be manufactured in a way that 
is hard to counterfeit.
420
 
 
The production of new copper coins happened to be the answer to the dilemma raised 
by the silver subsidiary coinage. The debased new copper coins manufactured by steam 
power were de facto token money. And because copper coins were of much lower value 
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and were used in frequent daily exchanges, the market was happy to accept them at their 
face value, and did not bother to spend them according to their intrinsic value. Although 
the market might have had an incentive to counterfeit them, this could be prevented by 
steam power technology (the coining press), which made private counterfeiting 
expensive and therefore uninviting. The coinage was based on the understanding that 
tokens (made by high technology and with their number controlled by the issuer) can 
circulate at their face value instead of their metallic content – a great breakthrough in 
traditional Chinese monetary theory shaped by commodity monies. The success of the 
new copper coinage (relative to the silver one) echoes the idea of the ‘standard formula’ 
that subsidiary money has to be token money. The value of token money was 
guaranteed by the technology (no counterfeiting) and the government’s credibility (no 
over-issuing), and therefore this option owed everything to the introduction of steam 
power.
421
 If well managed, this would also lead to a monometallic monetary system in 
which silver was the main unit and copper coins the subsidiaries.  
 
2.3.3.3 Why new copper coinage, not silver coinage, provided a solution? 
While silver subsidiary money did not work well due to its natural attributes (high value 
metals not being suitable for small coinage), copper coinage failed because of the 
institutional defect. If the government mint could have controlled its appetite (the mint 
output) the new copper coinage might have functioned well in the market. Both silver 
and copper coinage eventually failed and caused monetary chaos. Still, historical 
records seem to suggest that the two coinages in the market made a different impact and 
that copper coinage was to some degree a success at least during the first few years after 
its introduction. It successfully responded to the urgent problem of the market by 
providing more small change for daily transactions and by alleviating the monetary 
stringency in rural areas.  
 
Theoretically there are several reasons for the failure of silver subsidiary coins. First, 
small silver coins are still too big for small daily transactions. Even the smallest silver 
coin is still too large in terms of face value (a 10-cent silver coin in 1900 was worth 
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around 88 standard copper cash
422
). Therefore, small silver coins could only partially 
replace copper cash in urban areas and in terms of tax payment. These subsidiary coins 
could not be taken as the unit of account, and could therefore hardly replace copper cash 
in much smaller transactions in rural areas. Because of this relatively higher 
denomination, moreover, small silver coins could hardly be used as real small change, 
or an anchor of price quoting.  
 
Second, small silver coins had a very awkward position within the Chinese bimetallic 
system: they were linked to silver dollars at a time when the economy still recognised 
silver as bullion. Although silver dollars were widely accepted (sometimes even with a 
premium) in transactions, tael instead of dollars were the unit of account in both state 
taxation and private book keeping. Moreover, the state did not prohibit the use of silver 
bullion or foreign silver dollars and thus to promote the use of domestic silver dollars 
and their subsidiaries. Given that there were silver dollars of very different qualities in 
the market, the market treated different dollars according to their intrinsic value and 
ghost units (e.g.: Haikwan Tael, Kuping Tael) were widely adopted to measure the real 
value of silver coins. Domestic silver coins were soon accepted for their intrinsic value 
and circulated at a discount. Therefore small silver coins circulated at a price 
considerably below their face value.  
 
Because of the higher production cost of small change, small silver coins 
understandably contained proportionately less silver than silver dollars did. They were 
also more likely to be the subject of wear and tear. Because of their lower metallic 
content, coins of small denomination often depreciated quickly. In a market where silver 
was treated as an ingot (exchanged by weight), people would quickly adjust the value of 
small coins according to their silver content rather than their face value. Instead of being 
real subsidiary money, small silver coins served only as an alternative means of 
payment (smaller than silver dollars and bigger than copper cash) and increased the 
liquidity of the silver sector, instead of relieving domestic monetary stringency as a 
whole. The enlargement of the silver sector even further contributed to the phenomenon 
of ‘cheap silver and scarce copper cash’.  
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Reasons for the relative success of copper coinage are also multiple. First, compared to 
silver subsidiary coins, debased copper coins are more fitted as a medium for small 
transactions. Because of copper’s lower value, copper coins provide a more convenient 
basic unit of account; and in addition debased copper coins provide much less incentive 
to counterfeiters because the profit margin is much smaller. The new minting 
technology further discouraged counterfeiting.  
 
Second, there was also a reason why ‘big cash’ (another attempt at minting copper coins 
with different denominations) failed while copper coins did not. Normally debasement 
would induce counterfeiting, generating inflation which would phase out the effect of 
the initial increase in liquidity (as the historical ‘big cash’ had once done). Steam power 
technology provided added value to the copper coins – their uniform standard facilitated 
trade - besides its intrinsic metallic value. Therefore the market accepted the coins at 
their face value instead of discounting them or faking them.  
 
Third, the new minting technology also resolved the problem of ‘bad money driving out 
good’, a frequent headache in traditional monetary systems which treasure the intrinsic 
commodity value of money. Because of their high value in terms of exchange and also 
because of their small denominations, the market did not have the incentive to assay the 
variation of intrinsic metallic contents of the coins. Copper coins were therefore treated 
as token money, and were able to co-circulate with the traditional copper cash, instead 
of driving them out.  
 
In addition, the fact that the coinage experiment took place in one province probably 
also contributed to its ultimate success. Guangdong province was one of the 
economically most developed regions and enjoyed a long-established status in China’s 
foreign trade. It is also the province closest to Hong Kong and its population had long 
been observing the convenience of the machine-made ‘copper cent’ (tong xian) widely 
used there as subsidiary money.
423
 This institutional exposure is important for the 
market acceptance of a new coinage which was drastically different from the traditional 
one in terms of value, shape and institutional implications. With the success in 
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Guangdong province, the experiment was adopted in other provinces without much 
obstacle. If it had been introduced nationwide at the very beginning, the new copper 
coins might well have been rejected in places where people were not familiar with this 
kind of coinage.  
 
To summarize, the new copper coinage made possible by modern minting technology 
was able to provide sufficient small change in an affordable way. The market accepted 
the money at its face value, and did not counterfeit or discount it. The debased coinage 
did not push up prices in proportion to the level of debasement, and therefore provided 
real liquidity to the market.
424
 In rural markets where copper was the only accepted 
money, the coinage successfully resolved the money stringency issue, and thus 
promoted output and trade. In urban areas and big trade centres where copper was used 
side by side with silver, the increased supply of copper coins altered the silver/copper 
cash ratio back to the original rate (‘improved the rate,’ to use the wording of the 
merchants at the time
425
). This adjusted exchange ratio was welcomed by the market 
and facilitated trade. The fact is that it is only with proportionate expansion in the 
copper sector (copper monies with wen as the denomination) that copied the expansion 
in the silver sector could one say with certainty that there was a real monetary 
expansion in China. As a country that frequently experienced monetary stringency, 
monetary expansion did more good than bad. In addition, with the low cost token 
coinage, the state would have been able to maintain a certain coinage level according to 
the changes in the silver sector, so as to maintain a stable silver/copper exchange ratio 
which encouraged trade and commerce (something the Qing government often strived 
to do but never could because of the high cost of traditional minting). The introduction 
of copper coinage minted with modern steam power technology was therefore a positive 
shock to the monetary system and to the economy.  
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Chapter 2. The Big Problem of Small Change in Late Imperial China                                                     150 
 
 
  
2.4 Empirical Test: why did the new copper 
coinage, not the silver one, solve the problem 
of shortage? 
 
This paper argues that the adoption of steam power technology for minting copper 
coinage would have acted as a positive shock to the economy, while the silver coinage 
did not. As the timing of adopting the new coinage technology varied from province to 
province, DID estimations can be applied to test the impact of the institutional shocks 
on each regional economy before and after the introduction of the new coinage.  
2.4.1 Empirical framework - an indirect approach  
2.4.1.1 Theoretical speculation 
The silver and copper coinages minted with steam power technology were two 
institutional shocks to the monetary system. The discussion in the previous sections 
suggests that the silver coinage merely increased unwanted liquidity (induced inflation), 
while the copper coinage acted as a positive shock to the economy. The mechanism of 
the positive shock is complicated and needs further explanation.  
 
Most obviously, the shock would increase the supply of small coins in the copper sector, 
which in turn would increase the exchange rate between silver and copper cash (the 
tael-wen ratio). The implications of these direct consequences on the economy are 
profound, if not long-lasting. First, the increased money supply would break the 
possible deflationary tendency, re-inflate the rural economy and encourage output. 
Second, an increase in rural money supply would also lead to a certain increase in the 
commodity price (not necessarily proportionate to the increase in the money supply, 
given the increase in output and the effect of re-monetisation), and therefore would 
encourage farmers to sell more of their products. Third, the increase in price of silver 
against copper coins indicates in effect a restoration of silver/copper cash ratio to its 
previous high level. This means a drop in the commodity price when expressed in 
wholesale trading with silver, and thus encourages long-distance trade and exports. 
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Descriptions in documents by contemporary writers are in accord with these theoretical 
consequences.  
 
Ideally, in order to statistically disentangle the history, the following economic 
information is needed: local prices and wages quoted in copper cash; output in rural 
areas; exchange rates between silver and copper cash; information on domestic and 
international trade. However, the quality of most of the available data is far from ideal 
for rigorous statistical tests.  
 
2.4.1.2 Data availability 
Economic information from rural areas of the time is not well preserved. There are 
virtually no records of agricultural output in this period. The government gathered 
systematic information on grain prices in local markets, but these are quoted in silver 
(this dataset will be discussed in detail in the next section). Local prices and wages 
quoted in copper cash are the most direct barometer of interest, but records of them are 
also scarce, and are barely comparable.
426
  
 
Information on exchange rates between silver and copper cash is also scant: it fluctuated 
constantly and varied from place to place.
427
   
                                                 
426
 Another problem with the historical price information is that for the purposes of book-keeping, the unit 
of account in the book is often different from the money used in real transactions. For example, although 
daily transactions were carried out in copper cash and copper coins, silver tael (later silver dollars) were 
usually the money of account in account books, and transactions were recorded in terms of silver price 
according to the silver/copper exchange rate at the time. Therefore what the account books could have 
revealed is nevertheless still a distorted picture of the market price information. 
427
 In Beijing for instance, the exchange rates were decided daily at the meeting of the money market, but 
no record of the daily exchange has remained. T.P. Meng and S.D. Gamble, Prices, Wages, and the 
Standard of Living in Peking, 1900-1924, Special Supplement to the Chinese Social and Political Science 
Review (Peking Express Press, 1926), 73-4. 
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Figure 2-7 (p.128) presents the recovered regional series on both North and South China, 
based on records of several counties in the same region.
428
 The figures show that the 
silver/copper cash exchange ratio is generally higher in North China than in the South, 
and that since the 1870s, the ratio kept sliding. Within thirty years, from 1871 to 1900, 
the ratio dropped by 38% (from 1812 wen/tael to 1227 wen/tael) in the North and by 23% 
(from 1558 wen/tael to 1222 wen/tael) in the South. However, as with local price series, 
systematic silver/copper ratios across time and space are not available. 
 
2.4.1.3 The indirect approach 
Given the scarcity of systematic economic indicators, the empirical strategy therefore 
adopts a rather indirect way to test the theoretical speculations. The purpose is to test 
the impact of the technological shock – copper coinage minted by steam power – on the 
real economy: did it mitigate the problem of money stringency in rural areas? Because 
the timing for adopting the new coinage technology varied from province to province, 
Difference In Differences (DID) estimations can be used here to estimate the effect of 
this technological shock.   
 
It is argued that, with the increase in the money supply, the silver/copper exchange rate 
would adjust (i.e. increase) quickly, while the commodity price quoted in copper would 
not rise in proportion to the increase in the supply of copper coins. Two reasons support 
this argument: first, because, apart from price rigidity, remonetisation and an increase in 
output would offset the inflationary pressure; second, because the money market (in 
trade centres in particular) usually reacts much quicker than the commodity market 
(especially because many of the commodities are farm products for which changes in 
production may require considerable delay). Therefore when agricultural produce was 
collected by middlemen from the farm and traded in the market, its wholesale price 
expressed in silver tael would tend instead to decline. We therefore expect a decline in 
the wholesale grain price after the adoption of the new technology. The increase in 
output and decline in regional wholesale prices would naturally be followed by a 
possible rise in long distance trade (measured in terms of exports to both domestic and 
foreign destinations).  
 
                                                 
428
 Acknowledgements to Professor Kaixiang Peng for the data compilation and his generous offer of the 
data set.  
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2.4.2 Data description 
Panel datasets of grain prices are used for the test. The timing of adopting the coinage is 
used as the proxy of the external shock variable. Summary statistics are presented in 
Appendix B 2-1. The sections below discuss the panel datasets and the coinage 
diffusion data.  
2.4.2.1 Grain prices 
Grain price series (both wheat and rice) are used as the proxy of rural economic 
activities; they are both collected at prefecture level and at a monthly frequency from 
1881 to 1910 - a time span long enough to capture the difference in activities before and 
after the institutional shock.  
 
The grain price data come from the grain price reports of the Qing Court. The grain 
price report system in the Qing dynasty dates back to 1693. There are monthly reports 
containing the prices (in the form of tael/picul) of staples (including highest price and 
lowest price for each kind of grain) in the local markets.
429
 The reports were compiled 
in each prefecture and submitted to the central government each month. Some of the 
original reports were lost; the rest are kept in the First Historical Archive in Beijing and 
the National Palace Museum in Taipei. The data were collected, digitized and made 
available online by Wang Yeh-chien at the Academia Sinica.
430
   
 
The types of grain varied from place to place and in particular from North to South. As 
wheat and rice are the two most widely produced and consumed types of grain across 
the country, this paper composes prefecture-level monthly silver price panels of 
ordinary rice and ordinary wheat from 1880-1910, covering a total of 199 prefectures 
from 15 provinces. Rice and wheat price datasets cover slightly different areas; 
therefore the wheat price and the rice price panels will be tested separately.  
 
                                                 
429
 Picul is a measure of weight, equivalent to 100 catties (or around 60.48 kg). They are usually retail 
prices at local markets and were originally quoted in the copper cash price (wen/catty). The government 
grain reports did not specify whether the price they used were wholesale prices. They may  well have 
been retail prices later converted into equivalent silver prices in the documents. This is one of the 
drawbacks of this dataset: the original report did not specify the norms of data collecting and it is not 
certain whether the units used in each prefecture were uniform.  
430
 Yeh-chien Wang, "Database of Grain Price in the Qing Dynasty (Qing Dai Liang Jie Zi Liao Ku)," 
Academia Sinica, http://140.109.152.38/DBIntro.asp  
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2.4.2.3 New coinages: diffusion and magnitude 
The timing of the adoption of the new silver and copper coinage comes from Selected 
archives in modern Chinese monetary history, Vol. I. Late Qing Period. The volume 
examines relevant government memorials and compiles information on all the 
provincial mints including the dates of their establishment, and suspension.
431
 All dates 
are converted from the Chinese calendar to the Gregorian calendar.
432
 There was 
normally one mint (normally in the prefecture where the provincial government resided) 
in each province.
433
 The new coins mainly circulated within the province (in particular 
before 1905 when copper coins were prized). I took the month when the coinage was 
introduced as the time of adoption, and I assumed that once the coins were minted, all 
the prefectures within the same province would be affected by this technological shock. 
For details in the dates of coinage introduction please see Appendices A 2-1 and A 2-2.  
 
It is worth mentioning that although small value coins enjoyed wide acceptance and 
circulation, these new copper coins circulated mostly within their administrative 
boundaries (province). Traditionally copper cash travelled typically from the mint to 
adjacent area, from higher level markets (where they were minted) to lower level 
markets. But they were less likely to travel long-distance and across regions. It was 
particularly the case during the period of our discussion. At the beginning of the new 
coinage: the circulation of the copper coins was more regionalised with the introduction 
of new copper coins for four more reasons (beside the former reason on high transaction 
cost). During the first few years, copper coinage was in high demand and they were 
considered important and precious. The provincial governments banned the outflow of 
new copper coins. Later on with more provinces starting minting new coins (around 
1905-10) competitive minting (sometimes with depreciation) started, and provincial 
governments banned the use of coins minted from other province in order to protect its 
own seigniorage interest.  
 
                                                 
431
 Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 917-22. 
432
 Academia Sinica Computer Center, "Mapping of Chinese and Western Calendars "  
http://sinocal.sinica.edu.tw/  
433
 There are some exceptions. For example the Jiangsu Province had three mints located in three different 
prefectures: Nanjing (Nanking), Suzhou (Soochow) and Qingjiangpu (Chingkiangpu). However, once 
Jinagning started minting, copper coins started to circulate throughout the province.    
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2.4.2.4 Other data information 
Other data series are employed as controls. The control variables consist of data on 
economic conditions such as prefecture population data in 1820, 1851, 1880, and 
1910
434
 and land tax in 1820;
435
 the area of each prefecture during the Qing Dynasty,
436
 
annual weather data collected from 120 observation stations at prefecture level;
437
 and 
natural endowment data for rice and wheat production areas, including: dummies of 
whether each area was mainly rice or wheat producing, and the approximate rice/wheat 
acreage of each province during 1914-18.
438
  
 
2.4.3 Identification strategy with grain prices 
2.4.3.1 Baseline identification strategy  
The method of measuring the effect of new coinage is a generalised differences-in-
differences estimation. Below is the basic specification for testing the effect of 
technological shock on grain prices:  
 
𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡
15
𝑗=2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
 
where αi and γt are prefecture and time (month) fixed effects. Git is log grain price and 
takes values of two types: rice price in prefecture i in month t; (2) wheat price in 
prefecture i in month t. Coinageit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the new coinage is 
introduced in prefecture i at time t. Provincial time trends are added to capture the 
possible different time trends between provinces (t = 1, 2, …, 120).  
 
The impacts of silver and copper coinages are tested separately. The dummy variable 
Coinageit therefore also takes dummies of two types: one is the timing for silver coinage 
and the other is the timing for copper coinage. For the impact of silver coinage, 
Equation (1) can therefore be rewritten as:  
                                                 
434
 Cao, Population History of China: Qing Period (Zhongguo Renkoushi: Qing Shiqi) 691-701. 
435
 Fangzhong Liang, Statistics on China's Historical Population, Cultivated Land and Land Tax 
(Zhongguo Li Dai Hu Kou Tian Di Tian Fu Tong Ji), 1st ed.(Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 1980), 
401-11. 
436
 Cao, Population History of China: Qing Period (Zhongguo Renkoushi: Qing Shiqi) 708-18.  
437
 China State Meteorological Society, ed. Yearly Charts of Droughts/Floods in China for the Last 500-
Year Period (Zhongguo Jin Wu Bai Nian Han Laofen Bu Tu Ji)(Beijing: Atlas Press, 1981). 
438
 Dwight H. Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1969), 249-50. 
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𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡
15
𝑗=2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2);  
 
And for copper coinage:  
 
𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 +∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡
15
𝑗=2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
 
The coefficient of interest is β1. Under the assumption that the silver coinage added 
unwanted liquidity to the market and would lead to inflation, Coefficient β1 for 
Equation (2) is expected to be positive. However, the new copper coinage will stop the 
deflation trend in rural areas without necessarily generating inflation (in terms of price 
quoted in wen), while the adjustment in the currency market would more quickly 
capture the increase in the silver/copper cash ratio (silver became more expensive than 
copper cash did), which would result in a decline in the silver price of the grain. 
Coefficient β1 for Equation (3) is therefore expected to be negative.  
 
The main results are presented in   
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Table 2-1 and Table 2-2. Regressions are carried out at prefecture level. Column (1) is 
the OLS results for whether there is any impact of the coinage adoption; column (2) is 
the fixed effects results; column (3) is the fixed effect results, controlling for different 
provincial time trends.  
 
The baseline tests show that the introduction of silver coinage exerted an inflationary 
impact on the economy and the results are stable across different specifications. This 
may also suggest that the increase in the silver dollar supply further lowered the 
silver/copper cash ratio and therefore aggravated the issue of copper cash scarcity in 
rural areas, discouraging the output of rural produce and commodity trading.  
 
In terms of the impact of copper coinage, when controlling for fixed effects, it seems 
that the adoption of the coinage exerted a negative impact on the pricing of rice; while 
its impact on the pricing of wheat remains ambiguous. The results are not stable across 
different specifications. Further tests are therefore needed to disentangle the relationship 
between the monetary injection and commodity pricing.  
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Table 2-1 Baseline test: impact of silver coinage (prefecture level) 
Dependent variables Wheat Rice 
 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
 
(4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) 
Silvermints 0.456*** 0.047* 0.099** 0.384*** 0.097*** 0.128*** 
 
(0.003) (0.027) (0.322) (0.002) (0.022) (0.016) 
Prefecture fixed 
effects  
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Time fixed effects 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Time trends 
  
Y 
  
Y 
Observations 64248 64248 63308 64864 64864 64864 
R-squared 0.119 0.723 0.770 0.137 0.794 0.875 
 
 
Table 2-2 Baseline test: impact of copper coinage (prefecture level) 
Dependent variables Wheat Rice 
 
OLS Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
OLS Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
 
(4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) 
Coppermints 0.391*** -0.120*** -0.015 0.291*** -0.286*** -0.183*** 
 
(0.003) (0.038) (0.045) (-0.003) (0.039) (0.030) 
Prefecture fixed 
effects  
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Time fixed effects 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Time trends 
  
Y 
  
Y 
Observations 64248 64248 63308 64864 64864 64864 
R-squared 0.094 0.725 0.768 0.055 0.807 0.877 
a
: a dummy for the wheat producing area is used when the wheat price is the dependent variable; 
and a dummy for the rice producing area is used when the rice price is the  dependent variable.  
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2.4.3.2 Controlling for local specific characteristics  
More regional economic variables are introduced into the baseline equation to control 
for local specific characteristics.  
 
𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑖 + ∑ 𝜈𝑡𝑋𝑖 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡
360
𝑡=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
 
𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑖 + ∑ 𝜈𝑡𝑋𝑖 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡
360
𝑡=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
 
Equations (4) and (5) are the development of the baseline specification stated in 
Equations (2) and (3). Here I replace provincial time trends with a set of prefecture-
specific characteristics interacted with time fixed effects (Xi*trendt). Xi includes a set of 
controls including size of prefecture, land tax of each prefecture in 1820, population in 
1820, 1851, 1880 and 1910, as well as the approximate acreage of wheat and rice.
439
 I 
also include in the equation a dummy (Mainproducei) to show whether this prefecture 
belongs to a wheat (or rice) producing province (I use a dummy of a wheat producing 
area when the wheat price is the dependent variable and another dummy for a rice 
producing area when the rice price is the dependent variable ). The coefficient of 
interest is β1.  
 
The results are presented in Table 2-3 and Table 2-4: columns (1)-(3) report the results 
for the log price of wheat and columns (4)-(6) report the results for the log price of rice. 
Columns (1) and (4) show the results with time and prefecture fixed effects; columns (2) 
and (5) show the results with fixed effects as well as a dummy of a wheat or rice 
producing area; Columns (3) and (6) present results with fixed effects, dummy and 
other control variables. Standard errors are clustered at prefecture level.  
 
The tables show that there was a rise in commodity prices after the silver coinage; and a 
general drop in the commodity price quoted in silver at the time when the new copper 
coinage was introduced in the area. The results are stable across different specifications.  
                                                 
439
 Approximate acreages of wheat and rice are available on provincial level only for the years 1914-18. I 
therefore only use this control variable in tests on provincial level (shown in Table 2-5 and Table 2-6).  
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Table 2-3 With local controls: impact of silver coinage (prefecture level)  
Dependent variables Wheat Rice 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Silvermints 0.050** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.097*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 
 
(0.028) (0.033) (0.033) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) 
Prefecture and time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Main produce dummy 
a
 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Controls*Time FE 
  
Y 
  
Y 
Observations 60418 32682 32682 64864 43940 43940 
R-squared 0.706 0.679 0.679 0.794 0.811 0.811 
 
 
 
Table 2-4 With local controls: impact of copper coinage (prefecture level) 
Dependent variables Wheat Rice 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Coppermints -0.129*** -0.140*** -0.558*** -0.286*** -0.303*** -0.343*** 
 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.069) (0.039) (0.040) (0.046) 
Prefecture and time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Main produce dummy 
a
 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Controls*Time FE 
  
Y 
  
Y 
Observations 60418 59478 32682 64864 63741 43940 
R-squared 0.709 0.710 0.720 0.807 0.809 0.824 
a
: a dummy for the wheat producing area is used when the wheat price is the dependent variable; 
and a dummy for the rice producing area is used when the rice price is the  dependent variable.  
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2.4.3.3 Robustness check I: regression on provincial level data 
In most provinces there was only one copper mint in a province, and once the mint was 
established the whole province would be affected. Therefore the test at prefecture level 
might yield biased results due to different province sizes (some provinces had more than 
20 prefectures while others had fewer than 10). A similar test at provincial level was 
therefore carried out as a robustness check.  
 
The specifications are identical to Equations (4) and (5). Only αi and γt are now 
provincial and time (month) fixed effects. Git is the log of the mean of grain prices in 
province i at time t. Dummy variables Silvermintit and Coppermintit are equal to 1 if the 
new coinage is introduced in province i at time t (t = 1, 2, …, 120). Standard errors are 
clustered at the provincial level. Tables 7 and 8 show the results, which do not differ 
from the results shown in Table 2-5 and Table 2-6. 
 
Table 2-5 Robustness check: impact of silver coinage (provincial level) 
Dependent variables Wheat Rice 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Silvermints 0.050** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.097*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 
 
(0.028) (0.033) (0.033) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) 
Province and time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Main produce dummy 
a
 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Controls*Time FE 
  
Y 
  
Y 
Observations 60418 32682 32682 64864 43940 43940 
R-squared 0.706 0.679 0.679 0.794 0.811 0.811 
 
Table 2-6 Robustness check: impact of copper coinage (provincial level) 
Dependent variables Wheat Rice 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Coppermints -0.127 -0.448* -0.448* -0.302** -0.302** -0.352** 
 
(0.140) (0.264) (0.264) (0.141) (0.141) (0.151) 
Province and time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Main produce dummy 
a
 
 
Y Y 
 
Y Y 
Controls*Time FE 
  
Y 
  
Y 
Observations 72583 49305 49305 65397 65397 56099 
R-squared 0.778 0.755 0.755 0.833 0.833 0.840 
a
: a dummy for the wheat producing area is used when the wheat price is the dependent variable; 
and a dummy for the rice producing area is used when the rice price is the  dependent variable.  
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2.4.3.4 Robustness check II: introducing weather shocks 
Weather conditions have a strong impact on the commodity pricing, in addition to all 
the other monetary and economic causes. However, although there were around 120 
historical weather stations in China, many of them were located in remote areas from 
which agricultural and price information are not available. After merging weather data 
with the commodity price data, the number of observations were reduced to only around 
40 prefectures. The weather information was therefore included in a separate test as a 
robustness check.  
 
The original weather data information was split into five types, in which types 1 and 5 
denote bad weather (exceptional drought and flooding), 2 and 4 denote fair weather 
(limited drought and flooding), and 3 means good weather.
440
 Like Keller and Shiue 
(2007) and Jia (2011), I take the deviation of local weather from 3 to measure the size of 
weather shocks. A drought dummy (equalling 1 when the weather rank is 1; and 
equalling 0 otherwise) and a flood dummy (equalling 1 when the weather rank is 5; and 
equalling 0 otherwise) were also constructed. The three indicators were tested separately 
and the results are presented in Table 2-7 and Table 2-8. The results remain stable and 
robust with both linear weather information and shock dummies: under all conditions 
the introduction of silver coinage significantly increased the commodity price while 
new copper coinage significantly reduced the price. 
 
  
                                                 
440
 State Meteorological Society, Yearly Charts of Droughts/Floods in China for the Last 500-Year 
Period (Zhongguo Jin Wu Bai Nian Han Laofen Bu Tu Ji), preface and illustration. 
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Table 2-7 Robustness check with weather shocks: impact of silver coinage (prefecture 
level) 
Dependent variables Wheat Rice 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Silvermints 0.147*** 0.179*** 0.179*** 0.121*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 
 
(0.058) (0.056) (0.056) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046) 
Weather deviation Y 
  
Y 
  
Drought dummy 
 
Y 
  
Y 
 
Flood dummy 
  
Y 
  
Y 
Prefecture and time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Main produce dummy 
a
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls*Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9621 11253 11253 12512 15234 15234 
R-squared 0.730 0.701 0.701 0.850 0.834 0.834 
 
 
 
Table 2-8 Robustness check with weather shocks: impact of copper coinage (prefecture 
level) 
Dependent variables Wheat Rice 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Coppermints -0.353** -0.399*** -0.398*** -0.202*** -0.293*** -0.293*** 
 
(0.142) (0.136) (0.136) (0.074) (0.067) (0.067) 
Weather deviation Y 
  
Y 
  
Drought dummy 
 
Y 
  
Y 
 
Flood dummy 
  
Y 
  
Y 
Prefecture and time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Main produce dummy 
a
 Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls*Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9621 11253 11253 12512 15234 15234 
R-squared 0.742 0.715 0.715 0.854 0.846 0.846 
a
: a dummy for the wheat producing area is used when the wheat price is the dependent variable; 
and a dummy for the rice producing area is used when the rice price is the  dependent variable.  
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2.4.4 Findings and limitations of the empirical strategy 
 
The empirical findings show that there was a rise in commodity prices after the silver 
coinage; and a general drop in the commodity price quoted in silver at the time when the 
new copper coinage was introduced in the area. The results are stable across different 
specifications.   
 
There are certain limitations in the current empirical strategy: the test itself can be more 
robust if more control variables (such as the size of mint output) can be added into the 
regression. Also the current studies only look at the price panel data; the study will be 
more convincing if panel datasets of other macroeconomic condition (agricultural 
output or local export) can be applied.  
 
2.4.4.1 Proxy on mint output 
Apart from the timing of the shock, it would be better to also capture the different sizes 
of the shock (mint output) and to link them with the magnitude of the impact. The 
provincial mint records were not preserved and the exact figures of annual mint output 
are unknown. One possible proxy is the mint capacity (number of furnaces of each 
mint). The mint capacity was available by a survey of 1905-07, conducted by Imperial 
Commissioner sent by the government before a programme of centralising the 
provincial mint production. The problem with the survey information is that it only 
concerns the most prominent mints, and that the information is cross-sectional.
441
  
 
Another possible proxy of the mint output is the number of raw materials used in the 
mint. China had relied on foreign copper for coinage since as early as the 1870s, and the 
Customs reports recorded in great detail the imports of various types of copper (for 
instance, copper slabs and ingots) each year. The problem is that part of the ‘copper 
slabs and ingots’ were also imported for manufacturing purpose (though quite a small 
part). Also the amount of copper imported for minting purpose might not be used in the 
same year. Working through the original customs reports from port to port, picking up 
the statistics and calculating the net import of each port will be an onerous job, but if 
                                                 
441
 The survey took two years to complete, and it contains the mint capacity information of the day when 
the commissioner made his visit to the particular mints. Memorial of Bi Chen, Imperial Commissioner. 
Financial Archive Division, Selected Archive in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol. I., 917-22. 
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this job can be carefully carried out, net foreign copper ingots imported into each 
province each year can be taken as a relatively good proxy of the mint output. 
 
2.4.2.2 Indicator of macroeconomic condition 
Good economic indicators of this period are rare, but the customs statistics are one 
exception. The Imperial Maritime Customs Service published a series of comprehensive 
and detailed reports each year, containing not only trade statistics at national and local 
(for each port) levels,
442
 but also addressing wide economic issues over every region of 
China. These publications provide the most invaluable information about China, though 
the sheer size and the detailed nature of the published volumes often intimidate their 
users.  
 
Publications of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service provide annual export 
information of each port such as: the tonnage and ships passed through the specific port, 
the volume and unit price of every single item that entered the port.
443
 If successfully 
compiled into comparable datasets, the information would be invaluable for an entire 
body of new literature on early modern Chinese economic history.
444
  
 
2.4.4.1 Impact of coinage adoption on output and export – export indicators as 
the dependent variable 
The specification for the test with trade statistics as the dependent variable is only 
slightly different:  
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑗 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡
14
𝑗=2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
 
where Exportit is the logged figure of export statistics; αi and γt are the port and time 
(year) fixed effects, Coppermintit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if copper coin 
officially circulated in port i at time t. Yit denotes the  export duty at port i in year t. The 
coefficient of interest is β1. The assumption would predict a relative drop in the silver 
price of the local produce, which would in turn encourage exports and would be 
                                                 
442
 The name was changed to China Maritime Customs Service (CMC) after 1911. 
443
 The volume information include import, export, and re-export. And items are classified as foreign 
goods and local produces.  
444
 One drawback of the dataset would be that it is of annual frequency only.  
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reflected in the increase of exports; therefore the coefficient β1 here is expected to be 
positive. 
 
Two measures of exports – export value and export duty regarding both domestic and 
foreign destinations – were employed as dependent variables. The main results are 
presented in Table 11. The copper coinage had a positive impact on export value; and 
up to 1903, the technological shock also had a positive impact on export duty (the proxy 
for export volume). It seems that the impact of coinage adoption on exports was less 
significant than the level of grain prices, which is understandable, since the total export 
value and duty could not distinguish the type of export. A better estimation would 
distinguish agricultural produce from products of other sectors such as modern industry. 
However, the feasibility is questionable since export items varied greatly from port to 
port, which makes it almost impossible to compare a group of items between one port 
and another.  
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2.5 Concluding Remarks  
 
This paper examines reports of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service and discovers 
that towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Chinese economy suffered from a 
shortage of money for daily use and rural production, despite the phenomenon of ‘cheap 
silver’ and a silver inflow into China. It proposes that cheap silver or silver inflow did 
not necessarily encourage trade or increase money supply. The paper demonstrates that 
under the traditional monetary system, copper cash played an important role not only in 
domestic economy but also in China’s foreign trade. Chinese economy was dominantly 
a rural economy and most Chinese exports were goods produced in small rural 
households; all local goods were first collected by middlemen who paid with copper 
cash, before they could be shipped elsewhere. Silver facilitated the inter-regional trade 
but copper cash in fact determined the export pricing.  
 
The paper then constructs a prefecture-level dataset consisting of information on grain 
prices, population, economic endowments, climate as well as data on the timing in each 
province of adopting the new copper coinage. DID estimations are carried out to 
compare the level and changes in grain prices before and after the introduction of the 
new minting technology. A placebo test using the timing of the introduction of silver 
coinage is also carried out. At current stage, the estimation is only tested on grain prices. 
If, in the future, good quality data on regional output and export can be assembled, the 
test of the positive institutional effect can be extended to broader aspects of the 
economy. This exercise finds that the introduction of new copper coinage helped to ease 
monetary stringency in the countryside without necessarily generating inflation. The 
introduction of silver coinage, however, did not exert positive effect on the rural 
economy.  
 
Both contemporary reports and statistic exercises show that contrary to the conventional 
judgement that regional mints were purely profit driven and added to the monetary 
chaos, the introduction of new coinage minted with steam power technology helped to 
ease rural monetary stringency without necessarily generating inflation, and thereby 
encouraged output and trade.  
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In term of intrinsic value, the new copper coins were no better than the big cash (the 
debased coin which brought about monetary chaos during the Xianfeng inflation during 
1853-61). However the new copper coinage was, initially at least, a huge success while 
the introduction of big cash was an instant failure. This paper believes that the success 
of the new copper coinage should be attributed to two factors: it correctly responded to 
the market needs and it embraced technological innovation. First, the minting of small 
copper coins instead of large silver coins correctly tackled the market need. The new 
copper coinage was in fact a debasement which brought the silver/copper ratio (ratio 
between tael and wen) to the original level, and partially solved the monetary instability 
caused by ‘cheap silver’. Second, coins with smaller denominations are better to be 
token coins in order to prevent a chronic shortage of them, and steam power technology 
ensured the provision of token coins without inviting private counterfeiting.  
 
The widespread use of new copper coin was an epochal event in China’s monetary 
history: it was the first time that the Chinese market widely acknowledged and accepted 
a token (i.e. highly debased) coin at their face value, under a normal market condition 
(i.e. not under unusual circumstances such as a city under siege). The imperial 
government had long established a reputation of being an absolute power with zero 
credibility. For a long time in history, the credibility of the money provided by the 
government therefore could only come from its intrinsic value. For the first time, the 
credibility of the money came not only from the metallic value, but also from the 
endorsement of the new technology, which provided standardized coins with reliable 
quality and thereby greatly reduced the transaction cost.  
 
Introduction of a publically accepted token coin was the first step towards a 
monometallic standard. A fully-fledged token-coinage policy should include the 
following features: first, the metallic value of the token should be far below its face 
value; second, private parties should not be allowed to mint the token; third, the mint 
authority should issue small and legally limited amounts of them, and fourth, tokens had 
to be accepted as legal tender (maybe only up to a legally specified maximum sum). 
With these four rules in place, the coinage could be insulated against changes in the 
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relative price of copper, silver, or gold.
445
 By the end of the nineteenth century, these 
rules were fully established in many European states, which practically meant that these 
countries adopted the gold standard.  
 
In China only the first two rules were observed – they were satisfied by the introduction 
of steam power minting technology. The remaining two features, however, took a long 
time to accomplish. As a local initiative, the copper coinage lacked inter-provincial 
coordination and the mint output was never effectively controlled. The link between 
copper coins and the silver dollar was never legally established, or supported by 
financial institutions. The value of copper coins eventually depreciated.
446
 In 1910, the 
central government passed new legislations on currency regulation, including articles on 
putting all provincial copper mints under central supervision, imposing limited minting 
quota as well as linking copper coins with silver dollars (100 copper coins can be 
exchanged with 1 silver dollar) ensured by banks.
447
 However, before the legislation 
could be implemented, the Qing Dynasty was overthrown in 1911. The first decade of 
the Republican China (1912-49) only witnessed a period of prolonged domestic warfare 
and a deepened regionalisation in which all provincial governors (or warlords to be 
more accurate) sought to increase their sources of revenue. The seigniorage revenue 
from copper coinage was one of them and the depreciation of copper coin 
accelerated.
448
 Once an innovation and an originally important step towards monetary 
evolution, the copper coinage turned to be another disappointment. Keynes once said 
that the commodity money was the ‘last barbarian relic’ of the human society. However 
the question is when the government would be eventually civilised.  
  
                                                 
445
 ‘Yearbook for Legislation, Administration and Economics In the German Reich’, kindly translated by 
Prof. Oliver Volckart. G. Schmoller, "Über Die Ausbildung Einer Richtigen Scheidemünzpolitik Vom 14. 
Bis 19. Jahrhundert.," in Jahrbuch Für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung Und Volkswirtschaft Im Deutschen 
Reich 24(1900), 1249. 
446
 From 1902 to 1911, the retail price quoted in copper coins doubled. Ho, "From Cheap Silver and 
Copper Famine to Depreciation of the Copper Coinage," 472-4. 
447
 ‘Regulations on currency consolidation (1910)’ (zheng dun yuan fa zhang cheng). The regulations 
were detailed and carefully planned. Although whether or not the legislation was motivated by the central 
government desire to take the seigniorage revenue from the hand of provincial governments, we would 
never know. Zhang, History of Chinese Currency System (Zhonghua Bi Zhi Shi), 69-71. 
448
 During the 1920s, daily exchange rates between the silver dollar and the copper coin were recorded in 
Tianjin and Shanghai.  
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2.6 Appendices 
 
Appendix A 2-1 Dates of new coin issues  
Mint location Province name Silver coinage Copper coinage 
Guangzhou Guangdong 1890.05 1900.07 
Wuchang Hubei 1896.07 1902.09 
Shengyang (Mukden) Fengtian 1896.10 1903.09 
Tianjin Zhili 1897.01 1902.07 
Changsha Hunan 1897.07 1902.07 
Dihua Xinjiang 1897.07 1908.11 
Jilin Jilin 1897.08 1908.00 
Fuzhou Fujian 1898.01 1900.10 
Nanjing Jiangsu 1898.01 1902.06 
Chongqing Sichuan 1898.07 1903.08 
Anqing Anhui 1898.08 1902.05 
Hangzhou Zhejiang 1899.03 1903.03 
Xi'an Shaanxi 1899.04 n/a 
Harbin Heilongjiang 1900.00 n/a 
Jinan Shandong 1901.10 1904.08 
Kunming Yunnan 1906.04 1908.01 
Lhasa Tibet 1910.08 n/a 
Suzhou Jiangsu No coinage 1901.08 
Qingjiangpu (Huaiyin) Jiangsu No coinage 1905.02 
Nanchang Jiangxi n/a 1903.04 
Kaifeng Henan n/a 1904.11 
Nanning Guangxi n/a 1905.02 
Guiyang Guizhou n/a 1905.05 
 
Source: Selected Archives in Modern Chinese Monetary History, Vol.1 (1964), 823-4, 914, 917-23.  
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Appendix A 2-2 Spread of new coinage since 1900.  
 
 
 
  
Legend (year 
of adoption) 
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Appendix B 2-1 Summary statistics 
Panel A: Prefecture by month data (306 prefectures*360 months) 
 
Mean Standard Dev. Min Max 
Price of wheat 221.077 138.441 41 1960 
Price of rice 266.693 168.336 57 6477 
Average weather deviation from 3 (good 
weather) 
-0.178 1.028 -2 2 
Drought dummy 0.292 0.455 0 1 
Flood dummy 0.388 0.487 0 1 
Wheat as main produce dummy 0.702 0.457 0 1 
Rice as main produce dummy 0.596 0.491 0 1 
Silver mint dummy 0.027 0.162 0 1 
Copper mint dummy 0.016 0.126 0 1 
Panel B: Province by month data (21 provinces*360 months) 
 
Mean Standard Dev. Min Max 
Price of wheat (provincial mean) 234.362 132.736 73.5 1698 
Price of rice (provincial mean) 268.331 174.406 96.75 6477 
Wheat as main produce dummy 0.692 0.462 0 1 
Rice as main produce dummy 0.569 0.495 0 1 
Silver mint dummy 0.286 0.452 0 1 
Copper mint dummy 0.174 0.379 0 1 
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Appendix C 2-1 Image of copper coin (Qing dynasty, issued around AD 1905-1908) 
 
 
Source: online sources 
449
  
 
Front inside (reading from top to bottom, then from right to left): guang xu yuan bao (‘heavy 
treasure of Xianfeng’); 
Front outside top (reading from right to left): guang xi sheng zao (‘manufactured by Guangxi 
Province’); front outside bottom (reading from right to left): mei yuan dang zhi qian shi wen (‘each 
coin should be taken as 10 wen of standard cash’) 
Back top: KWANG-HSI;
450
 back bottom: TEN CASH. 
 
 
                                                 
449
 Copper coin during Guangxu’s Reign (1875-1908) [date of access: 27 Mar 2015] 
(http://collection.sina.com.cn/auction/ppsx/20140522/1455152547.shtml )  
450
 Kwang-hsi is the old spelling (Wade-Giles system) of Guangxu.  
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Chapter 3 The Second World War 
and Chinese Money Holders (1937-
1945): 
 
How did the wartime situation affect people’s money- 
holding behaviour? 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous two chapters have discussed the parallel development of two movements 
that contributed to the collapse of the traditional monetary system of imperial China: a 
continued process of monetary decentralisation and the monetary modernisation. On 
one hand, the power of the central government kept collapsing, leaving provincial 
governments with more freedom for tax autonomy and with more responsibilities in 
terms public goods provision (including the provision of money). The regional 
provision of monies increased liquidity but also gave rise to problems of monetary 
chaos and competitive coinage between regions. On the other hand, fragmented political 
situation (thus allowing certain area to change first
451
) also greatly pushed forward the 
modernisation of the monetary system. The regional minting activities since the late 19
th
 
century made way for a wide acceptance of token coins (for the first time in history the 
Chinese money holders were ready to accept token coins and used them with their face 
value), facilitating the transition from the silver-copper bimetallic system to a 
monometallic system (i.e. pure silver standard) which is arguably a necessary step 
towards further institutional evolution. The early period of Republican China (1911-49) 
witnessed a continued development of both trends. Political power continued to 
decentralise and the control of coinage became an important source of regional 
government revenue. At the same time, the transition to a de facto silver standard 
facilitated the development of banking sector in issuing banknotes linked to silver.
452
  
 
Besides these two movements, the formation of a new unified monetary system was 
taking place along with the process of state formation. The early Republican era 
(warlord period) saw the coinage and wide use of the Chinese silver dollar (Yuan Shikai 
silver dollar) minted by the Republican government. The Chinese silver dollars 
gradually dominated the market and became the primary bank reserve upon which 
various banknotes were issued.
453
 During the period between 1911 and early 1930s, 
China’s monetary system resembled a free banking system: it was a silver standard 
under which all kinds of banks could issue freely their own convertible banknotes; 
                                                 
451
 This happened to be the same underlying logic of Deng’s economic opening policy in the 1980s. 
452
 China was a de jure silver standard only for a very brief period, from March 1933 to November 1935.  
453
 Kuroda, "The Collapse of the Chinese Imperial Monetary System ". 
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although the government centralised the minting of silver dollar, other forms of silver 
(foreign dollars and silver ingots) still circulated, and no effective central bank was 
established during the warlord period. In 1927, the Nationalist Government led by 
Chiang Kai-shek, reunified the country (by defeating some warlords and teaming with 
the others) and underwent ambitious programmes of modern state formation, including 
a series of steady currency reform. In 1935, China abandoned its centuries’ use of silver 
and adopted a managed, foreign-exchange-backed currency system. The value of the 
money moved from metallic value to the credibility of the state (and also to a harder 
currency - foreign exchange).  
 
This reunification of the monetary system was sweet but short: China was soon dragged 
into a major warfare of eight years. The country split into several regimes issuing their 
own currencies competing with each other. Hence between 1911 and 1945, monetary 
evolution went through periods of further decentralisation (1911-27), then re-
centralisation (1928-37), and decentralisation (1938-45) again. Many interesting and 
important issues are worth discussing. However, the period of 1911-27 happened to be 
the most decentralised time in modern Chinese history and during this period economic 
data information is extremely scarce. The period of 1928-37 during which the major 
currency reform took place, on the other hand, receives much more attention and the 
topic has been frequently treated in many great works. Based on these reasons, this 
chapter skips the two sub-periods (a succinct history of monetary development will be 
provided in section 3.2), and focuses instead on the monetary development since 1937. 
This is the period when the value of money no longer resided within metal, but more 
within the credibility of its issuer – the state. The chapter therefore discusses source of 
credibility of fiat money, by investigating the value of currencies in competing regimes 
through the eyes of contemporary money holders.  
 
In September 1939, when the Second World War broke out in Europe, the Chinese state 
had already been seriously torn apart. China had entered into war with Japan in 1937, 
and by 1939, the country was divided into several autonomous regimes, all claiming to 
be the ‘only legitimate government’ in China. Representing distinctively different 
political interests, each regime scrambled for larger spheres of influence not only 
militarily but also economically. Each regime issued its own currency, and pushed the 
notes onto the population in the hope of getting more seigniorage revenue. 
Chapter 3. The Second World War and Chinese Money Holders                                                             177 
 
 
  
 
Although the currencies each had their main area of circulation, they travelled much 
further across their ‘borders’ because of inter-regional trade and because borders 
changed so constantly with the progress of war. Consequently, besides the daily worry 
of having their hometown flattened or letting inflation eat up half of their monthly 
salaries, the ordinary Chinese people sometimes had to consider which notes they 
needed to hold. Most of the wartime currencies were more or less fiat money (with 
limited or suspended convertibility to foreign exchange), which experienced inflation to 
certain degree. What determines people’s preference for which currency and how much 
of it they should hold? Is it the relative quality of money linked to the fiscal behaviour 
of the note issuing authority, or to progress in the domestic battlefield, or rather to 
people’s faith in a specific regime? 
 
This paper applies structural breaks analysis to examine changes in the real demand for 
money as reflections of money holders’ behaviour. It focuses on a regional comparison, 
and provides a new perspective in examining the wartime economy and Chinese 
wartime inflation. The paper examines two major currencies during the war, one issued 
in Free China by Nationalist Government led by Chiang Kai-shek, and the other issued 
in occupied China by the Reorganized National Government of China led by Wang 
Jingwei and supported by the Japanese government. These were the two major political 
regimes situated at the heart of the Chinese territory, both claiming to be the only 
legitimate government of the Republic of China. By examining and comparing these 
two currencies, the paper tackles two questions: what events were considered important 
in the eyes of contemporary Chinese? Did the events exert same impacts across the 
country? 
 
A great amount of literature has studied the wartime events by examining information 
from the financial markets during the US Civil War and the Second World War. Willard, 
Guinnane and Rosen (hereafter WGR 1996) study the greenback market (inconvertible 
paper money issued by the ‘Union’ states in the North from 1862) during the US Civil 
War,
454
 while Weidenmier examines the grayback market (paper money issued by the 
                                                 
454
 Kristen Willard, Timothy Guinnane, and Harvey Rosen, "Turning Points in the Civil War: Views from 
the Greenback Market," The American Economic Review 86, no. 4 (1996). 
Chapter 3. The Second World War and Chinese Money Holders                                                             178 
 
 
  
Southern Confederacy after 1861).
455
 A comparison of the two studies shows that major 
events such as the battle at Antietam and the battle of Gettysburg are reflected in both 
greenback and grayback markets, but at other occasions, Northern and Southern 
investors reacted differently and had different concerns. It seems that war events did not 
always have symmetrical effects on the two money markets. The paper by Frey and 
Waldenström (2004) studies bond prices traded in two geographically separate markets 
(in Zurich and Stockholm) and suggests that there appears to be asymmetric information 
between the two markets, because some of the events result in significant breaks in only 
one of them.
456
 Oosterlinck (2003) compares two identical long-term bonds (one issued 
by the Third Republic and the other by the Vichy government) traded on the Paris 
Bourse (Stock Exchange) from 1942 to 1944.
457
 By calculating the price differential, 
they explain the new series no longer by macroeconomic factors but in terms of the 
‘political risk of default’.458 Ho and Li (2010) use Chinese domestic bond yields to 
analysis events during 1921-42.  
 
This paper contributes to several strands of research. First, it contributes to the 
abovementioned literature of wartime event analysis by offering a case study in China. 
Previous research of historical ‘turning points’ mostly deals with information on 
financial markets of the United States or Europe, while Ho and Li’s paper on domestic 
bond yields stops in 1942, which was in the middle of the war. Second, this study 
applies the structural break methods to time tables of money holding, which provided a 
more comprehensive analysis in terms of the time span. There are several advantages to 
using this indicator compared to other indicators, such as bond prices, in the Chinese 
context. The Chinese bond market is underdeveloped and not much traded especially 
after 1937.
459
 It could be asked what the bond yields could reflect about people’s 
expectations. The bond yield data stops in 1942, right in the middle of the war. The 
foreign exchange market, although it endured the war period, was subject to government 
                                                 
455
 Marc Weidenmier, "Turning Points During the Us Civil War: Views from the Grayback Market," 
Southern Economic Journal 68, no. 4 (2002).  
456
 Bruno S. Frey and Daniel Waldenström, "Markets Work in War: World War Ii Reflected in the Zurich 
and Stockholm Bond Markets," Financial History Review 11, no. 1 (2004).  
457
 Kim Oosterlinck, "The Bond Market and the Legitimacy of Vichy France," Explorations in Economic 
History 40(2003). 
458
 Ibid., 333. 
459
 Chun-Yu Ho and Dan Li, "A Mirror of History: Chinese Bond Market from 1921 to 1942," working 
paper series for the Project 'Reconstructing the National Income of Britain and Holland, c.1270/1500 to 
1850' (April 2010): 27.  
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manoeuvring and therefore could not be used as accurate reflection of public 
expectations. Third, by comparing the monetary series of both Free China and Occupied 
China, this paper provides a more panoramic view of the wartime history, as most of the 
works of the Chinese wartime monetary issues focus on the currency (fabi) issued by 
the Nationalist Government, and is therefore limited to the study in Free China in the 
Southwest. Finally, historians in recent years (since the 1990s) have focused strongly on 
issues of perception. Much of this appears to be part of the culturalist turn of 
historiography.
460
 This paper contributes to this strand of research from a completely 
different point of view: it employs economic data and methods from the economic 
history perspective to address the question of how people perceived military and 
political events. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 3.2 provides the historical 
background of the competing regimes and various currencies; Section 3.3 provides the 
steps of the structural break methodology; Section 3.4 presents the empirical results and 
provides a brief discussion on the findings; Section 3.5 concludes the paper. 
                                                 
460
 For example Mohanty (1988) and Klein (2000), Chandra Talpade Mohanty, "Under Western Eyes: 
Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses," Feminist Review 30(1988). Kerwin Lee Klein, "On the 
Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse," Representations 69(2000). 
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3.2 Two Nationalist Governments and two 
currencies  
 
Since its late imperial period, China has been a state with limited monetary unity. The 
Xianfeng Crisis (1853-61) kick-started the process of monetary modernisation as well 
as its regionalisation. The monetary system at the beginning of Republican China 
(1911-49) was even more fragmented and complex, not least because of the warlord 
politics and the increasingly weakened central power. Hence between 1911 and 1945, 
monetary evolution went through periods of further decentralisation (1911-27), then re-
centralisation (1928-37), and decentralisation (1938-45) again. This section first 
provides a succinct history of the relevant monetary evolution along with the parallel 
development of the state. It then examines the two major competing currencies under 
two different regimes.    
 
3.2.1 Historical Context:  change of regimes: political and monetary 
3.2.1.1 From Warlord China to Nationalist China 
 
The Republic, soon after its establishment by various military and revolutionary groups, 
fell into the hands of Yuan Shikai (former pro-reform official of the Qing court) and his 
Beiyang military government in Beijing. The real political power was decentralised to a 
group of military warlords and the central government was extremely weak in all senses: 
militarily, politically and financially. This period was known as the Beiyang period 
(1912-1927) and it witnessed a series of chaotic civil wars between warlords.  
 
Disappointed by the military government, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Republic of 
China, formed the Nationalist Party (KMT)
461
 in South China and led several campaigns 
in order to overthrow the military rule and to re-install a democratic republic. After Sun 
Yat-sen’s death, Chiang Kai-shek the continued the North Expedition. At the same time, 
Wang Jingwei (another prominent revolutionist figure inside the KMT) led an 
independent military campaign against Beiyang and set up a separate government body 
                                                 
461
 The Nationalist Party is called ‘Kuomintang’ in Chinese pronunciation, and often referred to as KMT. 
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in Wuhan. Chiang’s crusade put down the regional warlords one by one and finally the 
Beiyang government was forced to step down. The Nationalist Party established its own 
government in Nanjing in 1927, and Chiang managed to merge the Nanjing government 
with the one in Wuhan established by Wang. The Nationalist regime (1927-1949) thus 
started.  
 
By the 1930s that the Nationalist rule was consolidated, comprehensive programmes 
were undertaken to centralise the power and to develop state capitalism. The first ten 
years of the Nationalist rule (the ‘Nanjing Decade’ from 1927 to 1937) saw tremendous 
progress in terms of modern state building: government consolidated its fiscal 
income;
462
 it set up the first central bank in 1928, carried out a series of currency reform 
and established the new fiat money system; it also actively engaged in industrial 
policies and designed the first five-year plan of industrial development. By 1936, there 
was among the Chinese population a genuine mood of ‘optimism and national unity’. 463  
Unfortunately this optimism did not last long as the Second Sino-Japanese War broke 
out in 1937: development policies were interrupted and the newly adopted fiat currency 
system became very handy for inflationary finance.   
 
3.2.1.2 Monetary decentralisation and recentralisation  
 
Beiyang Government (1911-27) centralised state silver coinage and encouraged the 
market to the use of silver dollar (Yuan Shikai dollar minted since 1914). Chinese dollar 
did not enjoy the sole legal tender status and the market use of silver took various forms 
from foreign silver coins (for example, Mexican silver dollars were used for daily 
transactions in the South-eastern coastal areas and treaty ports, while Japanese dollars 
were popular in Fujian Province) to silver ingot.
464
 Convertible banknotes were issued 
                                                 
462
 Consistent fiscal budget reporting started from 1928.  
463
 The achievement of the Nationalist regime is a subject of debate. Many argued due to the emphasis of 
the centralised state, level of free speech and also market liberalisation was limited compared to the 
Baiyang era. The Beiyang era, with the absence of absolute state power, witnessed the start of modern 
industrialisation, and was regarded as the ‘Golden Age of Chinese capitalism’. For detailed arguments 
please refer to: John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 13, Part 
2 Republican China, 1912-1949(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 147-60.  
464
 Kuroda, "The Collapse of the Chinese Imperial Monetary System " 104-05, 14-15. 
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by foreign banks, Chinese modern banks and native banks.
465
 In the early days of the 
Republic almost half the banknotes were actually issued by foreign banks.
466
 Among the 
modern Chinese banks, the most influential were two semi-official banks (Bank of 
China and the Bank of Communications) and their banknotes were well accepted. 
However, circulation of the banknotes had a regional pattern. Some of the notes 
circulated only within the borders of the place where a branch of a bank had issued 
them.
467
  
 
In 1927 when the Nationalist Government replaced Beiyang Government to be the only 
legitimate government of China, the currency system was still ‘a complicated mixture of 
silver coins and weights, fluctuating copper coins and paper money, all varying from 
place to place’.468 The Nationalist Government was more committed to the monetary 
reform: the Central Bank of China was established in Nanjing in 1928 and a supervision 
committee was founded to ensure that banks maintained adequate reserves behind their 
note issues. The Bank of China and Bank of Communications became government 
banks. In 1933, the use of tael as unit of account was abolished and the silver dollar 
became the only legal unit of account. In 1935, China abandoned its traditional silver 
standard and adopted a managed currency system. The Chinese Yuan (fabi) became the 
sole legal tender in Republic of China. Private banknotes were still allowed to circulate, 
but with much diminished importance. By 1936 the notes issued by foreign banks had 
shrunk to 8% of the total number of notes circulating.
469
 The provincial and local banks 
had some issues, too, the number being limited to a fifth of the total.
470
  
 
3.2.1.3 The 1935 Fabi Reform 
 
There are many possible driving forces behind the currency reform of 1935. One 
possibility (which also occurred frequently in official publications) is the economic 
                                                 
465
 Banknotes were denominated with various unit of account: in some cases the notes were denominated 
in tael (and there were different taels) and in other cases in silver dollars. Rawski, Economic Growth in 
Prewar China 130. 
466
 Ibid., 134-35.  
467
 Kuroda, "The Collapse of the Chinese Imperial Monetary System " 156. 
468
 Young, China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 3. 
469
 Rawski, Economic Growth in Prewar China 135.  
470
 Young, China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 135.  
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deflation in China in the wake of the global depression of the 1930s
471
 Western 
countries abandoned the Gold Standard (Great Britain went off the Gold Standard in 
1931 and other countries followed suit) and their currency depreciated. By this time 
China was on a pure silver standard. China’s link to silver made the Chinese dollar 
appreciate against foreign exchanges, resulting in exports decline and silver outflow.
472
 
The US government’s Silver Purchasing Act in 1934 further bid up the international 
silver price.
473
 Many scholars considered that the silver outflow led to a shrinking of the 
monetary base, resulting in deflation and financial crisis.
474
 Another driving force 
behind the abandoning of silver is the Chinese government strategy to escape the ‘silver 
fetter’ and to increase the government ability to extract seigniorage revenues.  
 
In November 1935, the Chinese government officially introduced its currency reform: 
the government decree stated that notes issued by the four government banks (Central 
Bank of China, Bank of China, Bank of Communications and the Farmers Bank of 
China) were the nation’s sole legal tender. It was a managed, foreign-exchange-backed 
currency system. The new Chinese dollar had a fixed exchange rate with the British 
pound as well as with US dollar. It was anchored at 1 CHD = 0.3 USD = 14 ½ d.
475
 
Banks, firms and all private and public institutions were to hand over their silver 
holdings to the Currency Reserve Board in exchange for the legal tender. The notes of 
other banks were to be gradually retired. The government banks were to keep the 
exchange value of the currency at the present level and to this end they would buy and 
sell foreign exchange in unlimited quantities. This new Chinese National Currency is 
often referred to as fabi, the Chinese equivalent of ‘legal tender’.476  
 
The reform was successful at the beginning: it encouraged foreign trade and stimulated 
the economy. There was mild inflation but it was needed for reflating the economy. By 
                                                 
471
 Friedman gives a vivid illustration of the relationship between the Great Depression and the Chinese 
currency reform, and Chiang’s eventual defeat in the war with the Communists. Friedman, "Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Silver, and China," 62-83. 
472
 The worldwide currency depreciation implies a price rise of international commodities such as silver 
and thus a real exchange rate appreciation of the Chinese currency. 
473
 The aim of Roosevelt government was to add silver to the reserves of the US Treasury until it reached 
a ratio of 1:3 with gold reserves. Friedman, "Franklin D. Roosevelt, Silver, and China," 66-67.  
474
 Contemporaries observed that in Shanghai, commodity prices fell, bank reserves were depleted and 
bank credit halted. Business failures increased. The real estate and stock market were frozen. "The China 
Year Book (Chung-Hua-Nien-Chien)," ed. H. G. W. Woodhead(Shanghai: North-China Daily News & 
Herald, 1929-38), 201-03   
475
 King, A Concise Economic History of Modern China, 138. 
476
 Chang, The Inflationary Spiral, 3-4. 
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nationalizing silver holdings, the government also received a windfall of monetary 
reserves. Part of the silver reserve was used to purchase foreign currencies, in order to 
stabilise the exchange market. The Chinese public were ‘exchange-minded to an 
unusual degree’477 and speculative attempts to force a break in the exchange rates were 
frequent. But the government did well to stabilise foreign exchange market with its 
foreign reserve.  
 
The currency reform proceeded successfully for the first twenty months and then the 
Sino-Japanese War broke out. The managed monetary system requires a prudent fiscal 
condition, but during the war the government could no longer maintain its already 
delicate fiscal balance and the monetary system became inflationary. The area of fabi’s 
circulation also shrank. Soon after the outbreak of the war, the Nationalist Government, 
as well as four government banks, moved to the interior (Free China). In occupied 
China puppet regimes were established and they started to issue puppet notes. The 
monetary regime disintegrated again with the split of the country. The major 
antagonising regimes were the Nationalist government in Chongqing (led by Chiang 
Kai-shek) in the interior (Free China) and the other Nationalist government in Nanjing 
(led by Wang Jing-wei) in Occupied China. They both claimed to be the only legitimate 
government of China and issued currencies competing with each other. The following 
section provided some stylised facts about this situation.  
 
3.2.2 Two Nationalist Governments and two currencies 
3.2.2.1 The Free China regime and the New Nanjing Regime 
 
China’s political landscape was completely changed during the Second World War. 
Even before the war, Manchuria had been effectively controlled by Japan since the early 
1930s. The central government was greatly impeded by further Japanese aggression in 
1937. By the end of 1937, the Chinese capital Nanjing was captured. The legitimate 
Chinese government, the Nationalist Government, retreated to the interior in the west 
(the ‘Free China’) and settled in Chongqing. The Japanese-occupied area was divided 
into several main regions, each with an autonomous government. These regions include 
Manchuria (turned into Manchukuo in 1931), Mongol Border Land (Mengjiang, a 
                                                 
477
 Young, China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 131-33.  
Chapter 3. The Second World War and Chinese Money Holders                                                             185 
 
 
  
puppet regime under Japanese control since 1936), North China (since 1937, including 
the cities of Beijing and Tianjin) and Central China (since 1938, including the cities of 
Nanjing and Shanghai). 
 
In the eyes of the Nationalist Government, the most threatening puppet regime was the 
puppet government of Central China. This regime controlled a vast land from Central 
China to the East Coast. The government had effective control over the economically 
most advanced areas (including Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang), and maintained 
Nanjing as its capital. In 1940, the government was renamed the ‘National Government 
of China’, with Wang Jingwei as the president (hereafter referred to as the New Nanjing 
Regime).
478
 Wang Jingwei was a famous revolutionist and a member of the Nationalist 
Party with very senior ranking (below only Chiang Kai-shek). 
 
Established in the original capital city, led by a respectable politician, this government 
sounded very much like the ‘real’ National Government that was now situated in 
Chongqing. This regime was established for the purpose of being the only legitimate 
government in China and to replace Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Government in 
Chongqing. The New Nanjing Regime also issued its own paper money that drove the 
Chinese legal tender out of circulation in Central China. 
 
3.2.2.2 Fabi and the Central Reserve Bank notes 
China’s currency was unified in 1935 with the introduction of the new Chinese dollar 
(also called fabi, which means ‘legal tender’ in Chinese479) which became the only legal 
currency in China. Fabi was a managed, foreign-exchange-backed currency: it had a 
fixed exchange rate with the British pound as well as with US dollar.
480
 Fabi were 
issued by government banks (Central Bank of China, Bank of China, Bank of 
Communications and the Farmers Bank of China) with branches all over the country. 
This monetary unity was maintained for twenty months, until the outbreak of the Sino-
                                                 
478
 The New Nanjing regime claimed for almost all the Japanese occupied area (North China, Central and 
South China, and Inner Mongolia), although its actual area of influence included only Anhui, South 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Nanjing and Shanghai. 
479
 The currency is often referred to as ‘fapi’ (spelling with the Wade–Giles system) in contemporary 
literature.  
480
 The exchange rate of fabi was anchored at 1 CHD = 0.3 USD = 14 ½ d (pre-decimal British pence). 
The government banks were to keep the exchange value of the currency at the present level and to this 
end they would buy and sell foreign exchange in unlimited quantities. King, A Concise Economic History 
of Modern China, 138.  
Chapter 3. The Second World War and Chinese Money Holders                                                             186 
 
 
  
Japanese War. With the gradual establishment of puppet regimes and puppet notes, fabi 
played a diminished role in occupied areas. 
 
Following the capture of the Chinese capital Nanjing in December 1937, the Japanese 
military decided to set up a puppet government to manage Central and South China. The 
new puppet government in Nanjing was called the ‘Reorganized National Government 
of China’. A puppet central bank solely for Central and South China, the Central 
Reserve Bank, was also established. On 8 January 1941, the Central Reserve Bank 
opened in Nanjing, and on 20 January a branch opened in Shanghai. The Central 
Reserve Bank notes (CRB notes) were at par with fabi, and competed for area of 
circulation.
481482
 
 
Figure 3-1 Foreign exchange rate of Fabi, and Central Reserve Bank (CRB) notes, 
in logarithm (against US dollars) 
 
                                                 
481
 Zhaojin Ji, A History of Modern Shanghai Banking: The Rise and Decline of China’s Finance 
Capitalism (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 214-5. 
482
 During the course of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese troops set up several puppet regimes and 
each regime set up their own central banks and issue their own currencies. CRB is only the most 
prominent one that posed a threat to the Nationalist government. Central banks of other puppet regimes 
included the Mengcheng Bank in Inner Mongolia, the Federal Reserve Bank in North China, and the 
Kwangtung Provincial Bank in Guangdong Province. To complete the picture, there were still other 
currencies such as the Japanese military yen (gunpyo, its formal name is, by the way, ‘China Incident 
Military Notes’) and various communist currencies issued by scattered communist bases. All these 
currencies had experienced inflations of different magnitudes (except for those of Manchukuo and 
Taiwan). Young, China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 165-88. 
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Source: Global Financial Data. 
 
Because of the existence of the foreign concessions in Shanghai and the foreign 
recognition of Chiang’s Free China,483 fabi remained a major currency of circulation in 
Shanghai during the first four years of Japanese occupation. However, after the attack 
on Pearl Harbour and the outbreak of the Pacific War, Japan claimed a full control of 
the city of Shanghai including the foreign concessions. The CRB notes were therefore 
forced into market circulation. On May 1942, the New Nanjing Regime announced that 
CRB notes would be the only legal tender notes in circulation in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Anhui, Nanjing and Shanghai. After the adoption of the CRB notes, the market was 
relatively stable compared with the fabi area. However, when the Japanese troops 
retreated in defeat in the latter part of the war, CRB note areas experienced even higher 
inflation than fabi areas, and in Shanghai the price rise had surged into hyperinflation by 
the end of the war in 1945. 
 
 
  
                                                 
483
 International Settlement and the French Concession remained independent of the Japanese military 
rule (until 1942), and within foreign concessions, branches of the four government banks still operated.  
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Figure 3-2 Note issues of fabi (millions, in logarithm), Nov 1935–Aug 1945 
 
Sources: Young (1965), pp. 363-5; Wu (1958), pp. 61-2, 85. 
 
Figure 3-3 Monthly growth rate of fabi, Jul 1937–Dec 1946 
 
 Source: ibid. 
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Figure 3-4 Note issues of (puppet) Central Reserve Bank (millions, in logarithm), 
Jan 1941–Aug 1945 
 
Source: Young (1965), p. 366. 
 
Figure 3-5 Monthly growth rate of CRB notes (with comparison of fabi), Jan 1941–
Aug 1945 
 
Sources: Young (1965), pp. 363-6; Wu (1958), pp. 61-62, 85 
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Figure 3-6 Monthly inflation rate (WPI) in Chongqing, Feb 1937–Dec 1946 
 
Source: Global Financial Data. 
 
Figure 3-7 Monthly inflation rate (WPI) in Shanghai, Jan 1937–May 1945 
Sources: Collection of Shanghai Price Index before and after the Liberation 1921-1957, pp. 163-70. 
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Figure 3-8 Monthly inflation rate (WPI) in Shanghai, May–Dec 1945 
 
Source: ibid. 
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3.3 Data and methodology: real demand for 
money and structural breaks analysis 
3.3.1 Data description: a focus on Chongqing and Shanghai 
Records of the central bank note issue for both regimes are well preserved. The series of 
monthly issues of fabi are taken from Young for figures from June1937 to August 
1945,
484
 and from Wu for figures from September 1945 to June 1949 (see Figures 3-2 
and 3-3). 
485
 The lists by Young and Wu are compatible because their materials are both 
taken from the records of the Central Bank of China. Data on monthly note issues of the 
Central Reserve Bank are also taken from Young (see Figures 3-4 and 3-5).
486
 
 
Complete price information, however, proves difficult to find. The price information is 
usually collected at municipal level, and now consistent wartime price indices could be 
found only for Chongqing and Shanghai. This paper therefore takes the Chongqing 
price information as representative of the Free China, and the Shanghai price 
information as representative of the New Nanjing Regime. Chongqing was the wartime 
capital and Shanghai was China’s financial centre. These are the centres where 
information travelled fast and where currency speculation took place. Price data from 
these two cities will therefore be relatively representative (see Figure 3-6, Figure 3-7, 
and Figure 3-8).
487
 
 
The Chongqing wholesale price index is obtained from Global Financial Data.
488
 The 
Shanghai wholesale price index is gathered from the Collection of Shanghai Price 
Indices before and after the Liberation, 1921-1957.
489
 It needs to be noticed that while 
in Chongqing the major currency was dominantly fabi, there was a change in major 
currency in Shanghai from fabi to CRB notes in the summer 1942. 
                                                 
484
 Young, China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 363-5. 
485
 Gang Wu, Historical Data on Chinese Inflation (Jiu Zhong Guo Tong Huo Peng Zhang Shi Liao) 
(Shanghai: People's Press, 1958), 61-2, 85. 
486
 Young, China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 366. 
487
 Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin are the only three cities that have preserved consistent price records 
of the wartime period.  
488
 "Global Financial Data." [Date of data access: 15 November 2010]. 
489
 Collection of Shanghai Price Index before and after the Liberation 1921-1957 (Shanghai Jie Fang 
Qian Hou Wu Jia Zi Liao Hui Bian 1921-1957), ed. Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences(Shanghai: 
People’s Press, 1958), 163-70. 
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3.3.2 Series of the real demand for money 
The series for testing consist of monthly observations on the real demand for money D 
(M/P) in Chongqing and Shanghai from June 1937 to March 1949. As an indicator (M/P) 
captures the demand of money holders for precaution and transaction needs. It also 
captures the market speculation in anticipating inflation or deflation, and therefore 
shows the public’s confidence in the government responsible for issuing the currency.  
The real demand for money is calculated upon the data series in wholesale price indices 
and note issues.  
 
The money demand (in logarithm) in Chongqing (lnDcq) is calculated by:  
 
      ckfapicq
WPIMD lnlnln     (1) 
 
WPIck is the wholesale price index in Chongqing; Mfabi is the note issue of fabi. Both are 
index series with July 1937 as their base month (July 1937=100).  
 
In Shanghai, as there was a switch of major currencies from fabi to CRB notes, analysis 
of the price-currency ratio movements in Shanghai thus naturally falls into two periods 
following the switch of currency: from June 1937 to June 1942 and from July1942 to 
the end of the war. Two money demand series (lnDsh1 and lnDsh2) are produced. The 
first series of (lnDsh1) is calculated by:  
 
shfapish WPIMD lnlnln 1      (2) 
 
WPIsh is the wholesale price index in Shanghai; Mfabi is the index of note issues of fabi. 
Both are index series with June 1937 as their base month (June 1937=100). The log real 
demand is therefore zero in June 1937. The series cover a period from June 1937 to 
March 1949, of which the values of observations from June 1942 to August 1945 may 
be useless since fabi was no longer the legal currency. Figure 14 shows the series from 
June 1937 to June 1942.  
 
The second series, lnDsh2, is computed by:  
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shCRBsh WPIMD lnlnln 2      (3) 
 
WPIsh is the wholesale price index in Shanghai; MCRB is the real number of note issues 
of CRB notes instead of indices. The series cover the period from January 1941 to 
August 1945. However, observations before 1942 hardly reflect reality, as the volume 
of note issues was trivial at the beginning (under the name of the Hua Hsing Bank) and 
it was fabi that still dominated the market. Figure 15 therefore presents the lnDsh2 series 
from June 1942 to August 1945.  
 
Figure 3-9: Real money demand, Chongqing Jul 1937-Apr 1949 
 
Sources: Global Financial Data https://www.globalfinancialdata.com/Platform/Login.aspx ; Young, pp. 
363-65; Wu, pp. 61-62, 85.  
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Figure 3-10: Real money demand in logarithm, Shanghai Jun 1937-Jun 1942 
(Money = Fabi) 
 
Sources: Collection of Shanghai Price Index before and after the Liberation 1921-1957, pp. 163-70; 
Young, pp. 363-65; Wu, pp. 61-62, 85.  
 
Figure 3-11: Real money demand in logarithm, Shanghai Jun 1942-Aug 1945 
(Money = CRB notes) 
 
Sources: Collection of Shanghai Price Index before and after the Liberation 1921-1957, pp. 163-70; 
Young, p. 366.  
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3.3.3 Structural breaks analysis: Sequential search technique with 
rolling windows 
 
This paper uses a sequential search technique to find unknown structural breaks 
endogenously. The method was first developed by Banerjee, Lumsdaine and Stock 
(1992),
490
 and was put into empirical studies by Willard et al. The steps of this paper 
resemble mostly those in the paper of Frey and Waldenström (2004). 
 
Step 1-basic idea and window size: 
The steps of this paper resemble mostly those in the paper of Frey and Waldenström 
(2004). The first step starts with the following equation: 
 
The main idea of the method is to break the time series into windows of shorter time 
span.
491
  Here we use a time span of 36 months, while the total length of time series is 
141 months. If window no.1 is defined from July 1937 to June 1940, then window no.2 
will be one month forward, i.e. from August 1937 to July 1940. This process will be 
repeated until the whole period is covered and this results in a total of 106 windows. For 
each window, a linear regression is performed to test the possibility of a break (the 
significance and the magnitude of a change in the mean).  
 
This is the basic equation for each window:  
 
                            

 
k
t
titit DD
1
0 lnln                                                          (4) 
Here lnDt is the logarithm form of real demand for money at time t and εt is the white 
noise error term. The lag length k = 1.
492
  
                                                 
490
 Anindya Banerjee, Robin L. Lumsdaine, and James H. Stock, "Recursive and Sequential Tests of the 
Unit-Root and Trend-Break Hypotheses: Theory and International Evidence," Journal of Business & 
Economic Statistics 10, no. 3 (1992): 271-87. 
491
 Frey and Waldenström, "Markets Work in War: World War Ii Reflected in the Zurich and Stockholm 
Bond Markets," 60.  
492
 The lag length k also requires some specification. It is chosen by the backward selection procedure 
suggested by Perron (1989) under the assumption of no break. The determination of the value of k 
depends on the significance of the estimated coefficients βi   and is quite a liberal procedure: if the 
absolute value of the t statistic on βk* is greater than 1.60 and if the absolute value of the t statistic on βl is 
less than 1.6 (l > k*), then k equals k*. If there are too many lags, the power of the estimation will 
decrease. In the present paper, the Perron procedure is also carried out and the result is k* = 1, for both 
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Step 2-linear estimation of equation: 
This step carries out the linear estimation on equation (4) for the first window. A Wald 
test for a structural break is carried out (by assuming a change in the constant in the 
middle of the window) and the F-statistic is recorded. The equation for estimation can 
be written as: 
 
                          ttt DumDD   110 lnln     t = 2,…,37.                          (5) 
 
Dum is a dummy variable which equals 0 when t ≤ 19 and 1 otherwise. A high F-
statistic indicates that the null hypothesis of no breaks (γ = 0) is strongly rejected and 
therefore suggests a high possibility of a structural break in this window. We then move 
the window one month forward and carry out the same estimation and the Wald test. 
This is repeated until all the windows are estimated and all the F-statistics noted. 
Windows with the greatest likelihood of a break will be picked up and each of the 36 
months within this window will be checked.  
 
Step 3-selection of windows with potential breaks: 
In this step, the F-statistics which have been collected are plotted on a time line. In this 
diagram, the peaks will be picked up manually. Windows which contain one of the 
peaks in the middle are candidate windows with potential breaks.  
 
Appendix A 3-1 shows the F-diagram for the real money demand in Chongqing from 
January 1939 to October 1947. Eight candidate windows are picked up for further 
investigation: from March 1938 to February 1941, from October 1938 to September 
1941, from January 1939 to December 1941, from July 1939 to June 1942, from 
November 1941 to October 1944, from January 1943 to December 1945, from March 
1944 to February 1947 and from August 1945 to July 1948. Some of the windows may 
overlap others for a few months. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
the Chongqing and Shanghai data. Perron, Pierre, ‘The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock, and the Unit 
Root Hypothesis’, Econometrica, Vol. 57, No. 6 (Nov., 1989), pp. 1382-84.  
Chapter 3. The Second World War and Chinese Money Holders                                                             198 
 
 
  
Appendix A 3-2 is the F-diagram for real money demand in Shanghai from January 
1939 to October 1947. Six candidate windows are isolated: from February 1938 to 
January 1941, from June 1938 to May 1941, from April 1940 to August 1942, from 
May 1941 to April 1944, from March 1944 to February 1947 and from July 1944 to 
June 1947. 
 
For Shanghai, another series of the real money demand is estimated, by calculating 
equation (3). For this series from January 1941 to August 1945, seven windows are 
identified as candidate windows as well: from January 1941 to March 1942, from 
March 1941 to August 1942, from September 1942 to February 1943, from June 1942 
to November 1943, from October 1942 to March 1944, May 1943 to October 1944 and 
from March 1944 to August 1945 (in Appendix A 3-3).  
 
Step 4-dating breaks in candidate windows: 
Since any of the 36 months within a window might be the cause of the high F-statistic, 
each date is statistically checked for the possibility of a break. Due to the fact that the 
sequential test cannot identify breaks around the beginning and the end of a time 
interval,
493
 six additional observations are therefore appended into the original window, 
making it an extended 48-months window (as the paper of Frey and Waldenström 
does
494
). In this way all 36 dates can be tested. All the selected candidate windows are 
estimated by an augmented equation, Equation (6), for statistically significant structural 
breaks within them: 
 
            tststt DumDD   110 lnln      s = t+6, t+7, …, t+41                      (6) 
 
Here Dumst is the rolling dummy variable. It takes the value of zero for the months 
before s and the value of 1 otherwise. For a candidate window, 36 estimations will be 
carried out for 36 dummies. Therefore the dummy Dst itself indicates the date of the 
break. The coefficient γs shows the magnitude and sign of the break. It can be 
                                                 
493
 Willard, Guinnane, and Rosen, "Turning Points in the Civil War: Views from the Greenback Market," 
1010. 
494
 Frey and Waldenström, "Markets Work in War: World War Ii Reflected in the Zurich and Stockholm 
Bond Markets," 61.  
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interpreted as the change of the mean in the price-currency ratio index. The percentage 
of the change in the mean can be calculated by the following equation:  
 
                              
  %1001)(%  sExpofChange                                                (7)  
  
The long-run effect can also be computed by:
495
  
 
                     
  %1001)]1/([% 1   sExpofChangeLongRun                            (8) 
 
  
                                                 
495
 Willard, Guinnane, and Rosen, "Turning Points in the Civil War: Views from the Greenback Market," 
1009. Equation (15) however works only when β<1, i.e., when the series do not contain a unit root. 
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3.3.4 Further discussion on methodology 
 
This section discusses the logic behind the ‘forward looking approach’ used for event 
study, as well as the merits and potential problem of the statistical method (structural 
break analysis).  
 
From data to events: the forward looking approach 
 
There are generally two ways of studying historical events with the help of time series 
data. The first is listing a number of events which are considered important in history 
and testing their significance in the time series. This method reassesses the importance 
of historical events which are already known to later observers
496
 and can therefore be 
called the ex-post checking method, or the ‘backward looking’ method. This method is 
often used to assess the relative importance of various historical events across time and 
space, in order to compare the magnitude and consequence of different events.
497
  
 
This method examines historical data information without previous knowledge of the 
dates of important events: it picks up the time slots that appear ‘abnormal’, and then 
makes historical inquiries to see what might have happened in history that have 
triggered this issue. As this method lets the economic statistics speak for themselves 
without preconceptions, it is useful in identifying history which might be overlooked by 
socio-political historians but nonetheless important in economic history. It is also useful 
to investigate the historical events which appeared to be important to people at the time, 
as many financial and economic indicators capture market perceptions of the time.
498
  
 
This paper falls into the second category called the ex-ante method, or the ‘forward 
looking’ method. This particular piece of history (Sino-Japanese War as well as the 
subsequent Civil War) was written and rewritten by various hands to serve different 
                                                 
496
 Ibid., 1001.  
497
 Neal and Weidenmier’s (2003) paper is a good example of fully assessing and comparing different 
historical events with all dimensions. Larry; Neal and Marc Weidenmier, "Crisis in the Global Economy 
from Tulips to Today: Contagion and Consequences," in Globalization in Historical Perspective, ed. 
Michael D.; Bordo, Alan M.; Taylor, and Jeffrey G. Williamson(Chicago and London: The Univesity of 
Chicago Press, 2003). 
498
 Some studies, for instance Mauro et al (2000) combine both approaches in order to further explore the 
data information and to reach a more comprehensive understanding of history. Paolo; Mauro, Nathan; 
Sussman, and Yishay Yafeh, "Emerging Market Spreads: Then Versus Now," IMF Working Paper, no. 
00/190 (2000). 
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political interest. And I am curious to see whether there are events that had been ignored 
and less remembered during the various 'repainting' of history.  
 
Sequential search technique with rolling windows 
 
This paper uses a sequential search technique to find unknown structural breaks 
endogenously. The method was first developed by Banerjee, Lumsdaine and Stock 
(1992),
499
 and was put into empirical studies by Willard et al. The steps of this paper 
resemble mostly those in the paper by Frey and Waldenström (2004).  
 
The graphs have already shown a lot of information about the change of income 
velocity: there are quite many sharp increases or decreases. However, with the naked 
eye it is difficult to tell whether this month is more like a short-term fluctuation or a 
‘turning point’ which would affect the velocity movement in the long run (which 
changes the trend of the time series). We call a point a ‘break’ when the impact of the 
change persists for a long time (18 month for example); and we call a point a ‘blip’ 
when its impact persists for only one or two months. 
 
This method of sequential testing suffers from some limitation. The quality of the 
dataset is not good enough in terms of length as well as frequency. The datasets for both 
Chongqing and Shanghai run from June 1937 until March 1949, while the main period 
of investigation is from July 1937 to September 1945 (the wartime inflation period). It 
would be better to have more observations before the period of investigation. 
Unfortunately, although the price series for Chongqing and Shanghai are relatively good 
and consistent, the monthly note issue information is available only from June 1937. 
The information on velocity starts therefore from June 1937, which is only one month 
before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. As the sequential test method cannot 
detect breaks at the beginnings and the ends of time series, the rise in velocity and 
people’s expectation of future warfare (whether optimistic or pessimistic) cannot be 
captured in the test, although a small upward trend is noticeable in the graph. The 
problem of data length is even more aggravated because, in the Shanghai case, the 
second velocity dataset (logarithm of price over puppet note issue) runs from January 
                                                 
499
 Banerjee, Lumsdaine, and Stock, "Recursive and Sequential Tests of the Unit-Root and Trend-Break 
Hypotheses: Theory and International Evidence." 
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1941 to August 1945. Information concerning the first half of 1941 and several months 
before August 1945 is therefore also lost. 
 
The frequency of the dataset is far from satisfactory, too, for it affects the selection of 
the window length. For a time series analysis, it is better to include more observations 
for the sake of greater explanatory power. For historical data, it is usually difficult to 
obtain series other than monthly data. Although there are papers using shorter time 
intervals, such as 18 months for monthly data,
500
 i.e. only 18 observations for a time 
series estimation, a more common practice is to use a window length of 36 months, 
following Frey and Kucher (2002) and Frey and Waldenström (2004). However, the 
definition of the window length also defines what ‘long-lasting’ means. As mentioned 
in previous sections, the definitions of a ‘long-lasting’ break vary from around three 
months (100 days in Willard et al.) to three years. A break with an effect of three years 
must be an important turning point. However, with a time span of three years, many 
smaller (not very long-lasting) events may be overlooked. This paper struggles to keep a 
balance between taking a reasonable length for the time series and selecting more events 
with a reasonably large impact: for the longer series (the Chongqing series and the first 
Shanghai series) it uses a 36-month window but, at the same time, it looks at more than 
one possible break in a window. The dates with the highest F-statistic will of course be 
chosen as the ‘break’ points; but other dates with relatively lower F-statistics in the 
same window will also be investigated. If these dates are also statistically significant 
enough, they will also be listed as ‘blips’ and their corresponding historical events also 
discussed. For the second Shanghai series (with puppet note issues as the denominator) 
this is too short: it has total observations for only 56 months starting from January 1941 
and ending in August 1945. Thirty-six months may be too big a window for a time 
series of such length. Moreover, with the usual 36-month window technique, six 
observations at the beginning and the end of the series will again be lost. Therefore, for 
this series only, the paper adopts a window size of 18 months. 
 
                                                 
500
 Frey and Waldenström, "Markets Work in War: World War Ii Reflected in the Zurich and Stockholm 
Bond Markets," 60.  
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A problem associated with the algorithm is that this test is basically ‘mean-shift-
oriented’.501 If an upcoming event is perceived gradually by money holders, i.e. if the 
structural change is gradual, our test may not be able to detect the change. 
 
                                                 
501
 Ibid., 61. 
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3.4 Empirical findings and discussion 
 
Three series (one in Chongqing and two in Shanghai) of real money demand are 
estimated and the results are listed in the Appendices (  
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Appendix B 3-1, Appendix B 3-2, Appendix B 3-3), including both breaks and blips. 
The difference between a break and a blip is the impact of the event; if it is long enough, 
it does not depend on whether the event triggers the biggest change in demand within a 
single month. 
 
The table below summarises the findings and lists fifteen events that are reflected as 
breaks or blips in either or both real demand series in two political regimes. The 
statistics shows the percentage change in real demand series caused by this break. The 
positive sign indicates an increase in real demand, so that people perceive the event as 
good news for holding more money; while the negative sign indicates a decrease in real 
demand, in which people perceived the event as bad news for holding money. 
 
Table 3-1 Major events and their reflection in real demand series in Chongqing 
and Shanghai series 
Dates Events Chongqing 
Shanghai 
M (Fabi) M (CRB) 
1939.08-11 
Military developments in European 
theatre -8.90% -7.77% *  
1939.12 News from Japanese government  -9.08% *  
1940.04 Puppet Chinese government in Nanjing -15.85% *   
1940.07 Battle of Zaoyang-Yichang -21.99% *   
1941.01 Hundred Regiments Offensive +17.01%   
1941.08 US oil embargo on Japan +10.88%   
1941.12 Pearl Harbour Attack    +19.40% * 
1942.02 News from Japanese government  -13.33%  
1942.06 Abolishment of fabi   +24.34% * 
1943.03 Handover of foreign concession    +17.64% * 
1943.05 Battle of West Hubei -12.65% *   
1944.06-07 D-Day, Battle of Saipan +11.56%*  -16.00% 
1944.10 Battle of Leyte Gulf   -20.38% * 
1944.12 Bombing in Tokyo   -34.28% * 
1945.06-09 Japanese surrender +48.38% *  -33.67% 
N.B. Breaks are denoted with (*); ** Germany officially surrendered on 8 May, and Japan on 15 August, 
1945. 
Source: Guo (1979); Appendices B. 
3.4.1 Free China (Chongqing series) 
Analysis of real money demand in Free China generates many surprises. Many 
important events (such as the beginning of the Second World War in Europe) are either 
insignificant or exert only minor influence (blips) compared to some local news. 
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3.4.1.1 Breaks 
April 1940 (decrease in demand by 15.85%) – establishment of a puppet 
government in Nanjing 
On 29 March 1940, the ‘Reorganized National Government of China’ was set up in 
Nanjing, headed by Wang Jingwei and supported by Japanese troops.
502
 It was not the 
first puppet regime in China. Officially, Central China, the North China puppet 
government, and the Menjiang government were all under Wang’s government in 
Nanjing. In reality, this regime controlled only certain areas in Central China (including 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Shanghai and Wuhan). 
 
However, the Nationalist Government in Chongqing was particularly worried about the 
establishment of this puppet regime. Although he had split with Chiang and been 
expelled from the Nationalist Party, Wang Jingwei had previously been vice director 
general of the Nationalist Party and was ranked number two in the Nationalist 
Government. His open rapprochement with Japan and the ‘restoration’ of the National 
Government of China in Nanjing made people doubt whether his government in 
Nanjing or the government under Chiang in Chongqing should be the real legitimate 
government. 
 
The Axis countries (Germany, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Denmark, Spain, Croatia, 
Slovakia, Bulgaria and Vichy France) quickly acknowledged the legitimacy of Wang’s 
government, while the attitude of the Allied forces (except for the US State Secretary, 
Cordell Hull, who immediately supported Chiang’s government on 30 March503) was 
ambiguous to begin with. Britain made clear its support for Chiang only almost two 
months later, on 10 May 1940.
504
 A British diplomat commented, ‘Let us see how much 
genuine Chinese support her new regime in China can command before we take an 
attitude towards it.’505 
 
It seems that from the start, the emergence of Wang’s government seriously undermined 
the legitimacy of Chiang’s government, both internationally and domestically. There 
                                                 
502
 Ting-Yi Guo, Chronology of the Republic of China Vol. 4 (Zhonghua Minguo Shi Shi Ri Zhi)(Taipei: 
Department of Contemporary History, Academia Sinica, 1979), 132. 
503
 Ibid. 
504
 Ibid., 134.  
505
 Fairbank and Feuerwerker, The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 13, 526. 
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was a genuine anxiety in Chongqing as it tried to reaffirm its diplomatic relationships 
with the major Allies. 
 
July 1940 (decrease in demand by 21.99%) – Battle of Zaoyang-Yichang and 
closure of the Burma Road 
The outbreak of the Second World War and the German advance in Europe stimulated 
the Japanese military progress in Asia. In early 1940, Japanese troops launched a new 
wave of military offensives aiming to annihilate the Nationalist Government and ending 
the warfare in China, so that Japan could concentrate its troops in Southeast Asia. 
 
Japan decided that the quickest way was to capture Chongqing and force China to 
surrender. For this purpose, the Japanese launched the Zaoyang-Yichang Campaign in 
May. Yichang is a strategically critical town in western Hubei; and, after capturing it, 
the Japanese troops could move directly up the Yangtze River to Chongqing. The 
Nationalist Government employed its best troops to defend Yichang, but Japanese 
troops finally took it on 18 June 1940. Luckily the Chinese army, under the command of 
Li Zongren, encircled the Japanese troops in Yichang so that they could not press their 
attack on to Chongqing.
506
 However, this battle depleted the best troops in the 5
th
 War 
Area. 
 
After the Chinese strategic victory (albeit at huge cost) in the Battle of Zaoyang-
Yichang, Japan did not abandon its original plan of finishing Chongqing quickly. The 
Japanese troops succeeded in occupying the area to the north and west of Hubei, a vast 
area producing agricultural produce for Free China. At the same time, the Japanese 
troops used Yichang as an airbase and started air raids on Chongqing.
507
 At the same 
time, Japan exerted diplomatic pressure on France and Britain, urging them to cut off 
the trade route from Southeast Asia to Free China. The Vichy Government of France 
sealed the route from Vietnam to Yunnan in late June. Britain also signed an agreement 
with Japan to close the Burma Road (from Burma to Yunnan) for three months from 
18
th
 July 1940. 
 
                                                 
506
 Long-Hsuen Hsu and Ming-Kai Chang, History of the Sino-Japanese War (1938-1945) (Taipei: Chung 
Wu Publishing Co., 1972), 334-9. 
507
 Chongqing was bombed on 5, 16, 22, 31 July. The University of Chongqing and the Central University 
were also bombarded. Guo, Chronology of the Republic of China, 137-38.  
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This was the most difficult time for the Nationalist Government since the start of the 
war. Although the war around Chongqing moved into a stalemate, with intensified siege 
conditions (from the cutting of foreign aid from Vietnam and Burma to China) and 
constant bombardment, Chongqing would have been captured, had there not been 
incidents elsewhere. The incidents include the Hundred Regiments Offensive, which 
diverted Japanese attention from Free China to the North Jiangsu area. 
 
May 1943 (decrease in demand by 12.65%) – Battle of West Hubei 
In 1943, with the adverse situation in the Pacific theatre, Japan turned its attention back 
to China. The scale of the Battle of Hubei (early May-mid June 1943) was not 
particularly large,
508
 but once again the aim was to invade Chongqing and destroy 
Chinese morale. The condition of the campaign was once again acute in late May. This 
situation was ended by a major Chinese victory in June. 
 
July 1944: (increase in demand by 11.56%) – turn of the tide in the European and 
Pacific theatres 
Several critical events occurred in this period. First, with the deterioration of the Pacific 
theatre, the Japanese troops launched Operation Ichi-Go in 1944. This operation 
consisted of a series of battles in North China (Henan), Central China (Hunan) and 
South China (Guangxi), aiming to unify three Japanese military bases and capture US 
airbases in South China, to secure a route for its military supplies in Southeast Asia and 
thus support the Japanese defences against the US in the Pacific.
509
 It was the largest 
offensive since the Battle of Wuhan in 1938. After a series of devastating struggles from 
April to December, the Japanese marked a decisive victory. 
 
However, Chinese people seemed not to be too dispirited. For one thing, despite their 
victory, the Japanese troops were not numerous enough to maintain an effective 
occupation and therefore later withdrew from many occupied territories. Another (and 
much more important) factor was that the tide in European and the Pacific theatres had 
completely turned by the summer of 1944. 
 
                                                 
508
 Hsu and Chang, History of the Sino-Japanese War, 390-5.  
509
 Ibid., 416-33.  
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In the European theatre, the Allied forces had gained remarkable momentum since the 
spring of 1944. On 6 June (D-Day), the Allied forces invaded Normandy in Northern 
France and the German units in France were soon defeated. On the other side of the 
European battlefield, the Soviet Union also launched strategic offensives in Belarus, 
Western Ukraine and Eastern Poland. At the time, people expected optimistically that 
the war would be over by the end of 1944. 
 
In the Pacific theatre, the US won two decisive battles in June: the Battle of Saipan and 
the Battle of the Philippine Sea. These two Japanese defeats pushed the Japanese Prime 
Minister, Hideki Tōjō, to resign. In particular, after the victory of Saipan in early July, 
the US removed its air forces from the bases in China (which had been destroyed by 
Japan) to Saipan and carried out intensive heavy bomber attacks on the Japanese home 
islands. 
 
September 1945 (increase in demand by 48.38%) – Japanese surrender and the 
end of the war 
At the beginning of 1945, Japanese troops launched another wave of offensives (in west 
Hunan, north Hubei and west Henan) as its last desperate attempt to crush China. But 
the offensives were quickly rolled back by the Chinese counteroffensive. The Chinese 
forces recovered the three provinces. 
 
The German surrender in May 1945 was a blow to the Japanese. In June, US forces 
came nearer Japan and took Iwo Jima, Okinawa, by the end of the month. In August, the 
US dropped two atomic bombs on metropolitan Japan. The Soviet Union also invaded 
Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula. The Pacific War ended on 15 August 1945 
(Victory over Japan Day). The formal Instrument of Surrender was signed on 2 
September on a US battleship in Tokyo Bay. The Instrument of Surrender to China was 
signed in Nanjing on 9 September 1945. The Chinese territories which had been 
occupied by the Japanese, including Manchuria and Taiwan, were returned to China. 
The Sino-Japanese War formally ended. 
 
3.4.1.2 Blips 
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November 1939 (decrease in demand by 8.90%) – Reaction to developments in 
Europe 
No single particular event could be found (either domestically or internationally) for 
this blip. This blip may have been induced by the news from the European front, which 
took the people in Free China a longer time to realise the severity of the situation. 
 
January 1941 (increase in demand by 17.01%) – Hundred Regiments Offensive 
This increase in money demand accompanied the Chinese victory in the Hundred 
Regiments Offensive. This offensive was led by the Communist divisions of the 
Nationalist Army in Japanese-occupied North China. This offensive was more like a 
guerrilla war, and did not acquire much importance in terms of how many cities or 
towns the Communist army recovered. However, it was a critical event that to some 
extent raised the siege of Chongqing. The Battle of Zaoyang-Yichang resulted in a 
stalemate. Large numbers of Japanese troops were stationed in the city of Yichang and 
in Hubei province. The Hundred Regiments Offensive diverted Japanese attention from 
Hubei back to its occupied territory in North China. China’s capital, Chongqing, was 
therefore temporarily safe from immediate Japanese threat. 
 
August 1941 (increase in demand by 10.88%) – US oil embargo on Japan 
With the stalemate in China, Japan turned its attention to Indochina and Vietnam. 
Although one of the reasons for the Japanese expedition in Southeast Asia was to seal 
Free China’s trade route, the deployment of major Japanese forces to outside China was 
nevertheless good news for the war-torn Chongqing government. The Japanese quickly 
occupied Saigon and South Vietnam. The Japanese aggression in Southeast Asia 
harmed the Western powers’ interests. The United States, United Kingdom and other 
Western powers reacted with a freeze on Japanese assets. On 1
st
 August 1941, the 
United States announced an oil embargo against all ‘aggressors’.510 Since U.S. supplied 
more than 80% of Japan’s oil, this policy was widely perceived as a declaration of war 
on Japan, and thus greatly raised people’s morale in Free China. 
 
 
 
                                                 
510
 "World War Ii Timeline,"  in World War II Database. 
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3.4.2 Occupied China (Shanghai series) 
As noted above, the case of the puppet Nanjing Regime is a little complicated: fabi was 
the major currency in circulation even after the occupation of the area in late 1937. The 
CRB notes appeared in the market in January 1941 and began to be issued in large 
quantities only by the latter part of 1941. From January 1941 to June 1942, fabi and 
CRB notes co-circulated in Shanghai. After June 1942, fabi ceased to circulate and CRB 
notes became the only dominant money in the market. 
 
The structural analysis considers both demand series lnDsh1 and lnDsh2 (by using fabi 
and CRB notes as denominators respectively) as investigated in their full lengths. 
However, since the fabi was replaced by CRB notes after June 1942, the structural 
breaks of lnDsh1 which occur after June 1942 are not discussed. Likewise, the structural 
breaks of lnDsh2 which occur before June 1941 are not explored (we simply assume that 
after six months of circulation, the CRB notes in the market became as least as 
important as the fabi). 
 
3.4.2.1 Breaks 
 
August 1939 (decrease in demand of fabi by 7.77%) – Pre-WWII events 
In Shanghai the turning points of real money demand emerged a month before the start 
of the European War. Although the European War formally broke out on 1
st 
September 
1939, the pre-war developments in early 1939 were intense: in March Germany annexed 
Austria and in August it occupied the whole of Slovakia. A series of European events 
would have made people expect that important events were going to happen sooner or 
later and that, with these events, global attention and international aid to China would 
be reduced. China’s chance of winning therefore seemed dimmer. 
 
Domestically, the condition of the financial market in Shanghai was shaky at the time, 
perhaps not least because of the military developments in Europe. As noted above, at 
this time the foreign exchange market was still maintained in the International 
Settlement of Shanghai, and the Sino-British Stabilisation Fund was founded in March 
1939 to maintain the official exchange rates of fabi. However, the fund was quickly 
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depleted. Foreign exchange controls were imposed on 18 July and on the same day the 
exchange rate of the fabi on the black market jumped. The market instability in 
Shanghai even attracted Chiang’s attention, and on 30 July he contacted the US 
government, requesting American aid to stabilise the market.
511
 
 
December 1939 (decrease in demand of fabi by 9.08%) – news from Japanese 
Government 
No particular events took place in China, except for the Battle of South Guangxi (mid 
November 1939-late February 1940). The increase in real money demand was more 
likely to be caused by the unstable financial market in Shanghai, as well as by 
international news. In late November, Nobuyuki Abe, the newly elected Japanese Prime 
Minister, acknowledged that the ‘China Incident’ was too complicated and could only 
be resolved in five to ten years. As Shanghai was already under Japanese control, news 
from Japan and about the Japanese Prime Minister’s speech should have easy to know 
about.
512
 Abe’s speech was probably perceived as a signal that the Japanese control of 
Shanghai would not be temporary, and that in the long run, the holding of fabi would 
not be secure. 
 
December 1941 (increase in demand of puppet notes by 19.40%) – Pearl Harbour 
Attack 
Estimations of lnDsh2 (the demand series with puppet note as the denominator) shows a 
significant decrease. It seems that the outbreak of the Pacific War strengthened people’s 
belief that the Japanese control over Shanghai (and China) would be long, and therefore 
it would be wise to hold notes issued by the Central Reserve Bank (never to be confused 
with the ‘Central Bank of China’, which is the real Central Bank of the Nationalist 
Government). This consideration seems to be confirmed by subsequent actions by the 
Japanese. After the Pearl Harbour Attack on 8 December 1941, the Japanese troops 
gradually took control of the international settlements and concessions in Shanghai. 
 
June 1942 (increase in demand of puppet notes by 24.34%) – abolition of fabi 
In the months following the Pearl Harbour Attack, Japan quickened the pace of its 
invasion both the Pacific and Southeast Asia. In a short time the Japanese Army swept 
                                                 
511
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512
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through large areas. For a time it appeared that the Japanese ‘Pan-Asia economic zone’ 
slogan was going to be realised soon. In Shanghai, the Japanese troops also finalized 
their monetary move by setting 25 June 1942 as the final date for the ‘abolition of fabi’. 
The approach of this deadline for fabi suddenly caused puppet notes to be favoured in 
the market. 
 
March 1943 (increase in demand of puppet notes by 17.64%) – handover of foreign 
concessions to the puppet regime in Nanjing 
For China, Pearl Harbour had its own positive impact: it finally drew the United States 
into the war. The United States recognized the importance of China in holding back 
Japan’s major military strength. The last thing that the United States wanted to see in 
China was a rapprochement between Japan and the Chongqing government, in which 
case, Japan could deploy its full strength in the Pacific theatre while at the same time 
benefiting from China’s abundant resources. The United States, therefore, became the 
main source of foreign aid starting from 1942. The Nationalist Government was no 
longer fighting the war alone and China was again back to the world stage. In October 
1942, both the United States and Britain relinquished their rights of extra-territoriality in 
China, and new treaties were signed in January 1943.
513
 
 
In response to this diplomatic move, and in order to build up a ‘legitimate’ image of 
Wang’s puppet regime, Japan and the puppet government in Nanjing signed the joint 
declaration which stated that Japan was going to return its foreign concession to the 
Chinese government in Nanjing (in January 1943).
514
 In late February, the Vichy 
Government in France declared that it would hand over the sovereignty of its foreign 
concessions to the puppet Chinese government in Nanjing. In March, Hideki Tōjō took 
the time to fly from Tokyo to Nanjing to sign the agreement for returning Japanese 
concessions.
515
 Thereafter, the puppet government in Nanjing assumed the exercise of 
sovereignty over the French and Japanese concessions in Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin. 
These diplomatic measures seemed to strengthen the position of Wang’s puppet regime 
and its puppet notes. However, people’s confidence in the puppet regime (or rather in 
Japan) was not to last long. 
                                                 
513
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October 1944 (decrease in demand of puppet notes by 20.38%) – turn of the tide 
Since the summer of 1944, the tide of the war had turned against the Axis countries. In 
the European theatre after the D-Day in June, the Allied troops entered Belgium and 
liberated Brussels and Antwerp in September. Luxembourg was also liberated and 
France was cut in half. On the other side of the theatre, Soviet Union entered 
Yugoslavia. 
 
In the Pacific theatre, the Allied forces also made significant progress (the Battle of 
Saipan in June enabled the U.S army to bombard Japan proper). People’s confidence in 
the existence of the puppet regime in Nanjing (and therefore in the puppet money) was 
already shaken in June 1944 (reflected as a blip in the series). 
 
A heavy blow for Japan in October was defeat in the Battle of Leyte Gulf (23-26 
October). This is the second battle of the Philippine Sea, and is generally considered to 
be the largest naval battle of World War II. The Imperial Japanese Navy suffered its 
greatest loss of ships and crew in this battle. Within the same month, the US air forces 
also attacked the Ryukyu Islands and Taiwan.
516
 
 
In China, the Japanese Army launched the Operation Ichi-Go, during which Japan drew 
in its best troops and a lot of resources. Since Japan had implemented a policy of 
‘sustaining the war by war itself’, resources to finance the war were extracted from the 
occupied areas, and the economic strain could be easily felt in the market. Meanwhile 
on 14 October, the Japanese Prime Minister, Fumimaro Konoe, sent his delegate to 
Shanghai in the hope of negotiating a ceasefire with the Nationalist Government. The 
negotiation reached no agreement. However, news of this talk should have rather 
disturbed Shanghai market. 
 
December 1944 (decrease in demand of puppet notes by 34.28%) 
By the end of the year 1944, the tide of the war was clear irreversible. In Europe, the 
Allies launched their winter invasion. In the Pacific, having lost the Philippines 
Campaign, the Japanese moved the Japanese South Army headquarters from Manila to 
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Saigon in Vietnam. In Southeast Asia, however, things were not going on well for Japan 
either. The Allied South East Asia Command also launched offensives in Japanese-
occupied Burma. Besides, US forces carried out a series of bombing raids on Japan and 
Nanjing, the seat of Wang’s puppet government.517 
 
On 23 November, Wedemeyer, the newly appointed U.S. Chief Commander in South 
East Asia, told journalists that his military campaign plan was already approved by 
Chiang and that he was confident in defeating the Japanese troops in China. The impact 
of the news in the occupied area was huge.
518
 
 
3.4.2.2 Selected blips 
 
February 1942 (decrease in demand of fabi by 13.33%) – News from Japanese 
government 
The months between the Pearl Harbour and the summer of 1942 were the heyday of the 
Japanese Imperial Army. Japanese troops made rapid advances in both the Pacific and 
Southeast Asia. By February 1942, Japan had already conquered Hong Kong, Macao, 
Singapore, Manila, and Java. On 16 February, the Japanese Prime Minister, Hideki Tōjō 
(the one who launched the Pearl Harbour Attack), claimed that Japan ‘was going to 
liberate the whole Asia’.519 
 
June 1944 (decrease in demand of puppet notes by 16.00%) – D-Day, Battle of 
Saipan 
The inflation rate reached 50.46% monthly. On 6 June 1944 (the D-Day), Western 
Allies landed in France, and had reached Germany by September. Also in June, the US 
Army won decisive victory in the Battle of Saipan and the Battle of Philippines, and the 
Japanese navy was driven back to the islands of Japan.
520
 
 
                                                 
517
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June 1945 (decrease in demand of puppet notes by 33.67%) – The Japanese 
Surrender 
Germany surrendered on 7 May. In June the Battle of Okinawa ended in a decisive US 
victory. The US Army started bombing Japanese cities and cut off Japanese imports. In 
Shanghai, inflation reached 301.96% in June. In August 1945, the US military dropped 
two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Soviet Union kept its promise 
made at Yalta and invaded the Japanese-held Manchuria. In Shanghai the price level 
rose by 106.29% in this month. The Japanese surrendered on 15 August (V-J Day). 
People in China had already expected this event as early as June, and the exact date was 
just a matter of a little more time. Compared with eight years of severe battle and heavy 
losses, two more months is nothing, really, nothing. 
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3.4.3 Discussion 
From Table 3-1 we can see that in Chongqing, events that had a long-term impact in the 
demand trend are the establishment of the Puppet government in Nanjing, the Battle of 
Zaoyang-Yichang, the Battle of West Hubei, D-Day (when the tide of the European 
battlefield is reversed) and the Japanese surrender. Most of the breaks are events that 
directly endangered the very existence of the Nationalist Government, either militarily 
or diplomatically. Events such as the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe and 
the Pearl Harbour Attack were not that significant in the eyes of the people at that time. 
 
Events that had caused breaks in the Shanghai series are all related to one concern: 
whether the Japanese rule in the occupied areas would be permanent, (would the 
progress of the Japanese military operation in the Pacific continue). For example: in 
September the European War broke out; in December 1939, no particular events took 
place in terms of the progress of the war. However, in November 1939, the newly 
elected Japanese Prime Minister acknowledged that the ‘China Incident’ was too 
complicated and could only be resolved in five to ten years. All these news seems to 
suggest that the Japanese rule in China would be long term, and these news would cause 
panic among fabi holders. 
 
One striking feature of the table is the apparent diversity of interest among the money 
holders of the two cities. Nevertheless, three events caused statistically significant 
reactions in both cities (though sometimes caused real money demand movements in 
opposite directions): the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe, D-Day and the 
Battle of Saipan, and finally the surrender of Germany and Japan. All these three cases 
are important international events during the Second World War. It could probably be 
inferred that the people’s expectations of the Sino-Japanese War largely depended on 
the development of the war in other parts of the world. 
 
Besides, in all three cases, reactions in the Shanghai series preceded those of the 
Chongqing series. The Shanghai market seemed to react (and sometimes anticipated) 
more quickly to international news than Chongqing did, and therefore the problem of 
asymmetric information probably existed. 
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3.5 Concluding remarks 
 
The result of the study sheds light on three major issues. First, military, political and 
economic events have significant impact on the behaviour of money holders. When a 
piece of news came that was generally perceived as unfavourable to a regime (for 
example, the defeat of its army in a major battle, or a disruption of diplomatic relations 
with foreign countries), the credibility of the government would be undermined. People 
who held the money issued by this particular regime would then adjust their money 
holdings: if the regime kept losing in the war, money holders would prefer to spend the 
money as quickly as possible, or to exchange the money for other ‘harder’ currencies. 
These behaviours would increase the real demand of this particular currency. On the 
other hand, when the regime defeated its enemies and gained international support, 
money issued by this regime would be regarded as ‘safe’, and the demand would fall. 
The series on money demand can therefore also be used to detect historical events. In 
the Chinese context, it probably works better than conventional indicators like bond 
price or asset price (in foreign exchange market) in China. 
 
Second, the findings suggest a problem of asymmetrical information across different 
monetary regimes during the war. It also reveals a divergence of interests and priorities 
between Free China and the Japanese-occupied China. Before the attack on Pearl 
Harbour in December 1941, the inflationary processes in Shanghai and Chongqing 
presented a similar pattern. After 1941, people in Free China were affected by domestic 
news (especially news that impinged upon the existence of the Nationalist Government). 
In Shanghai, however, people’s expectation was more tied up with the Japanese military 
advance, especially in the Pacific theatre. 
 
Finally, the paper seeks to determine how the wartime events also triggered inflation by 
influencing the note issue (although the paper does not claim the magnitude of events 
would overrun that of note issue). The study of the real demand series shows that 
people’s expectation and money-holding behaviour, as expressed in the real demand, 
are closely linked with the development of war both at home and abroad. It seems to 
suggest that besides the problem of runaway note issue, the progress of the war also had 
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a great impact in the progress of velocity of circulation (almost the reverse of real 
money demand) and therefore on the wartime inflation. 
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3.6 Appendices 
 
Map 3-1 Map of China – Japanese advances and occupation 
 
Source: The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 13, p. 549. 
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Appendix A 3-4 F-tests for structural breaks in real money demand (LnMfabi - 
LnPck): Chongqing, January 1939-October 1947 
 
 
 
Appendix A 3-5 F-tests for structural breaks in real money demand (LnMfabi – 
LnPsh): Shanghai, January 1939-October 1947 
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Appendix A 3-6 F-tests for structural breaks in real money demand (LnMCRB - 
LnPsh): Shanghai, January 1941-August 1945 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 3-7 Wald-test estimation results on 8 candidate windows, Chongqing 
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Appendix A 3-8 Wald-test estimation results for 6 candidate windows, Shanghai 
(LnDsh1) 
 
 
Appendix A 3-9 Wald-test estimation results on 7 candidate windows, Shanghai 
(LnDsh2) 
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Appendix B 3-1 Breaks and blips in real money demand in Chongqing 
Date 
(1) 
Beta 
(2) 
Lamda 
(3) 
F-statistics 
(4) 
Prob>F 
(5) 
ST % 
change 
(6) 
LT % 
change 
(7) 
Apr-40 0.9024 -0.1725 28.61 0.0000 -15.85 -17.25 
Jul-40 0.8306 -0.2484 26.24 0.0000 -21.99 -24.84 
May-43 0.7897 -0.1352 7.74 0.0079 -12.65 -13.52 
Jul-44 1.0208 0.1094 8.79 0.0048 11.56 10.94 
Sep-45 0.7183 0.3946 25.75 0.0000 48.38 39.46 
blips 
Nov-39 0.9908 -0.0932 14.63 0.0004 -8.90 -9.32 
Jan-41 1.0950 0.1571 4.92 0.0317 17.01 15.71 
Aug-41 1.0428 0.1032 5.94 0.0188 10.88 10.32 
 
 
Appendix B 3-2 Breaks and blips in real money demand in Shanghai (M= note 
issue of fabi) 
Date 
(1) 
Beta 
(2) 
Lamda 
(3) 
F-statistics 
(4) 
Prob>F 
(5) 
ST % 
change 
(6) 
LT % 
change 
(7) 
Aug-39 0.7476 -0.0808 10.27 0.0025 -7.77 -27.41 
Dec-39 0.7282 -0.0952 7.91 0.0073 -9.08 -29.55 
Nov-42 0.8392 -0.1430 6.13 0.0171 -13.33 -58.90 
Jul-43 0.9326 -0.1458 3.93 0.0535 -13.57 -88.51 
Sep-45 0.5703 -0.9145 12.51 0.0010 -59.93 -88.09 
blips 
Sep-40 0.8153 -0.0710 4.93 0.0315 -6.85 -31.91 
Oct-41 0.8415 -0.1143 4.86 0.0326 -10.80 -51.38 
Feb-42 0.8151 -0.1309 5.11 0.0286 -12.27 -50.74 
Dec-43 0.9583 -0.1296 2.98 0.0913 -12.16 -95.53 
Jun-48 0.7020 -0.4683 1.57 0.2167 -37.40 -79.23 
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Appendix B 3-3 Breaks and blips in real money demand in Shanghai 
(M= note issue of Central Reserve Bank) 
Date 
(1) 
Beta 
(2) 
Lamda 
(3) 
F-statistics 
(4) 
Prob>F 
(5) 
ST % 
change 
(6) 
LT % 
change 
(7) 
Dec-41 0.8886 0.1773 3.71 0.0692 19.40 391.04 
Jun-42 0.8383 0.2179 3.65 0.0697 24.34 284.56 
Mar-43 0.5467 0.1624 3.41 0.0789 17.64 43.09 
Oct-44 0.6234 -0.2279 6.63 0.0176 -20.38 -45.39 
Dec-44 0.3456 -0.4198 7.51 0.0134 -34.28 -47.35 
blips 
Jul-41 1.0592 -0.1431 1.06 0.3199 -13.33 1022.21 
Aug-41 1.0623 -0.1412 1.10 0.3131 -13.17 863.66 
Apr-41 0.9521 0.0859 0.62 0.4392 8.97 501.74 
Sep-42 0.7219 0.1434 1.02 0.3233 15.42 67.48 
Jul-43 0.8546 -0.0938 1.64 0.2144 -8.95 -47.53 
Feb-44 0.5898 -0.1657 5.54 0.0284 -15.27 -33.23 
Jun-44 0.6614 -0.1744 1.49 0.2379 -16.00 -40.26 
Jun-45 0.5343 -0.4105 5.04 0.0376 -33.67 -58.58 
 
Notes: Column (1) shows the break (or blip) point dates determined by the algorithm described in section 
3.4.2. Column (2) is the coefficient β1 calculated by equation (11). Column (3) γ is the change in the 
conditional mean. Column (4) is the F-statistics that shows the probability of a break at the specific date 
(the higher the F-statistic the higher the possibility of a break). Column (5) is the significance of the break. 
Column (6) is the percentage change in demand, based on equation (13). Column (7) is the long-run 
percentage change in demand, based on equation (14); this column is only indicative when the series does 
not contain a unit root (i.e., only works when β<1). 
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Thesis Conclusion 
 
The first main chapter examines the monetary policies during the reign of Xianfeng 
(1851-61) and offers a new explanation for the mechanism behind the Xianfeng 
inflation (1853-61) in early modern China. By reconstructing systematic historical data 
on government income and expenditure, the amount of money created as well as the 
annual money stock in Beijing, the chapter shows that the monetary policies introduced 
in this reign did not cover the military outlay. The government paper notes were used in 
government salary payments but they could barely buy anything. In fact the monetary 
policies during this period only temporarily relieved the fiscal crisis of the central 
government, and their function was more of a fiscal nature. The inflation was caused by 
the plethora of debased coins and by the official banknotes issued to exchange for 
government paper notes. With the debasement of the coinage, price levels rose and the 
unit of account depreciated. Since banknotes were linked to the copper cash (and later 
to big cash), their purchasing power depreciated as well. Official banknotes were over-
issued and had no proper backing. Serious inflation occurred in 1860 and 1861, not due 
to any further creation of money by the government, but due to runs on real metal 
against banknotes.  
 
Monetary policies were never been more active during the entire Qing dynasty than in 
this particular period. A run of money creation ensued, consisting of both traditional 
methods (debasement) and modern elements (paper money and banknotes). However, 
with the limited monetary knowledge among officials and even more limited resources, 
the monetary policies of Xianfeng’s reign were ill designed and far from a monetary 
reform. Predictably, these policies, which were imperfectly implemented in different 
regions, prompted a gradual collapse of the traditional monetary system; nonetheless, 
they set in motion monetary regionalisation, and incidentally accelerated the monetary 
evolution.   
 
The second main chapter identifies the problem of the shortage of small money in China 
which is common in a bimetallic monetary system. In the late 19
th 
 century, the shortage 
of copper cash aggravated the fall in the price of silver and therefore provoked a 
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permanent change in the silver/copper price ratio in the commodity market. With 
difference-in-differences estimations on regional grain price changes, the chapter 
demonstrates how the introduction of new coinage minted using steam technology 
helped to ease rural monetary stringency without necessarily generating inflation, and 
thereby encouraged output and trade. It also shows that the province-initiated monetary 
reform was a progressive measure, contrary to the conventional judgement that regional 
mints were purely profit driven and only added to the monetary chaos. The population 
started to accept copper coins as token money. This development prepared for the 
evolution of the monetary system from a bimetallic standard to a silver standard (during 
Republican China) in which copper coins became subsidiary currency to the silver 
dollar. The research therefore echoes theories on commodity money which claim that 
coins with smaller denomination are better accepted as token coins in order to prevent a 
chronic shortage of them, and that steam technology ensured the provision of token 
coins without opening the door to private counterfeiting. 
 
The third main chapter studies the behaviour of fiat money holders during the war. 
During this period, paper currency became the only commonly used money in the 
market and, when the war started, governments (legitimate or puppet) all rushed to 
speed up their printing presses so as to increase the revenues from seignorage. The 
chapter applies structural break tests on time series of the real demand of money in 
different monetary regions to see what, given a choice, makes them hold a currency and 
what makes them renounce it. It identifies the timing of the breaks with historical events 
and shows that in wartime, the soundness of the fiat currencies lies in the survival of the 
governments that issue them. 
 
This thesis traces the odyssey of the monetary evolution in China, which occupied a 
span of almost a century (from the 1850s to the 1940s); and the three main chapters 
examine three episodes from three different angles. The evolution started from a 
commodity money system, in which the state had very limited control over the money 
supply, and advanced to a fiat money system by which the government was able to 
carry out an inflationary monetary policy which sustained arduous warfare for eight 
years. Throughout history, the monetary authority has struggled between its fiscal needs 
and the obligation to provide a sound means of exchange. Along with the collapse of the 
old regime and the gradual building of the modern state, the credibility of money 
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migrated from its intrinsic value to the endorsement of modern technology, and 
eventually to the state as a monetary institution. During wartime, however, a fiat money 
system is understandably subject to state manipulation, and the soundness of the money 
depends on the life or death of the state.  
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